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This dissertation examines how the change in the international economy away
from manufacturing to finance has affected African development. The dominance of
financial liberalization is obvious to most observers; however, discourse on the
development of African economies since 1980 generally focuses on the primary lending
institutions (the IMF and World Bank). This dissertation is really an attempt to create a
narrative about the rejection of alternative forms of development and subsequent
implementation of rieoliberal policies. African countries rushing pell-mell to privatize,
democratize, and implement all things neoliberal, crystallizes the sterile nature of
alternatives to financial liberalization. Much of the discussion surrounding strategies for
development remain grounded in previous notions of how countries develop, the stages
of development, and generally how countries can develop their infrastructure. While all
of these have salience, it does not quite capture the essence of how the world has been
transformed. It is no longer possible or sensible to discuss African development without
understanding the role of international finance capital. Development cannot simply be
understood by bargaining with foreign companies and attracting FDI. To be sure, that is
not the only aspect of development but one that was heavily emphasized just fifteen to
twenty years ago. The present global economic recession provides a perfect example of
how important international finance capital, in this case derivatives, are so important to
the international economy. Now we must understand derivatives and how this financial
tool became so dominant in the international market economy.
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But who can now use the words of socialism with a straight
face? . . . Now it is a sick joke . . . There are still radical
leftists out there, who stubbornly claim that true socialism
has not yet been tried; and there are still moderate leftists,
who claim with more justification that one can reject
Marxist-Leninism without necessarily becoming a disciple
of Milton Friedman. But the truth is that the heart has gone
out of the opposition to capitalism.
-Paul Krugman, The Return ofDepression Economics
All social scientists are obliged to develop and sharpen one basic necessity: the
ability to separate rhetoric from reality. This ability depends on the researchers’ ability to
flesh out ideological arguments advanced as empirical truths. Indeed, as many would
now agree, all social science is value-laden and this is particularly clear in the field of
political science. More to the point, discussion concerning the nature of development,
globalization, and democracy is loaded with ideological propaganda from the left and
right. This is particularly evident when analyzing the struggle over ideology (particularly
over the last fifty years) that continues to dominate analysis of African development and
the impact of International Finance Capital (IFC) on African countries. Although this
struggle has tended to center on a critique of the structural adjustment policies of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (IBRD), an analysis of the
1
2
influence of International Finance Capital is an attempt to understand the relationship that
determines the rationale for these aforementioned funding institutions.
The current financial crisis that envelops the globe is a perfect example how
significant International Finance Capital has become. The usual suspects, the IMF and
World Bank, have not been mentioned as a variable in the most recent global recession.
A salient fact that was unthinkable only five to ten years ago. This current crisis requires
an understanding of abstract financial instruments such as financial derivatives, most
notably credit default swaps. There is no mention of structural adjustment programs and
the like. Although there is a shared culture that both derive from: A culture that
privileged deregulation and unfettered capitalism over transparency and accountability.
Millions of Americans had to take a crash course in financial derivatives and learn what
forward and backward options were. It is in this context that people came face to face
with the reality that seemingly abstract financial instruments affect the lives of billions in
a very concrete manner. In fact, it illustrates the central concern — or what should be the
central concern for political scientists.
An inquiry into International Finance Capital cuts to the core of what political
scientists presumably are and should be concerned with - power. Political scientists
should at a minimum understand one of the more basic political realities - politics is a
struggle for power and is unwaveringly linked to economic interests. This recognition
provides the context for exploring such basic questions as: Who benefits? What is the
nature of a particular relationship? What are the historical factors that shaped this present
reality? By extension, it should strike one as logical that questions of this sort are always
timely and indispensable, particularly when the topic is development. These questions
presumably have nothing to do, or should have nothing to do, with feasibility or
timeliness. In addition to the time-honored search for relevance, our concern
as political scientists should be to unveil the nature of power dynamics, outlining the
nexus of this relationship and prescribing a clear alternative re1ationship.
Rationale
The assumption embraced in this work is that, in view of Africa’s position in the
global economy, it is unsound to think that a clear and precise understanding of African
politics can be accomplished by a non-critical analysis of the ascendance to free-market
economics and capitalism. It was only roughly thirty years ago that African countries,
through the Organization of African Unity (OAU), had codified a radical agenda in the
form of the Lagos Plan of Action, which unapologetically asserted their collective desire
for self-reliance and breaking the bonds of old dependent relationships. Yet that moment
in African history seems more than thirty years old since the Lagos Plan of Action could
not come from the present geopolitical environment. Post-1980 African politics
represents a decisive break from the language of dependency and an embracing (albeit
suspiciously) of Neoliberalism.
For this reason, concern over Africa’s continuing struggle in the international
economy must develop outside the neoliberal box — a box that constrains political science
research and real-world policy. The outgrowth of departing from the neoliberal
I Hans Morgenthau, “The Purpose of Political Science,” in A Design for Political Science: Scope,
Objectives, and Methods. editor, James Charlesworth (1966). This is what Hans Morgenthau had in mind
in his essay “The Purpose of Political Science.” Morgenthau outlined the challenges for political scientists
that were committed to the core function of the discipline: telling the truth about power relationships.
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framework as a point of departure is that the mainstream ideological retreat to the notion
of capitalism as the “only game in town” and There Is No Alternative (T.I.N.A) limits
analyses of Africa and its relationship to the international economy.2 If we indeed accept
the notion that capitalism represents the “end of history”, then the best we can hope for is
piecemeal reform through moral suasion. The advocacy for revolutionary transformation
then becomes the domain of zealots or — what may soon become a part of our language —
Marxist fundamentalists. With the above in mind, it becomes important, indeed critical,
to understand the present international political and economic landscape from a historical
perspective. The contemporary international economy is a result of the continuous drive
for liberalization by international funding institutions, financial interests, and the leading
techno-industrialized nations. Correspondingly, in the Post -Cold War era, the landscape
of this global economy is decisively supported by free-market principles. While it may
be a narrow ideological position to state, as Fukuyama has, that “there is no alternative”
(which clearly buttresses the free-marketers), the fact is that the political and economic
leadership in Africa has resoundingly accepted this notion. To many in and outside of
Africa, concerned about Africa or not, socialism is regarded as a failed project, and those
that claim the Soviet Union never really applied the Marxist interpretation of history, are
viewed by non-Marxists as archaic remnants from the Cold War era. What this clearly
means is that a work of this nature seemingly “spits in the wind.” It goes against the
dominant paradigm that Globalization is not only spreading across the globe but
2 T.I.N.A was popularized by Francis Fukuyama in an article “The End of History” published in
The National Interest (1989). Fukuyarna argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in the
preeminence of democratic capitalist development and signaled the end of ideological conflicts (i.e.
communism lost and died after the Cold War).
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providing the masses of people, heretofore unrecognized opportunities. In addition, the
dominant paradigm is buttressed by the widely accepted belief that African countries are
amongst the poorest in the world largely as a result of their own failures; some of the
leaders are or were kleptocrats; and African countries have all for better or worse
embraced free market principles. Yet we still do not have a proper analysis of the impact
of IFC over the course of the last twenty years, which represent the ascendancy of liberal
democratic capitalism (neo-liberalism). Analyzing this particular period will enable us to
clearly understand the benefits or limitations of this path of development from empirical
evidence and not simply ideological arguments.
Purpose
A cursory review of the history of Africa and the international economy during
the twentieth century indicates both a protracted African struggle for development and
Western European and North American commitment to political and economic
dominance. Grounding the dialogue in a historical context should locate continuities or
dynamic shifts in previous relations between African countries and the international
community. The challenge then for us is to sort out the complex nature of relationships
while articulating political, economic and cultural interests. Our concern with Africa’s
relationship in the international economy must then account for the diversity of African
states’ historical interactions in the international system; the agency of Africans
themselves; the multiplicity of actors; and ultimately any continuities or breaks in
previous relationships. Although much has been written about Africa’s woes ad
nauseam, John S. Saul and Cohn Leys proclaim that “there have so far been few studies
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of the logic of global capitalism as it works its way through the African continent.”3
While that remains the case, a wealth of research has been generated concerning African
development, primarily in the area of political economy.
Historically, theorists in the field of political economy to varying degrees have
analyzed the logic of capitalist development. This is the case with both classical political
economists such as John Locke, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx, John
Maynard Keynes, and Joseph Schumpeter, and with more recent economists such as
Robert Heilbroner, Paul Krugman, Lester Thurow, and William Tabb. While there is
much divergence among these thinkers, one characteristic on which all seem to agree is
that profound challenges to the stability of nations periodically arise within the capitalist
system. Their analyses vary regarding the system’s ability to reassert itself and overcome
periods of stagnation or decline. Notwithstanding the periodic crises, the history of
capitalism has been and continues to be dynamic. Shifts, conflagrations, depressions, and
crises have failed to tear it asunder.
The life force of capitalism has been and continues to be capital. The ability of
states to attract and generate capital investment is a necessity for obtaining wealth and
power. To wield power individuals and nations must be more than consumers. In fact,
one would be correct in the assertion that the most fundamental aspect of the global
economy is the struggle between states to attract and harness capital. Not only does this
illustrate the reality of the contemporary economic order, but also highlights its most
3 John S. Saul and Cohn Leys, “Roape & and the radical Africanist: What next?” Review of
African Political Economy (June 998):
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fundamental problematic. To emphasize the point further, the expansion of capital and
the exalted role capital movements have on the process of globalization, represents the
central problematic for African countries in their struggle to develop.
While some may claim otherwise, and there is sufficient evidence that they do,
the overwhelming focus on the International Funding Institutions (principally the IMF
and World Bank), has been warranted to an extent. This proposal attempts to broaden the
analysis beyond the International Funding Institutions and by extension their structural
adjustment policies. While these international financial regimes are integral to advancing
neoliberal interests, the concept of International Finance Capital suggests a more
fundamental dynamic at play that influences the constraints and challenges facing
African countries. The concept International Finance Capital encompasses international
capital flows in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Portfolio Investment,
derivatives, trade and lending. Our primary objective then is to understand the nature of
this process and its relationship to African development. In this vein, often examined
issues which should be assessed critically, such as structural adjustment and level of
indebtedness, are important to our analysis, but not as the primary point of departure.
These attempts to deconstruct the utility of structural adjustment policies and the
stranglehold that debt has on African development are widespread. Often however, the
critique does not raise more fundamental questions regarding the nature of capitalist free
market development. The type of analysis being referred to here overwhelmingly focuses
on structural adjustment policies, and provides space for advocates of neoliberalism to
reform their language without transforming their praxis. In other words, it does not
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represent analyses of foundational issues but strategic issues. Thus, the language of
structural adjustment, democracy, privatization and development may become more
progressive rhetorically while remaining committed to free market development. This is
illustrated by the World Bank’s development report for 2000, which purported to “step
beyond the debates over the role of governments and markets, recognizing that they need
to complement each other.” The Bank does concede “the experiences of Japan, East
Asia, and China make clear that it is possible for a country to have an interventionist
government and still enjoy extremely rapid economic growth over a period of decades.”4
While not a seismic shift in their thinking, this is a departure from the Berg Report of
1981
.
In essence the Bank has incorporated analyses (most likely unconsciously), of the
following from Kidane Mengisteab in Globalization and Autocentricity in Africa’s
Development in the 21st Century. Mengisteab argues that “A key proposition of the
present study is that an ingenious balance between global integration and autocentricity is
a more promising alternative for Africa’s development in the twenty-first century than is
the now — predominant globalization strategy.”6
Although the Bank uses terms such as “Globalization” and “Localization,” which
4 World Bank 2000, Entering the 21st Century: World Development Report 1999/2000, 2. We
cannot overemphasize the significance of this comment. The World Bank is clearly committed to neo
liberal notions of development. The neo-liberal tradition does not stray far from the classical liberal
5 World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agendafor Action
(Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1981). The Berg Report is shorthand for the above title. The Berg
Report was a part of the liberal strategy, which at that time was resurgent, in advocating export-led
development and increased integration in the international economy for African countries.
6 Kidane Mengisteab, Globalization andAutocentricity in Africa’s Development in the 21st
Century (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1996), 17. The statement by the World Bank Report was that
“this report views the changes that have been set in motion as contributing to — and as manifestations of—
two phenomena: globalization and localization.”
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may on the surface seem progressive to some, it concretely represents no real departure
from their philosophy. Globalization is operationalized by the Bank as integrating
economies into the larger international financial network, whereas localization refers to
greater democratization. While it is interesting that the language has changed,
substantively the Bank initiates nothing new and their strategy is essentially a refurbished
form of their traditional model. Despite the fact that our study seeks to extend beyond the
increasingly common analysis of TFI’s, an effort will be made to elucidate their role in
Africa’s development.
While the African continent contains a diverse collection of nations, which have
been affected to varying degrees by international finance capital, we believe an aggregate
and stratified analysis can produce useful and insightful information on Africa’s
development in the international political economy. Despite the fact that the importance
of International Finance Capital has grown during the last twenty years, particularly in
the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), African countries remain in deleterious
economic and social conditions.
Table 1.1 Net Private Capital Flows
Net Private Capital Flows 1970 1981 1991 2001
Sub-Saharan Africa Na 13.1 2.7 7.9
Source: Data from African Development Indicators 2003 (World Bank, 2003).
Table 1.2 Net Private Portfolio Investments
Net Private Portfolio Investment 1970 1981 1991 1999 2001
Sub.-Saharan Africa 0.1 -0.1 0.7 8.7 -8.8
Source: Data from African Development Indicators 2003 (World Bank, 2003).
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The tables above illustrate the overall increase in capital flows to sub-Saharan
Africa and the volatile and unpredictable nature of International Finance Capital.
Theoretical Framework
According to Chiji Akoma, the “Western intellectual tradition and culture have
been shaped by the encounter with colonialism.”7The theoretical framework used here
accepts Akoma’s position.
Sheldon Wolin argued in his magnum opus, Politics and Vision, that “of all the
restraints upon the political philosopher’s freedom to speculate, none has been so
powerful as the tradition of political philosophy itself. In the act of philosophizing, the
theorist enters into a debate the terms of which have largely been set beforehand.”8
While this characteristic certainly has its benefits, namely continuity of thought and
concepts, it also has drawbacks in that assumptions made about how the world develops
may be carried from one generation to the next. While they may rest on a firm
foundation, these assumptions often are grounded in the explicit or implicit belief in the
superiority of a particular group over other groups. This leads to the construction of a
particular narrative that while including debates within the narrative, the fundamental
assumptions are never broached as being problematic. This potential pitfall hinders
political theories at each end of the spectrum.
One of the more lively debates in political science since the end of World War II
has been over development. A myriad of schools of thought from Keynesians to post-
7 Chiji Akoma, “Black Narratives and Critical Theory: Two Responses,” in MFS Modern Fiction
Studies 48.2 (2002): 461.
8 Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continui4’ and innovation in Western Political Thought
Expanded edition (Princeton University Press, 1994), 21.
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Keynesians, neoclassicists to Marxists have clashed over which theoretical descriptions
and prescriptions are best suited for coming to grips with African development. Western
nations were confronted with the reality that maintenance of their colonies following
WWII was too costly — politically and economically — particularly in light of the
momentum of nationalist movements. Modernization and development theory emerged to
provide the theoretical tools to advance western interests. What emerged from these
theories was not so much a scientific approach to understanding development as it was a
narrative. This particular narrative situated the West as the best example of modernity
and the apex of development. While not explicitly rooted in social Darwinism, implicitly,
the subtext of modernization theory was that non-white societies are inferior to white (i.e.
western European and North American societies). Predictably the narrative of
modernization and development was quickly challenged by another narrative that
purported to provide “agency” to the “Third World.” The opposing narrative represented
by dependency theory, “rejected notion(s] of ‘original’ underdevelopment, ‘traditional’
society, and subsequent ‘stages of growth.’9
Initially, development theory was influential in the “Third World” as many were
willing to accept the need for capital accumulation in order to develop. However, in short
order, Marxist influenced scholars began to challenge those notions as the quote from
Frank above illustrates. Although dependency presented a challenge to modernization it
too represents a particular narrative. Both of the narratives are limited in their value as
theories for understanding development — descriptively and prescriptively.
9 André Gunder Frank, Latin Aijierica: underdevelopment or Revolution: Essays on the
Development of Underdevelopiiient and the Immediate Enemy (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 7.
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Peter Lewis succinctly captures a central aspect of the debate — the myriad
schools of thought aside. Lewis argues that two general schools of thought, neoclassical
and structuralist, “neither.. adequately addresses the question of how governments
develop the capacity to foster economic growth nor looks at the equally urgent issue of
how development coalitions might emerge among state elites and societal groups.”°
Ironically, both sides of the debate view the other as unscientific. The neoclassicists
(roughly encompassing modernization and development theorists) are quick to assess
structuralists (roughly encompassing underdevelopment and dependency theorists) as
dogmatic, unscientific, and “largely defeated by the economic crisis of the third world.”
For their part the structuralists posit arguments that the teleological approach of the
neoclassicists “distracted them from paying close attention to the realities on the ground
in the developing societies.” Additionally, the structuralists pointed to the ethnocentrism
of the neoclassicists, all the while ignoring their own ethnocentrism. André Gunder
Frank, an early and influential adherent of dependency theory, would later reject the
Eurocentrism of both schools of thought.
This dissertation is guided by the understanding that both approaches represent
particular narratives, which though useful are ultimately limited in their scope. This
approach does not dismiss the rich analysis that the neoclassicists and structuralists may
offer. Michael Toolan offers an explanation on narratives:
A narrative is never without contexts which both shape and come to be
10 Peter M. Lewis, “Econo,iic Reform and Political Transition in Africa: The Quest for a Politics
of Development,” World Poli11L. -19. 1 (1 996):93.




shaped by the story that is told and heard. And I have put contexts in the
plural for the obvious but often-neglected reason that the teller and
addressees of the very same narrative may assume quite different grounds
for that tale being told, and may individually deduce rather different
‘points’ from the story, grounds for its tellability, and real-world
consequences. It is because any narrative inevitably has some effect on its
addressees and consequences in the real world (whether or not these
effects and consequences are overt or hidden) that we have to recognize
that narratives are, among other things, a kind of political action.
Narratives in short, carry political and ideological freight.L
In formulating a narrative, context becomes extremely important. There are two
important contexts — of situation and of culture. When we examine the implications of
international finance capital on African development since 1980 two grand narratives are
debated with one formulating a discourse that is market-centric, views Africa’s plight
resulting from corrupt leaders, poor macro and micro-economic politics, and an overall
failure to democratize and liberalize their economies. The other narrative constructs an
alternative that locates the West as the problem, indeed, the central problem, from
colonialism to neocolonialism, and imperialism. In this narrative, African countries have
never been allowed to act as sovereign nations and construct strategies for development
based on their own particular contexts.
While both of these narratives discuss the same phenomenon, the discourse is at
opposite ends of the spectrum. Claude Ake critiqued the neoclassicists (while not using
that term) for their propensity to use concepts that sought to maintain and expand western
hegemony. Ake argued that African and non-western theorists need to develop concepts
that deconstruct and empower African and third world countries.
Because there is a propensity for theories to be overrun by political commitments,
12 Michael Toolari, Narrative: A CriticalLingitistic Introduction (London: Routledge, 1988), 227.
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the theoretical framework argued for here is eclectic in nature and ultimately in
agreement with the general thrust of Paul Feyerabend’s argument for theoretical
anarchism. This approach is best suited to confront biases in research while not being
beholden to a grand narrative. Feyerabend explains his view of theoretical anarchism as:
One of my motives for writing Against Method was to free people
From the tyranny of philosophical obfuscators and abstract concepts such
as “truth,” “reality,” or “objectivity,” which narrows people’s vision and
ways of being in the world.b
While the approach here is informed by the historical materialist approach, it
remains eclectic in nature. Various authors have discussed the teleologism and
Eurocentrism of Marx as well as that of the neoclassicists. In the final analysis, the
teleologism of both grand narratives, notwithstanding their ethnocentrism, is able to
provide only half the picture.
It is important to take a moment to describe the eclectic theoretical aspect of this
work. One understands that the Marxist conception of history has been eulogized for the
past fifteen to twenty years. The Monthly Review remains its most pronounced advocate,
although debate about the direction of Marxism has been active in the journal’s recent
history. I attempt to incorporate a nuanced version of historical materialism because
Marx and Engels never had the opportunity to finish their work on historical materialism.
A part of the unfinished effort was an understanding of the role of culture and its
relationship to material reality. Engels’ oft-quoted letter to Joseph Bloch addressed this
very issue. This is important to keep in mind since much of the first section of the case
studies will be heavily descriptive, in an attempt to place the countries in their proper
13 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: 1975), 179-180.
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historical context. Historical materialism, as noted by Engels, and accepted here, does
not equate to a form of economic determinism, a label detractors of hurl at Marxists:
According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately
determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real
life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if
somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only
determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless,
abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the
various elements of the superstructure: political forms of the class struggle
and its results . . . juridical forms ... philosophical theories, religious
views . . . also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical
struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form.’4
It is clear that Marx and Engels developed their conception of historical
materialism from their critique of the physiocrats, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, George
Hegel, and Ludwig Feuerbach. Historical materialism is an effort to contextualize the
discussion on politics, economics, religion, philosophy, class, gender (i.e. the
superstructure) on the material conditions individuals and societies must contend with.
Marx and Engels were writing at a moment when material reality had to be emphasized
in light of the influence of Hegel’s “spirit” and the “idealism” of earlier socialists.
This theoretical perspective seeks to understand the dialectical process, which
undergirds the relationship between international finance capital and African countries.
Following Engels, it stands to reason that IFC does not dictate the contours of the
relationship from a philosophically determinist perspective, but it constitutes an
important aspect, at times the most important when investigating the traj ectory of African
development. Therefore, the period from 1980—2001 is a critical historical moment
14 Friedrich Engels, “Letter to Joseph Bloch,” in The Marx-Enge/s Reader, 2nd edition, ed.
Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), 760.
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since it captures the phase when free market ideology was drastically beginning its most
recent ascent.
The other key component to our theoretical framework is the concept of capital
developed by Marx and illuminated more recently by István Mëszarós in Beyond Capital.
If we accept capital as an all-encompassing social process, which ultimately trumps the
superstructure, then by extension the concept of capital is an all encompassing social as
well as economic process. As stated earlier, there have been many sound analyses of the
IMF, World Bank, and recently of Neoliberalism. All of these are important and extend
the body of knowledge in political economy, African politics, and international relations.
However, and this cannot be underemphasized, since we utilize the historical materialist
conception of history, for our purposes it is important to recognize the IMF, World Bank,
and neoliberal ideology as aspects of the superstructure. As a result, international finance
capital constitutes the most significant concept to critique Africa’s relation to the rest of
the world. It is important to note that we use capital in the sense of it being a social force
and not simply an economic reality. While not reifying the concept of International
Finance Capital, the figure on page 17(1 .1) illustrates the interrelationship between IFC,
International Funding Institutions, African development, and the hegemonic ideology of
Neoliberalism. The classic Marxist construction utilizes base and superstructure but this
is problematic since it gives the illusion of a determinist structure. Moreover, the plethora
of variables at work makes it near impossible to proclaim a “base.” Figure 1 captures the
essence of the relationship, although our emphasis is on International Finance Capital.
Because Engels admitted that the superstructure at times is primary, it is important to
17
reflect the potential for multiple primary sites of engagement. The emphasis here is on
International Finance Capital because of the propensity of scholars and activists to
critique the role of international funding institutions, critique the lack of African
development, or critique the influence of Neoliberalism on African development. The






Figure 1. Interrelationship between IFC, International Funding Institutions, African
development, and the hegemonic ideology of Neoliberalism.
There have been numerous works from the Marxist tradition that have analyzed
the nexus between Imperialism, Finance Capital and Multinational Corporations (MNCs).




examine two exemplars in this field of analysis. The work of V. I. Lenin and Harry
Magdoff probably still constitute the best Marxist critiques of imperialism. In
Imperialism, The Highest Stage ofCapitalism Lenin applied Marxist philosophy to the
international market. Marx never addressed the international economy in great detail;
therefore the work of Lenin, on the heels of Hilferding and Bukharin,
‘
was quickly
established as a seminal work. There are a few features of capitalism that Lenin focuses
on which are essential for understanding the role of MNCs. Lenin describes what may be
the “most important” feature of the capitalist economy to economic concentration and the
presence of monopolies:
At a certain stage of [capitalist] development, concentration itself, as it
were, leads right up to monopoly; for a score or so of giant enterprises can
easily arrive at an agreement, while on the other hand, the hindrance to
competition, the tendency towards monopoly, arises from the very
dimensions of the enterprises. This transformation of competition into
monopoly is one of the most important — if not most important —
phenomena of modern capitalist economy.16
Lenin exposed a central flaw not only in capitalism but the concept of a free-
market economy as well. The flaw is that because of a concentration in industry and the
creation of monopolies, competition, a primary component of capitalism, is undermined.
Barnet and Muller examined how multinationals can fix prices relative to their best
interests.
‘
This is an issue for underdeveloped countries who argue incessantly about
15 Rudolf Hilferding, Finance Capital: A Study in the latest Phase of Capitalist Development 1st
edition (NY: Routledge, 2006); Nikolai Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy (Modern Readrer PB-
290) (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1973).
16 V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage ofCapitalism (Peking: Foreign Language Press,
1973), 14.
17 Richard J. Barnet & Ronald E. Muller, Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational
Comporations (Simon and Schuster, 1974), ch.7.
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price fixing by corporations in the leading industrialized countries. The ability to fix
prices means that a cartel arrangement exists and Lenin argued that this is the moment
that imperialism supplants capitalism:
Cartels come to an agreement on the conditions of sale, terms of payment.
etc. They divide the market among themselves. They fix quantity of goods
to be produced. They fix prices. They divide the prices among the various
enterprises.
This imperialist stage of capitalism created an environment where a limited
number of people control the social means of production. They are also able to codify
their capital by means of finance capital. This aspect Barnet and Muller locate as a
central factor used by M1’JCs. They place finance capital alongside technology and
marketing ideology as crucial functions of the global corporation’s control.’9 Where
Lenin located periods of industrial boom as providing immense profits for monopolists,
we can locate communications technology as a boon for finance capital. The recent
information technology revolution, with its attendant fast-rising growth, produced
significant profits and introduced a new dynamic to the international economy.
However, and this is significant for Africa, in periods of downturn the losers are small
entrepreneurs who are unable to withstand the vagaries of the market and big banks
purchase these businesses and add them to their holdings. Finally, Lenin discussed five
features of imperialism that are important to understand for our purposes:
(1) the creation of monopolies
(2) merging of bank capital with industrial capital and the creation, on the
basis of this “finance capital”
(3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities
1 8Lenin, 20.
l9Barnet & Muller, passirn.
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acquires exceptional importance
(4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist combines which
share the world among themselves
(5) the territorial division of the world among the biggest capitalist powers
is completed.
The finance capital discussed by Lenin is qualitatively different from
contemporary finance capital. At the moment financial derivatives, classified by Warren
Buffet as “financial weapons of mass destruction,” were not central to the world Lenin or
Marx observed. Although derivatives have been around since the 19th century, they did
not become a dominant component of international finance until the recent ascendance of
Neoliberalism.
Harry Magdoff, in his works The Age ofImperialism and Imperialism.’ From the
Colonial Age to the Present, provides an excellent analysis of multinational corporations
and their role in the changing global environment. Magdoff in essence picked up where
Lenin left off, being afforded the opportunity to analyze the increased involvement of
MNCs. Magdoff highlights the transition from trade to investments. He argues that
investments are increasingly moving abroad where they are fixed forever (in terms of
plants and equipment) until the natural resources of the host country are finally
exhausted.2’ The main objective of imperialism is maintaining and expanding an open
trading and investment environment for global corporations. At the time, Magdoff
viewed the arrival of MNCs as suggestive of a considerable structural change in the
world economy.
In addition to the work of Magdoff and Lenin, Kwame Nkrumah had much to say
20 Lenin, 106.
21 HalTy Magdoff, The Age ofImperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 10.
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about the impact of “imperialist finance” on African development. What Nkrurnah did,
as others before him, was to collapse the notion of Direct Foreign Investment (Foreign
Direct Investment) with finance capital. The two are closely interrelated; however,
portfolio investment and FDI are both subsets of IFC. Robert Gilpin provides significant
clarity:
The international financial market has become a prominent feature of the
global economy. The volume of foreign exchange trading in the late 1 990s
has been approximately $1.5 trillion per day, an eightfold increase since
1986; by contrast, the global volume of exports (goods and services) for
all of 1997 was only $6.6 trillion, or $25 billion per day! In addition, the
amount of investment capital seeking higher returns has grown
enormously, by the mid — 1 990s, mutual funds, pension funds, and the like
totaled $20 trillion, ten times the 1980 amount. Moreover, the significance
of these huge investments is increasingly leveraged; that is, investments
are made with borrowed funds. Finally, derivatives (repackaged securities
and other financial assets) play an important role in international finance.
International financial transactions, valued in 1997 at $360 trillion, which
is far larger than the worth of the entire global economy, have contributed
to financial complexity and, many believe, to international financial
instabilityJ
The global economy as it is presently situated is a different problematic from that
which Nkrumah, Lenin, or even Magdoff observed. First and foremost FDI no longer
reigns supreme. Clearly, to some iniperialisrn is still an issue as well as the over-influence
of IVINCs. But the focus on IVINCs, particularly as a threat to the nation state, which
occupied center stage since the 1960s seems a bit misplaced in today’s global economy.
While IVINCs seek to harness capital our attempt is to understand the seeming
netherworld of capital, specifically TFC. More to the point, IFC as it relates to the
22 Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of the Global Economy: The World Economy in the 21st Century
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 141. While Gilpin does not use this term, what lie describes
is essentially hyper-alienation. His description points to the increasing disjointrnent between actual labor
and those that make profits. Thus the market is determined by derivatives and the like and not actual labor.
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dominant approach in theory and in practice - Neoliberalism. While this work does not
believe that it provides the best prescriptive utility for African development, we must
nonetheless take a moment to critique the major work on Neoliberalism.
International politics as it exists in our world is a byproduct of Western
hegemony: theoretically at the level of international political philosophy and historically
by the expansion of European culture. At no point has there been a unification of
political philosophy. The major preoccupation of western political science, in this case
the sub-field of international politics, has been the debate waged continuously concerning
the utility of realist/neorealist philosophy and liberal/neoliberal philosophy. While these
philosophies diverge on the role of the state, notions of power, and constraints of
anarchy, they converge concerning the legitimization of the international political system.
In light of the globalization of world affairs, the discussion and debates that center on the
international political system have particular relevance for African politics. The level of
marginalization that takes place materially and theoretically enlightens us about Africa’s
role in international politics. Efforts must be taken to substantiate or disclaim Western
hegernonic discourse and practice. Presumably critiques of the realist/neorealist
liberal/neoliberal debate must be undertaken to satisfy this effort.
After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy by
Robert Keohane presents a neoliberal perspective on the growing interdependence of the
world economy. Although neoliberalism is viewed as the antithesis of neorealism both
ideologies share fundamental similarities. Keohane attempts to construct a balance
between the realist and idealist notion of international politics. While neorealisrn and
neoliberalism share the view of an anarchic international arena, the constraint that this
imposes on the state represents a significant departure between the two approaches.
Keohane, a neoliberal, analyzes cooperation and discord with the assumption that
sovereign nations have mutual interests. This supposition is the antithesis of realisms
rational egoism that assumes that nations undauntedly seek to codify their self-interest;
thus, Keohane focuses on international institutions and the ability of these institutions to
provide the culture of cooperation.
While the title leads one to believe that the analysis concerns the world political
economy, Keohane explicitly advances that his analysis is concerned with advanced
market economies. Keohane reasons that the advanced economies are “relatively similar”
resulting in high levels of interdependence that place their respective nations on friendly
ground, a consequence which is less prevalent concerning relations with “less developed
countries.”23 Thus, from our perspective the continued peripheralization of Africa is
understood as a necessary consequence of Keohane’s analytic method, which
consequently raises questions concerning the viability of the neo liberal philosophy for
analyzing and understanding Africa’s role in the world political economy.
Keohane outlines the purpose of his work in part one of After Hegemony -
Questions and concepts. Keohane states: “This book is about how cooperation has been,
and can be, organized in the world political economy when common interests exist. It
does not concentrate on the question of how fundamental common interests can be
23 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 6. His rationale is certainly influenced by
Kant’s ‘Zones of Peace.”
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created among states.”4 In this framework familiarity produces interdependence
(cooperation). Recognizing that a world economy does exist, Keohane posits that a
fundamental dilemma is to “organize cooperation without hegemony.”25 The liberal
institutionalists (Keohane) believe in the necessity of hegemony to achieve cooperation.
The world economy consists of hundreds of ostensibly autonomous nations, which are
not subordinate to any international governing body. Thus, there are no “authoritative
allocators of resources.” Nations left to seek their own interest, without a dominant actor
influencing cooperation, may persist in an anarchic environment. Keohane’s unabashed
focus on advanced industrial economies clearly illuminates that neoliberals and their
approach, are extremely limited on putting forth solutions to Africa’s problems. To the
contrary of a framework that illuminates African interests, the solution lies within the
context of neoliberal development. Neoliberalism is used to maintain and expand the
existing order and makes no pretense that the order is exploitive or flawed in any manner.
Conclusion
In conclusion, when we state that we are incorporating a nuanced version of
historical materialism, precisely this means that the role of culture has to be accounted for
in international relationships. This is a characteristic. which Marx and Engels failed to
develop in any significant manner. Not because they underestimated or denied its
significance — they simply did not live long enough. Many theorists point to Gramsci




culture and national liberation, Cedric Robinson’s critique of Marxism26 and Edward
Said’s enlightening Culture and Imperialism are some of the better recent works on the
significance of culture. Said’s work in particular examines the “ideological formations”
which support western cultures’ imperialist leanings while undermining non-western
cultures’ value. More to the point, neoliberalism is the ideological formation that
supports IFC. When we analyze the impact of IFC, we are examining a western construct,
which implicitly and explicitly devalues non-western constructs. More to the point,
classifications of bourgeoisie vs. proletariat; core vs. periphery; and developed vs.
underdeveloped provide theoretical utility but are only enhanced by adding the all-
important cultural element. Gunder-Frank, at one time the most notable advocate of
Dependency theory, rejected the Eurocentricism of Marx, and by extension the
dependency school.
For their part, the neoliberals are incapable of raising certain questions because of
their desire to interrogate cooperation. In other words, the foundation is accepted as
legitimate. Legitimacy in this sense involves the understanding that the international
order is anarchic. The method of the neorealists is not to assess the role of capital or
finance capital but cooperation between states. Their assumption is that states ultimately
are able to cooperate based on mutual gain.27 This assumption implicitly dismisses the
struggle for power by African and other “Third World” countries by granting legitimacy
26Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition (NC: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
27Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in
Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977); David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and
Neoliberalisin: The Conteinporaiy Debate (NY: Columbia University Press, 1993).
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to the world system. Therefore, once the assumption is made that the system is worth
maintaining, how does one engage groups that argue against the legitimacy of the
system?
All is not lost however, for the neoliberals still have something to offer.
Understanding cooperation remains an important task. North-South and South-South
cooperation are certainly important for understanding and developing viable strategies for
development. The neoliberal propensity to utilize Game Theory may prove useful for
understanding why African nations participate in institutions that many argue are
weighted against their interests.
The case studies reveal that standard theoretical approaches can illuminate some
of the challenges but ultimately they fall short in capturing the nuance needed for
understanding African development. Botswana was selected because of its stable history
as Africa’s longest-running democratic regimes. Botswana, in the narrative of the
neoclassicists, has liberalized, democratized, privatized, and created a safe and productive
environment to attract capital. Botswana has experienced consistent economic growth
since independence yet the country remains underdeveloped. Theorists more likely to
utilize World Systems theory may see Botswana’s success as the result of a relationship
between elites in Botswana and elites in the west. Hence, the failure to alleviate the plight
of the poor in Botswana and decrease the gap between the wealthy and poor validate
Marxist-influenced theories. Although advocates of free trade argue that the Botswana
case is not an example of the market not working for Botswana. The problem of income
and wealth inequality is the purview of policymakers and not a result of deeper
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integration into the free-market.
Tanzania, while one of the most impoverished states, is an example of a country
that transformed from socialist to market-led development. It offers an interesting
example of a country attempting to embrace the order of the day while retaining it
commitment to education, health care, and the like. Kenya is an interesting counter to
Tanzania, not simply because of its proximity, but for its historical embrace of market-led
development and eschewing of socialism and ideologies of that ilk. Nigeria, and this will
shock no one, is Africa’s most important economy. Nigeria is important because of its
potential, strategic resources, and the raw size of its economy. This is all certainly
notwithstanding Nigeria’s reputation as Africa’s, indeed one of the world’s most corrupt
states — an impossible designation to measure.
Statement of the Problem
The development of Africa has been a major concern (to say the least) for
Africans, continental and diasporan, since the modern independence movements of the
post-World War II period.28 This concern has inspired an assortment of debates
surrounding which path of development is most applicable and beneficial to Africans.
Political leaders and activists have viewed African socialism, scientific socialism,
capitalism, and various attempts at mixed economy as “the solution” at one point or
another. The stated reasons for their failure to improve African’s socioeconomic
condition are debatable for some, but for many the answer is clear and not open to debate.
Capitalism and its handmaiden, the free-market economy, is the only viable solution.
28This statement does not discount activism prior to “independence” but is a reflection of the
historically recent discussion concerning development.
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The force of this ideology as it weaves it way through the globe should be
evident to all observers. The vast majority of states have accepted the reality of
globalization, albeit if not with open arms. The presumption proponents of free-market
economics make is that this is the only way for nations to develop and consumers to reap
the most benefits. Furthermore, adherents of the free-market argue that the technological
advancement created by the competition a free market engenders ultimately benefits the
consumer and those creative enough to continue to develop new technologies. Although
detractors point to increasing inequality and unemployment that often accompanies
increased openness (often attributed to the volatility of market forces), supporters counter
and argue that democratic regimes are best suited to rectify any shortcomings. It seems
that in the minds of many, the very mention of democracy is enough to ensure equity and
stave off the more rapacious aspects of capitalism and free-market development.
International Finance Capital has been a rapidly increasing force in the global
economy since 1971, the year of the first oil crisis. With the exception of the years
following 1979, the year of the second oil shock, up to the introduction of the Brady Plan,
IFC was the main impetus for the further integration of African and other underdeveloped
economies into the global market.29 While the proponents of free-market economics
insist on the merits of increased IFC - better competition, better prices for consumers,
technology transfer, and access to new markets — the impact is often volatile, particularly
when the previous inflow of capital degenerates into an outflow. This undeniably affects
underdeveloped nations to a greater extent than industrialized nations; primarily because
29Pierre-Richard Agenor and Peter Montiel, Development Macroeconomics 2nd ed. (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 575.
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of the fragile nature of their economies. Because African countries have been
preoccupied with distancing themselves from their colonial past and embarking on a
rebirth of sorts, it becomes imperative that we understand the period 1980-200 1. As a
sign of where we are, African governments have adopted the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA),
which seeks to attract enhanced investment opportunities for international capital and
deepen Africa’s integration in the world economy. The G8 has given its blessing and
seem excited about the direction of this plan for the future development of its relationship
with African countries.
The Cold War era receives a lot of attention since successive administrations were
guided by an imperative designed to contain communism at all costs, disregarding
whether a regime was democratic or not. This focus ostensible changed with the end of
the Cold War (at least a thawing of the tensions) and the Clinton administration sought to
shift the terms of U.S. — Africa policy. In this vein, the Clinton administration advocated
democratization, the dev
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policy for sub-Saharan Africa while also extending benefits to the Caribbean basin.
Initially the bill, dubbed “Nafta for Africa” by some, passed the house but died in the
Senate in 1999. President Clinton pushed for the reconsideration of the legislation,
eventually leading to its passage into law on May 18, 2000. The full title of the Act is
“An act to authorize a new trade and investment policy for sub-Sahara Africa, expand
trade benefits to the countries in the Caribbean Basin, renew the generalized system of
preferences, and reauthorize the trade adjustment assistance programs.” It is generally
referred to as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
There was a lot of consternation concerning this act because the principle
advocates derived from the American oil and multinational corporate interests. The most
prominent corporate supporters were Chevron, Mobil, Texaco, and AIG. This group
formed a coalition “The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act Coalition, mc” which was
led by Chester Crocker, former secretary of state for the Reagan Administration and
architect of “constructive engagement” with the apartheid regime. Crocker argues that
during this time:
The Clinton years were years of rhetorical activism. I don’t think anyone would
argue with the notion that this was the most African-oriented at the rhetorical
level of any administration. Some credit needs to be given on commercial
diplomacy and trade. The late Commerce Secretary Ron Brown helped put Africa
on the map and so did the President, in the commercial areas. My problem with
that eight years is that I think we kind of avoided our responsibilities on the
security and conflict issues. So, it’s a mixed legacy that this administration now
faces.3’
31 Charles Cobb Jr., All Africa.com. Retrieved October 22, 2008, from All Africa.com:
http://allafrica.com/stories/200106260229.htrnl
By the time George W. Bush became the president of the United States, there was
already a few initiatives in place focusing on African development. The New Partnership
for Africa’s Development in concert with Bill Clinton’s Comprehensive Trade and
Development Program for Africa were the most recent attempts at the time of policy
choices for African development. The signatories of NEPAD are clear that the
predicament Africa finds itself in is a result of numerous factors and that globalization
does not guarantee success. The primary factors pointed to in the NEPAD are
unfavorable terms of trade and poor governance. We should make no mistake in
understanding that poor governance, rightly or wrongly, has been emphasized as the
primary factor prohibiting African development. In accepting this argument, and
embracing all of its constituent elements, the framers of the NEPAD believe that
incorporating “good governance, entrenchment of democracy and sound economic
policy-making” make for the best possible engagement of the process of g1obalization.”2
What is interesting is the conscious decision to not challenge or resist the nature of the
international economy but rather to argue for increased involvement. The NEPAD states
“The new long-term vision will require massive and heavy investment to bridge existing
gaps.”3 The NEPAD was applauded by European, American, and International Funding
Institutions officials as the best African proposal for development. This should come as
no surprise since the NEPAD embraced the Neoliberal trading environment. In fact, a
32 Kempe Ronald Hope, “From Crisis to Renewal: Towards a Successful Implementation of the
New Partnership for Africa’s Development,” African Affairs (2002): 101.
33 NEPAD, The New Partnership For Africas Development. Retrieved September 9, 2002, from
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa:
http://uneca.org/eca resources/Conference Reports and Other-Documents/nepad! 1
part of the NEPAD document comes from the “Millennium Partnership for the African
Recovery Programme: A Market Access Action Plan for Africa” that was published by
the department of trade and industry in South Africa during May 2001. The NEPAD is
striking for its refurbished and retread ideas, which its framers pass off as revolutionary
or symbolic of an African renaissance, an idea pushed by Thabo Mbeki. While one could
take my word for it, a group of African scholars and activists met in Accra, Ghana on
April 23-26, 2002 to discuss Africa’s development challenges. Their assessment of the
NEPAD is summed up in their document as follows:
We concluded that, while many of its stated goals may be well-
intentioned, the development vision and economic measures that it
canvases for the realization of these goals are flawed. As a result, NEPAD
will not contribute to addressing the developmental problems ... On the
contrary, it will reinforce the hostile external environment and the internal
weaknesses that constitute the major obstacles to Africa’s development.
Indeed, in certain areas like debt, NEPAD steps back from international
goals that have been won through global mobilization and struggle.34
In addition to the above initiatives, Vice-President Dick Cheney produced a very
influential “Cheney Report” in 2000. Daniel Volman argued that the increased attention
towards Africa by the Bush Administration was largely a byproduct of this report, but he
seems to underestimate the focus on Africa before 2000. Volman states that:
The Cheney Report states, African countries provided 14 percent of total
U.S. oil imports.. .but by 2015, according to the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency, West Africa alone will supply 25 percent of America’s imported
oil. Of particular significance is the talk that many West African streams
are lighter, higher-valued crude oils that are tailor-made for U.S. East
Coast markets and are able to offer an alternative to Middle Eastern supply





The Bush-Cheney focus on Africa would be in the context of strategic national security
interests, which for volman and others was completely unprecedented, hence marking a
shift from clinton administration policy towards Africa. September 11, 2001 would serve
only to further reinforce the G.W. Bush administration’s outlook on Africa as a source of
national security interests. Specifically as an avenue to find alternatives to Middle
Eastern oil. Not long after 9/11 the Institute for Advanced Starategic and Political Studies
held a symposium “African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African
Development.” Thus, countries such as Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Angola
became very important to U.S. strategic interests. Coupled with the U.S. “war against
terror,” and billions of dollars are being invested in the oil and miltarization of oil
producing regions. Very little concern has been made concerning democratization or
good governance. Padraig Carmody succinctly captures these developments:
There are now direct weekly flights from Texas to Equatorial Guinea,
which in 2003 had the world’s fastest-growing economy. It has a
population of half a million people, but U.S. oil firms have invested S5
billion there. According to Human Rights Watch, continued human-rights
abuses have not deterred U.S. investment, and the country is
geostrategically attractive to the U.S. because it is a non-muslim country
and is not a member of OPEC. The size of its oil revenues
is a state secret, but in the first year of its contract with ExxonMobil
Equatorial Guinea got to keep only 12 percent of oil revenues.6
35Daniel Volinan, “The Bush Administration and African Oil: The Security Implications of US
Energy Policy,” ROAPE No. 98 (December 2003): 573-584.
36P. Carmody, “Transforming Globalization and Security: Africa and Anierica Post-9/I 1,” Africa
Today 52.1 (2005): 97-120.
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NEPAD has come into existence at a time when African countries are faced with
a variety of issues critical to their development in the twenty-first century. Among these
issues are the impact of international financial institutions on African development; the
continued legacy of colonialism in Africa; the nature of African development (what path
should countries pursue?); and African countries’ links with international finance capital.
Each of the above issues is significant for understanding the politics of contemporary
African states in the global economy. The first two issues above had a profound impact
on twentieth-century African and global politics. In short, much of the twentieth century
from Africa’s perspective was a struggle against colonialism. After finally throwing off
the fetters of colonialism, African countries had to operate in a changing international
environment where international financial institutions and multinational corporations
were, by the 1 970s, wielding a tremendous amount of influence. Thus, from our
perspective, it is impossible to gain a clear understanding of African politics without
accounting for the dialectic between Africa’s pursuit of development balanced by the
interests of her former colonizers and the contemporary role of international finance
capital. The third issue, concerning the path of development, continues to be significant,
even in light of the dominance of neoliberal development. Rather than solving the
problematic of development, neoliberalism raises new questions concerning whose
interests are being met. Finally, international finance capital is more influential than ever
and the ability of African countries to negotiate their relationship to IFC and benefit from
that relationship is vital for understanding African development.
Hypothesis
3D
Before stating the hypothesis, several observations should first be presented
concerning widely held assumptions about African development. The first widely held
assumption is that African economies are not diversified and are highly susceptible to the
vagaries of the market. Many African economies are monocropic or monomineral
(meaning they are dominated by one particular industry) which leads to market-oriented
dominance. Second, an extension of the first assumption, African economies’ high
agricultural reliance leads to their being extra-dependent on the weather for the strength
of their exports. Third, a common assumption based on poor governance, poor
infrastructure, and a lack of resources desired by the international investment community
- African economies attract very little IFC. Fourth, the major challenges impeding
African development are corruption, famine, HIV/Aids, and debt. Finally, the
sociopolitical environment for attracting increased IFC is extremely poor.
While all of the assumptions have grounds for validity, it is the last assertion that
is the focus of this dissertation. We argue that between 1980 and 2001 IFC going to
Africa increased and this had an overall negative impact on the sociopolitical and
socioeconomic environment. This impact would be substantiated by finding an increase
in IFC and subsequent decrease in health care, equity, literacy, and environmental
indices. It is expected that a rise in IFC will also result in a rise of GNP.37 The second
hypothesis focuses on democracy. Democracy as discussed in most publications is
simply a set of procedures for choosing the senior personnel of government. We adhere
371-listorically, successful economies were judged by their GNP or GDP. This has changed over
the past 15 years as other indicators gain in importance. No serious scholar would assert that development
can solely be measured on the basis of a nation’s GNP or GDP today.
to the distinction between liberal and social democracy8with the belief that an
environment open to investment may equate to liberal democracy but not social
democracy. Therefore, we expect our case studies to show that where there is an increase
in IFC there is also an increase in aspects of liberal democracy (i.e. free, fair, and regular
elections). Finally, incorporating the notion of base and superstructure from Marx and
Engels, we expect to find a transformation in the superstructure that reflects a regime of
IFC.9 The transformation taking the form of more openness (i.e. decrease in tariffs and
subsidies), rhetoric in support of the neoliberal agenda, and privatization.
Research Questions
1. Has the pace of development accelerated in Africa between 1980 and 2001? This
question is critical since the proposition put forth by proponents of the international
economy is that integration in the global economy accelerates the process of
development. Integration in the global economy involves decreasing trade barriers and
quotas, an increase in foreign technology, involvement in international regimes designed
to create and maintain a liberal international order, and an increase in the level of
privatization within a given country. Development is the combination of an increase in
GNP, GDP, and social resources. Thus, an improvement in education, health. housing,
transportation, and infrastructure would be indicative of development.
38Liberal democracy deals more with the standard operating procedures of a democracy, primarily
free, fair, and regular elections, and freedoin of speech, press, and assembly. Social democracy is more
concerned with the equitable distribution of wealth and is more apt to have broad-based redistributive
policies.
39 Robert C. Tucker, ed. The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd edition, (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1978), passim.
2. Does a correlation exist between the external debt of African countries and increased
integration into the global economy? If there has been an increase of international finance
capital in Africa this question seeks to determine the historical context for the increase. It
is assumed that African countries following the second oil shock were left little choice
but to turn to the IFTs for assistance in repaying their external debts. This assistance in
turn paved the way for increased international finance capital in Africa.
3. Why were African nations faced with a debt crisis and what was the role of private
international banks? This question is concerned with the origin of the debt crisis. My
sense is that the oil shocks created balance of payment deficits, which led to external
debt. However, claims have been made that African nations are faced with large debt
because of poor economic policies, mismanagement of resources, and corrupt politicians.
The involvement of international banks is critical for understanding the interaction
between international credit and African dependency. Specifically. I am concerned with
terms of repayment and African countries ability to meet those terms.
4. How does integration in the international political economy impact Africa’s
agricultural industry and small farmers? The majorities of Africans are farmers and rely
on farming for subsistence or the state relies on agriculture for trade. It is critical to
understand the dialectical relationship between the IFC and Africa’s agricultural sector,
particularly in light of the United States and European Union (EU) insistence on
subsidizing aspects of its agricultural industry.
Context
In order to successfully place our discussion in its proper context, we must
1
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progress from the simplistic notion that an understanding of contemporary events results
from analysis of past events. However, this is not as simple as it sounds since different
theorists understandably hold opposing views on where to begin or on what period most
captures or defines the problematic in question. In this vein, two different approaches for
examining African development are offered by the World Systems theorists that view the
“long fifteenth-century” as a decisive point in developing a Modern World System and
those theorists that view the carving up of Africa by the great powers of Europe in 1884-
1885 as primary when examining African development or underdeveloprnent.
World systems theorists generally view Africa’s integration in the global
economy as beginning in the seventeenth century. They view the involvement of African
labor (i.e. slave labor) as being different from incorporating the nation in the world
system. The 1 7th century is the period when Dutch colonizers established a way-station
at the Cape and began to expand inland, thereby planting the seeds for a protracted
unequal relationship. Others view the Berlin Conference of 1884 and subsequent
continent-wide colonization as the crucial point of Africa’s entry into in the global
economy. The process of monetisation, which as Claude Ake points out, was necessary
in establishing a new economy and dismantling an indigenous economic base, was
introduced during the colonial period.40 While both perspectives offer some putative
value, the argument put forth here is that African integration in the global economy began
in the fifteenth century. Once the Portuguese seized the Moroccan port of Ceuta in 1415
it signaled the demise of indigenous African independence. African leaders from then on
40 Claude Ake, A Political Economy ofAfrica (England: Longmnan Publishers, 1981), passim.
had increasingly to account for the interests of outsiders; indeed African leaders had to be
concerned with foreign influence. This perspective regards African labor as essential to
the development of the modern capital system rather than simply a marginal component
at this point in world history. An understanding of its significance is critical for two
reasons:
1) The human labor wrested from Africa between the fifteenth and
nineteenth centuries began the depletion of any nation’s most essential
resource — people. This depletion of human production incalculably
stunted the development of Africa.
2) The exported African labor provided an essential component for
Spanish, French, Portuguese, Dutch, Caribbean, and North American
economic development. The trajectory and likelihood of their global
ascendancy would have been considerably hindered without African labor.
With the above as a precursor, this study is historically grounded in the following
framework, which encompasses five stages:
Stage 1 — The introduction of African labor in the international division of
labor and the expansion of Europe (15111 century): Wallerstein in his magnum opus The
Modern World System, does not locate the 15111 century as the introduction of Africa into
the international division of labor. However, we argue that it is quite clear that the 1 5111
century represents the introduction of African labor into the international division of
labor. African’s in the 1501 century are beginning to be sent to Europe as laborers.
Stage 2 - Increased European penetration into Africa (17111 century):
European penetration became sharper, extending deeper into Africa and creating the
Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade.
Stage 3 - Continental partition by the great powers of Europe (1884-85):
With most countries abolishing the slave trade, European nations fashioned a new form
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of domination — colonialism. The Berlin Conference created agreed upon boundaries for
European colonial nations.
Stage 4 — Nominal or flag independence/ Ideological and Economic
dependence (1 950s/1 960s): The stage of great expectations as Africans attempted to
throw off the fetters of colonialism and ostensibly assert their newfound sovereignty.
Stage 5 — Incorporation of Neoliberal prescriptions (1980 — present): The
ascendance of neoliberalism and frontal attack on Keynesianism, protectionism, and all
things resembling constraints upon the free market.
Stage 5 encompasses the age of global finance. 8db, Bullard, and Maihotra
argue that a liberalization of financial flows resulted from the creation of a Eurocurrency
market, the accumulation of petrodollars in industrial countries, and the liberalization and
trade and capital accounts. As a consequence of these actions, they argue that three
discernible traits accompanied financial liberalization. The first trait resulted from
commercial banks withdrawing from international lending and the corresponding rise
investment banks, mutual, hedge, and pension funds. The second trait was the rise of
securities as a means of transporting capital as opposed to foreign direct investment or
lending. The third trait, closely related to the first two, was the ascendance of arbitrage
and derivatives.4’
This perspective should capture the key nodal points in Africa’s relationship with
the European dominated international order. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were a
period of sharp competition by European powers, specifically the Dutch, Portuguese,
41 Walden Bello, Nicola Bullard, & Kamal Malhatra, Global Finance: New Thinking on
Regulating Speculative Capital Markets (London: Zed Books, 2000), 4-6.
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English, and Spanish. Occupation of the Caribbean and Latin America typified the modus
operandi of the major European powers at that historical moment. The end of the
sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth were marked by Dutch
establishment of dominance in coastal Senegambia and Benin. Although their power
would wane in the late seventeenth century, European trading corporations would find
this period as a boon to their business:
The demand for black labour presented Western Europe with an
unprecedented task at a time when radical economic and political changes
were taking place. In the second half of the seventeenth century the
decline of Spain and Portugal became increasingly evident. Holland, then
at the peak of its power, began to be ousted by France and England whose
economies were developing rapidly. From the end of the seventeenth
century these two countries were exercising ever-increasing influence in
Africa, while the Spaniards and even the Dutch were playing no more than
marginal roles. Meanwhile, Portuguese success in Angola allowed them to
retain an advantageous position in the slave trade.4
This process deepened African involvement in the ever-expanding orbit of
European imperialism. While this discussion does not account for Africa’s contemporary
predicament, it does illuminate the historical context of this troubling relationship.
The demand for efficient and cheap bulk shipment of heavy products
throughout the world, the new metal steamship, which made it possible,
and rapid communication (transatlantic cable service began in 1866) set
the stage for a comiriercial revolution. This commercial revolution was
financed by the simultaneous growth of international banking and the
creation of a ‘single multilateral system of international payments.’ A
world market, governed by world prices, emerged for the first time.43
42B.A. Ogot, ed., General History ofAfrica: VAfrica from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth
Cent uty (California: Unesco, 1999), 9.
43lbid.,.33. Linked to this superordinate-subordinate relationship was the construction of a
narrative which situated African’s and their culture as backward. This of course was used to justify
European exploitation masked in the veneer of civilization. While the specifics of the relationship have
changed, the narrative remains eerily similar in the language of development.
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This world market was dominated by the concentration of power in the hands of
giant corporations, with the subsequent internationalization of capital. These
corporations, inevitably working with banks, consolidated their power to stretch across
the globe, linking the majority of the world’s population in an unequal dependent
relationship. They were able to exploit their “comparative advantage” and compel non-
European nations into exporting their resources for consumption in the core areas of the
international economy. Certainly, over-consumption is a crucial aspect of imperialism
that acutely affects the relationship between the haves and have not’s. Rostow’s highest
stage, the stage of high mass-consumption, represents the height of development. It also
represents the stage characterized by Western achievement.
In an attempt to provide a critical understanding of this phenomenon of over
consumption, Samir Amin’s analysis in Accumulation on ci World Scale provides a useful
tool for deconstructing this connection. The fundamental problem Amin argues is one
between the “developed” world (the center) and the “underdeveloped world (the
periphery). The periphery does not lack in surplus but in finding ways to manipulate their
surplus.44 This surplus is unproductive, wasteful or exported. These problems develop
fiom the economic and social formation of the periphery and how the underdeveloped
states are integrated into the capitalist wor1d-econorny.4Amin refers to an important
stage in the development of the capitalist world-economy as the period of the industrial
44David Korten, When Coiporations Rule the World (Berrett-Koehler publishers, 2001)
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revolution. This period marks the ‘flowering’ of the capitalist mode of production, where
international specialization (comparative advantage) among industrial (core) and
agricultural (periphery) nations was established. During this period the peripheries’
resources were exported to the highly industrialized nations for consumption, while the
profits were often expatriated by MCs.
While there are those that argue that Amin’s (and others that share this view)
argument is flawed and that things have indeed changed, African countries continue to be
among the poorest countries in the world. They are poor because of poor policies and
conuption; a harsh international environment; or a combination of both. Whichever logic
one subscribes, any account of Africa’s integration in the world economy must analyze
the colonial experience and its influence on the composition of African economies.
The post-colonial challenges of African economies are often assessed by
neglecting or minimizing the impact of colonization. This is the case even though the
colonization of African countries established the role of Africa in the international
economy. It is this relatively recent history of Africa, which reflects a subordinated and
exploited continent. A great deal of twentieth century African politics was shaped by the
legacy of colonialism and neocolonialism. Colonialism shaped the political and
economic foundations of the recent “independent” African countries. Colonialism also
placed African countries in a state of economic dependence. African countries, rather
than operating as sovereign actors in the international political and economic system,
existed for the development of the core European states. Walter Rodney provided a
succinct overview of this phenomenon:
44
Colonial Africa fell within that part of the international capitalist
economy from which surplus was drawn to feed the metropolitan sector,.,
Colonialism was not merely a system of exploitation, but one whose
essential purpose was to repatriate the profits to the so-called mother
country . . . It meant the development of Europe as part of the same
dialectical process in which Africa was underdeveloped.4
There remains a need to analyze whether this phenomenon has subsided or
continues in other varieties. The authors of the UNESCO series on African history
reinforce the claims of Rodney by arguing that:
The introduction of currency and with it banking activities and the
tremendous expansion in the volume of trade between colonial Africa and
Europe in turn led to the total integration of the economy of Africa into
that of the world in general and into that of the capitalist economy of the
colonial powers in particular. The years after 1935 merely deepened this
link and not even independence has fundamentally altered this
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relationship.
Generally, it is agreed that colonialism was destructive to the development of
Africa. However, there remain studies such as the Hoover Institution’s Colonialism in
Africa 1870-1960 that focuses on the purported benefits of colonialism. The UNESCO
volume cited above also points out particular benefits from the colonial era, such as
relative peace (in relation to the period before colonialism), transfer of technology, Pan-
African consciousness, industrial development primarily in the form of transportation and
integration into the global economy. However, as pointed out by the author, the negative
46 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, D.C.: Howard University
Press, 1982), 149. Often quoted now, this work cannot be underestimated for its uniqueness at the time.
Most underdevelopment theorists were discussing Latin American countries. This was the first major work
that analyzed Africa in such a fashion.
47A.Adu Boahen, “Colonialism in Africa: Its impact and significance,” in General Histoiy of
Africa.” VII Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935 ed. A.Adu Boahen (California: Unesco, 1990),
331.
45
impact outweighs the so-called benefits. In fact, the positive impact of colonialism is
surreptitious at best. The balance sheet reveals extraverted monocrop and mono-mineral
economies, which at best stunted the development of Africa. Additionally, many of the
crops are not indigenous and are solely for export, which results in increasing domestic
food shortages in many African nations.
To be sure, this study is not an attempt to blame all of Africa’s ills on colonialism
or Europeans. However, the linkage between colonial policies and neo-colonial practices
cannot be denied. Samir Amin plainly views the relationships as defined by the super
exploitation of African peasant labor beginning during the colonial period and
transitioning into independence.48 The significance of the colonial legacy is that Africa
has been controlled according to the desires of foreign interests. In general, agricultural
production (in which women comprise the majority of the labor force), mining, and the
overall division of labor serve the market interests of the highly industrial and
technological world.
Post WWII: Development’s
The post-1945 era has seen marked increases in both international
economic ties and regulatory/collaborative arrangements to manage them.
“At least among the developed liberal countries interdependent ties since
1945 have come to be accepted as a fundamental and unchangeable
feature” of international relations, and “few governments are willing to
argue any longer for the benefits of economic closure.” Increased
international economic ties exist at many levels involving trade, foreign
investment (including globalfirms,) and finance, and they are promoted by
a growing acceptance of liberal economic policies. One impact of these
48Sarnir Arnin, Ma/development: Anatomy ofa Global Failure (London: Zed Books, 1990), 11,
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trends is that states are losing their degree of autonomy in managing their
domestic and international economic policies because of both the intensity
of the interdependencies and the development of explicit and implicit
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regimes.
After the end of WWII (post-1945), America in particular, multinational
corporations in general, exploited their opportunity to dominate the world-economy. This
opportunity was highlighted by the war torn social and economic nature of Germany,
Japan and Western Europe. In order to stabilize and rebuild their economies and
infrastructure the Marshall Plan was implemented to fund this venture. The explosion of
international investment and the increase in the role of MNCs was largely provided by
the Bretton Woods System (1944-1976). This system was created to provide the
leadership for a stable world economic order. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
was created to supervise the world monetary system, even though the “United States
monetary policy became the world monetary policy.”50 The major impediment to this
system-it was tied to the US dollar. When the United States did well the world did well;
when the US faltered the world faltered. This allowed the caretakers of the international
economy to recognize a need for change in the monetary system. Important to the
development of the international economy was also the birth of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948. This was an attempt by the member countries (23
at the time) to reduce customs tariffs and increase trade.
African Independence
At the dawn of Africa’s expected renaissance in the 1950s and 1960s, euphoria
49Jarnes N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czernpiel eds. Governance without Government: Order and
Change in WoridRolitics. (Cambridge University Press, 1992),80-81
5OGilpin, 131-34
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justifiably overwhelmed Africans and the African diasporic community. Unfortunately,
this euphoria was premature. African countries had many challenges ahead and one of
the most significant was settling on which path of development to take. In this area the
intellectual community briefly acquiesced to W. W. Rostow’s concept of stages of
growth and David Apter’s notion of modernization.5’It was widely accepted by many
that African nations, now independent, could develop economically following the
western paradigm. Even a scholar such as Claude Ake, who certainly is linked to the
radical tradition, did not escape the influence of modernization theory. Ake’s first work,
A Theoiy ofPolitical Integration, published in 1967, examines what he terms “the
problem of political integration.” By this time, at least thirty-five African nations had
won independence. With these “new” states as his backdrop Ake analyzes what served
as central questions at that particular historical moment:
A) How to elicit from subj ects deference and devotion to the claims of the
state.
B) I-low to increase normative consensus governing political behavior
among members of the political system.5
The central challenge that newly independent African nations faced, according to Ake,
was regime stability and maintenance. Ake incorporated what we now know as
conservative conceptual tools to analyze the African condition. Ake focused on
consensus theory, political system, political behavior, charismatic legitimation, political
5lPeter Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation (Boston:
Bedford/St. Martins, 2000), 24-25.
52Claude Ake, A Theoiy ofPolitical Integration (Hornewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967),
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democracy, and political stability. All terms utilized and promoted by Gabriel Almond,
David Easton, Samuel Huntington and Lucien Pye. With the benefit of a 2002
perspective we are able to identify the challenges encountered when focusing on regime
maintenance as opposed to transformation. At the time, Ake believed that:
The crucial problem of the postcolonial situation is the integration of the
new nation which is threatened by strong centrifugal forces. The
nationalist movement . . . tends to disintegrate with the elimination of
imperial control ... The optimistic psychological atmosphere
characteristic of revolutions raises expectations to heights that the new
government cannot possibly satisfy with the meager means at its
disposal.53
This view would be radically changed by the development of radical critiques
which argued for a New International Economic Order NIEO) on the basis of primarily
African and Latin American countries’ underdevelopment. Rather than successfully
establish a NIEO, African countries moved from colonialism to neo-colonialism. It
became increasingly clear that the industrialized western nations were concerned about
continued access Africa’s agricultural and mineral resources and Africa as a potential
market for western goods.54 As a result, the desire to have African nations remain
dependent became a reality. An understanding which various African leaders held long
before academicians caught on. Dependency theory did not develop until the late 1 960s,
whereas, Kwarne Nkrumah had already written Africa Must Unite, Consciencism, and
Neo-Colonialisrn: The Last Stage ofImperialism. Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Julius
Nyerere, Eduardo Mondlane, Arnilcar Cabral, and Patrice Lumumba all sought to instill a
53Ibid., 17.
54 Chinweizu, “Africa and the capitalist countries,” in Ali A. Mazrui, ed., General History of
Africa: VIII Africa since 1935 (California: UNESCO, 1999), 770-77 1.
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radical departure from the western framework. Whether considered populist socialist,
Afro-Marxist, scientific socialist or simply Marxist inspired, each preceded what
academics would later classify as dependency theory. This is not to minimize the
dependency theorists by any means, simply to put the development of theory and exactly
who accepted modernization theory in proper context.
The 1 960s are associated as a romantic historical moment when revolutionary
change was possible. In fact, 1968 is singled out as the year when a global revolution
nearly took hold. Two of the era’s most recognizable revolutionary figures —their
likenesses which should have been hanging on the wall of every good revolutionaries
home — Che and Malcolm, both were infused by Africa’s revolutionary potential. Their
optimism was certainly a result of African countries foray into the international arena as
independent states. The fact that both Che and Malcolm would be disappointed
symbolizes the disappointment that the masses of indigenous Africans also shared.
Malcolm was infused by the idea of African unity, particularly through the agency
of the Organization for African Unity (OAU). He as many Africans believed that the
OAU would serve as a vehicle for reaching continental unity. The allure of independent
African countries codifying continental unity attracted the masses and pan-Africanists —
continental and diasporan. Malcolm made two trips to Africa, one in 1959 that largely
attempted to ingratiate the Nation of Islam with the orthodox Islamic world. The second
trip in 1963 inspired his forming the Organization of Afro-American Unity, modeled (in
name only) after the OAU. While Malcolm was well received, his stay in Ghana, the
base for all intents and purposes of the push for pan-Africanism, he received no
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significant counsel from Kwarne Nkrurnah. No plans were made — only platitudes. This is
significant since Nkrumah was viewed as one of, if not the leading voice of renascent
Africa. The failure of Nkrumah and Malcolm to formulate substantive plans symbolizes
the problematic. Both were victims of a nefarious counterintelligence program, which
they both underestimated. Secondly, while they and many other Africans (continental and
diasporan) embraced nationalism and pan-Africanism, embarking on this program after
capturing the state introduced variables for which they were ill prepared:
The emergence of African nationalism and African demands for national
self-determination (independence) of individual colonies followed a
different pattern than its classic European counterparts of earlier centuries.
The emergence of European “nations” (i.e. cohesive group identities)
generally preceded and contributed to the creation of European “states”
(the structures of governance). The net result was the creation of viable
nation-states that enjoyed the legitimacy of their peoples. This process was
reversed in Africa. In most cases, the colonial state was created before any
sense of nation existed. As a result, the creation and strengthening of a
nationalist attachment to what in essence constituted artificially created
African states became one of the supreme challenges of colonial
administrators and the African leaders who replaced them during the
contemporary independence era.55
Che Guevara’s foray in Zaire (presently the Democratic Republic of the Congo) is
an example of the historic development of revolutionary leaders and parties in Africa
throughout the 1960s and 1970s in the larger context of the Cold War led to proxy wars
in Africa, as a battlefield for American or Soviet interests. The attempts of African
countries to be nonaligned and seek a path of development independent of the two major
powers failed miserably. This of course raises the question as to why the failure? This
question has been debated fiercely by proponents of various ideological positions. The
55Peter J. Schraeder, African Politics and Society.’ A Mosaic in Transformation Second Edition
(CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2004), 8 1-82.
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classical liberal philosophy of Adam Smith, neoliberalism, dependency theories ranging
from world systems theory to the development of underdeveloprnent have all been
presented as sufficient ideologies from which to understand African politics. While all
have had more than sufficient groups of adherents, it is the liberal tradition that has
impacted policy the most over the last twenty years, not only in Africa but globally as
well.
The liberal tradition posits that the best way for nations to develop is through the
implementation of an open trading regime. Under such a regime, economic efficiency is
increased and economic growth maximized the more open an economy becomes.
Ultimately the consumer is supposed to benefit by having a wide range of goods and
services from which to choose. Competition is encouraged by this approach’s heavy
emphasis on individualism, a free-market economy, and private property. In this
framework markets tend to expand territorially, always in search of cheap labor, low
costs and high returns. The “market generally brings all facets of traditional society into
the orbit of the price mechanism. Land, labor, and other so-called factors of production
become commodities to be exchanged.”6 The argument supporting liberalism holds that
cultures are transformed from “traditional” to “modern” societies via the incorporation of
classical liberal and neoliberal ideology. The proponents of liberalism benefited from the
oil shocks of the 1970s, which led to a debt crisis for underdeveloped nations.
The Debt Crisis
During the 1 970s two oil shocks shook the foundations of the world economy,
56Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy ofInternational Relations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1987), 20.
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particularly those less developed countries, in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean,
and the Pacific that had no or few energy resources. Before the oil shocks of the 70s, the
creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel in 1960
transformed African economic relations. OPEC was created by the democratic
government of Venezuela in response to the hegemony of American oil companies that
controlled prices and production. Western Europe and Japan depended on cheap oil.
OPEC sought to restrict the monopolies while gaining a larger role in oil production and
prices. The majority of African nations relied heavily on petroleum products, ranging
from 60 to 90 percent of the energy required to power their factories. While African
countries enjoyed low prices for oil in the 1960s (roughly $2 a barrel) the rise of OPEC
in 1973 and the resulting oil crisis increased the price of oil to $12 a barrel. By 1981
following the second oil shock, prices for a barrel of oil soared to
$34•57
The result was
that larger percentages of the export earnings of African states were used to purchase oil.
By the early 1 980s African nations were using upwards to 60 percent of their export
earnings to purchase oil. Combined with a decline in agricultural prices and a lack of
foreign exchange, non-OPEC African nations were confronted with a massive balance of
payments deficit. The debt crisis of 1982 intensified the challenges of African countries
in the global economy. The crisis extended the cycle of borrowing, weakened Africa’s
position in international decision-making, and sharpened the balance of trade deficits and
terms of trade problems. While there are many causes for the debt crisis, particularly the
military buildup of African countries, decline in export earnings, decrease in foreign aid,
57The prices for oil are not constant and reflect the currency value only during that period.
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capital flight by foreign investors, and poor policies by African governments; the belief
here is that the two oil shocks, precipitated by a price rise by OPEC, profoundly altered
African economies since these events helped to usher in the hegemony of neoliberalism.
The resultant debt crisis created political instability, increased the level of
poverty, diverted resources from needed areas and ushered in huge debt servicing. The
response of African countries and the international community increased Africa’s
integration in the global economy. Integration in the global economy is a concept that
incorporates the economic, cultural, and political sphere. The removal of trade barriers is
an example of increased economic integration. The level of technology in a given society
also is an indicator for integration since technology often transports culture. As a result,
the presence of multinational corporations and the level of privatization may be indicative
of African countries’ integration in the world economy. International regimes that
facilitate trade between nations and the dissolution of tariffs and quotas are the major
conduits for integration.58David Harvey, author of A BriefHistory ofNeoliberalism, says
of this period “There has been an emphatic turn towards neoliberalism in political-
economic practices and thinking since the 1 970s. Deregulation, privatization, and
withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision have been all too common.”9
Since the early 1 980s the international economy has been characterized by two
dominant factors: 1) the free trade in goods and services and 2) the free movement of
capital. The stock prices, interest rates, and exchange rates of various nations are
58 Bela Balassa, The Theoiy ofEconomic Integration (Hornewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 1961), and F. M. Scherer, Competition Policies for an integrated World Economy (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1994).
59 David Harvey, A BriefHistomy ofNeoliberalis,n (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2-3.
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increasingly interrelated and international financial markets overwhelmingly have an
impact on economic conditions. Because of the role of international finance capital in the
fate of individual countries, we can speak of a global capitalist system — a system
favorable to financial capital, which can freely go where it is best rewarded.
Salience of Contemporary International Relations
Keohane and Hoffman argue “No longer is it meaningful to speak of
“Western Europe” and “Eastern Europe” as distinct entities; for the first time
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smce World War Two, “Europe” is a political as well as geographical reality.”
Europe has historically united de facto if not de jure in codifying an agenda
towards Africa. This agenda has always sought to maintain and expand Europe’s
“comparative advantage” over African nations. It is because of this historical
legacy that these nations share (oppressor and oppressed), that the trade
relationship remains insidious at best. The majority of African countries since
“independence” continue to overwhelmingly rely on Europe as the primary
location for their exports. The Lome conventions ostensibly were an attempt to
normalize a reciprocal trade relationship between Europe and Africa. John
Ravenhill offers that:
As the EU is fond of reminding its ACP partners, the convention is the
most comprehensive economic agreement offered by industrialized
countries to a group of developing countries. Besides a trade chapter,
which grants free access to European markets on a nonreciprocal basis to
most of the exports of the ACP countries, it includes a scheme to stabilize
ACP earnings from the export of agricultural commodities (STABEX),
measures to encourage ACP mineral production for the European market
6OSee Robert 0. Keohane and Stanley Hoffman, “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s” in
Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb, eds. The European Union: Readings on the Theory and
Practice ofEuropean Integration (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994) , 238.
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(SYSMTN), arrangements for specific quantities of ACP sugar to be
purchased by the EC at prices close to those paid to European producers,
institutions to promote cooperation in the fields of agriculture, and funding
for financial and technical assistance through the European development
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fund.
This program further entrenches Africa in the anachronistic notion of comparative
advantage (in the context of the international capitalist system) and their role in the
international division of labor. The Lomé conventions and Cotonou Agreement
conceptually are bankrupt in providing any meaningful solutions to Africa’s problems.
One of the central problems for contemporary African political economy, which will
surprise no one, is their continued reliance on agricultural exports. African nations
continue to export agricultural commodities while importing foodstuffs. One would
suppose that the philosophy or ideology one adopts would be libratory, however, instead
of transcending the deleterious effects this produces in African economies, the liberal
philosophy seeks to maximize their weakness. Only amongst the nations in the European
Union could Lorné be viewed as a rational choice. Certainly, the focus on providing
sugar to the EU (then EC) should concern African nations (as well as Caribbean and
Pacific nations) about remaining monocropic. As the world continues to make
extraordinary leaps in technology, the European Union demonstrates their vision by
agreeing to purchase sugar from the ACP producing nations. The Lomé Convention also
provides for the extraction of minerals by ACP nations for European Markets. Samir
Amin provides a searing indictment against the nature of these treaties:
6lSee John Ravenhill, “Dependent by Default: Africa’s Relations with the European Union” in
John W. Harbeson; Donald Rothchild, eds. Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1995) , 116-118.
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France has de facto retained privileged status in its former colonies,
notably by the bias of control over the franc zone; the conventions of the
association of the African states to the EEC show a concern for preserving
privileged status for Europe in regard to American and Japanese
competitors, despite the general opening-up of Africa implied by
worldwide expansion; that with Britain’s membership of the EEC and the
association of the African states, the jockeying for influence by the various
powers in Africa is even more overt; the kind of unequal relations renewed
in this framework in no sense represents progress towards the liberation of
Africa and development of its peoples, but on the contrary their restriction
to obsolete mining and agricultural specialization’s that are to Europe’s
advantage.62
During the 1980s Africa’s share in global manufacturing output bottomed out.
Thus, while the Lomé Convention theoretically grants free entry of manufactured goods
from the ACP nations, substantively it has taken no steps in providing for increased
manufacturing output. Peter Dickens states that the “Manufacturing industry is a small
proportion of these countries’ trade; the most important element of the Lomé Convention
relates to commodities and agricultural products.”63
The relationship between Africa and the EU is one that maintains rather than
transcends relationships codified during colonialism. The access granted to the European
market is limited to certain products, restricting products that compete with European
products. The nature of the goods being exported from Africa continues the dependent
relationship, meeting Europe’s needs as opposed to addressing Africa’s plight. The
problematic of Africa’s extraverted economies continues within this framework, which
only promises to become more insidious with the recent agenda of the United States.
External forces continue to shape Africa’s future, proceeding with a liberal agenda of a
62Sarnir Am in, Ma/development: Anatomy ofa Global Failure, 117.
63 Peter Dicken, Global Shfl: The Internationalization ofEconomic Activity (New York: Guilford
Press, 1992) , 165.
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free-market economy where Africa’s role is fixed as a supplier of raw materials and
agricultural products. Industrialization is the politically correct term pundit’s use
when describing Africa’s needs; however, the resulting reality leads one to question their
logic and reasoning.
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development in concert with Bill Clinton’s
Comprehensive Trade and Development Program for Africa are the most recent attempts
in a series of failed policy choices for African development. The signatories of NEPAD
are clear that the predicament Africa finds itself in is a result of numerous factors and that
globalization does not guarantee success. The primary factors pointed to in the NEPAD
are unfavorable terms of trade and poor governance. We should make no mistake in
understanding that poor governance, rightly or wrongly, has been emphasized as the
primary factor prohibiting African development. In accepting this argument, and
embracing all of its constituent elements, the framers of the NEPAD believe that
incorporating “good governance, entrenchment of democracy and sound economic
policy-making” make for the best possible engagement of the process of globalization.”64
What is interesting is the conscious decision to not challenge or resist the nature of the
international economy but rather to argue for increased involvement. The NEPAD states
“The new long-term vision will require massive and heavy investment to bridge existing
gaps.”6’ The NEPAD is being applauded by European, American, and International
Funding Institutions officials as the best Afiican proposal for development. This should
64Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr., “From Crisis to Renewal: Towards a Successful Implementation of
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development,” African Affairs 101 (2002): 394.
65The New Partnership For Africa’s Development (NEPAD). October 2001.
hrtp://www.uneca.org/eca resources/Conference Reports and Other-Documents/nepad/1 (9/9/2002).
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come as no surprise since the NEPAD does not pose any threat to the Neoliberal trading
environment. The NEPAD is striking for its refurbished and retread ideas, which its
framers pass off as revolutionary or symbolic of an African renaissance. While one could
take my word for it, a group of African scholars and activists met in Accra, Ghana on
April 23-26, 2002 to discuss Africa’s development challenges. Their assessment of the
NEPAD is summed up in their document as follows:
We concluded that, while many of its stated goals may be well-
intentioned, the development vision and economic measures that it
canvases for the realization of these goals are flawed. As a result, NEPAD
will not contribute to addressing the developmental problems . . . On the
contrary, it will reinforce the hostile external environment and the internal
weaknesses that constitute the major obstacles to Africa’s development.
Indeed, in certain areas like debt, NEPAD steps back from international
goals that have been won through global mobilization and struggle.66
U.S. Congress passed H.R. 434, the Trade and Development Act of 2000, which
included an African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The Clinton administration
pushed for and received its passage into law. The G.W. Bush administration supports
AGOA and views it as an integral component of U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa
as a way of increasing trade relations between the U.S. and sub-Saharan African
countries. The AGOA seeks to promote economic growth by partnering with African
governments and African regional organizations to develop better governance, more
transparent and open economies, political freedom, the reduction of poverty, and
expanded markets for U.S. exports.
The crux of the AGOA is duty-free market access to the U.S. for AGOA
66Africa: Accra Declaration on Development. April 23-26, 2002.
http://www.africaaction.org/docsO2/accr0204.htm. (10/1/2002).
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beneficiary countries. At the AGOA’s inception there were 35 beneficiary countries, a
number that has now increased to 40 beneficiary countries. To qualify as a beneficiary
country, the country must be located in sub-Saharan Africa, be moving towards a market
based economy that eliminates all tariff and non-tariff barriers, eliminates price controls,
parastatals, and subsidies. Beneficiary countries also must provide measures to protect
intellectual property. The countries that are afforded beneficiary status will be privy to
annual meetings of the United States-Sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Economic
Cooperation Forum, presided over by the secretary of commerce, secretary of the
treasury, and the secretary of state. Additionally, the president and congress have agreed
to put pressure on NGOs and the private sector to deepen their relationships with
beneficiary countries by holding their own set of annual meetings. The idea is that these
meetings will expose the beneficiary countries to not only potential trade partners but
best practices for creating an environment where free-market policies can take root and
flourish.
The primary component of the AGOA is the preferential treatment of certain
textiles and apparel. At least this is what has been applauded by supporters of the AGOA.
“AGOA will provide real opportunities’ to Africa. Even on conservative estimates about
Africa’s supply response, Africa’s non-oil exports could be raised by 8-11 percent.”67
These products are subject to Rules of origin (Roos), meaning that apparel articles
assembled and/or cut and assembled in beneficiary countries must use fabric wholly
67D.R. Mattoo Aaditya, The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and its Rules of Origin:
Generosity Undermined?: http://www.house.gov/rncderrnon/agoa!pdf/2002 worldbank working.pdf
(12/13/08)
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formed in the United States. Initially “fabric” did not include “knit-to-shape” apparel.
However, knit-to-shape apparel is included in the latest AGOA benefits. Of the 40
beneficiary countries 27 are eligible to receive the apparel benefits.
Impact
After the first year of the AGOA implementation 2000-200 1, U.S. exports to sub
Saharan Africa grew “17.5 percent to nearly $7 billion,” although the previous high was
$6,694 billion in 1998. The overwhelming majority of this increase was in “aircraft, oil
and gas field equipment, and motor vehicles and parts.”68 United States Imports to Sub
Saharan Africa declined the first year, primarily because of a drop in crude oil prices.
Crude oil dominated U.S. imports from sub-Saharan Africa and was followed by
platinum group metals, woven or knit apparel, diamonds, motor vehicles and parts, Iron
and Steel, and cocoa bean and preparations. Importantly, Nigeria, South Africa, Angola,
and Gabon accounted for 85 percent of U.S. purchases. South Africa was the only
country from that group that did not supply crude oil. A New York Times story describes
the correlation between South Africa’s automobile industry and the AGOA:
More than 80 percent of the cars made at BMW South Africa’s plant in
Rosslyn, about 10 miles outside of the capital, Pretoria, are for export.
Half of those, an estimated 25,000 this year [travel] to consumers in the
United States. The cars will enter duty-free, under a preferential trade
agreement intended to stimulate African economies.
Additionally, the World Trade Organization is now the main arbiter of free-trade
throughout the world. The Trade in Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS agreement).
68 2002 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharami Africa
amid lmnpiemetation 0/the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. District of Columbia: Office of the United
States Trade Representative.
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commitment to reduce tariffs and subsidies, particularly in sectors that do not benefit
African nations, have been the focus of international protests at the end of the 2O
century and beginning of the 2l century.
Methodology
The nature of my research requires the analysis of voluminous economic data on
Africa. The methodology best suited for this undertaking is two-pronged: first it is at root
a historical analysis of African politics primarily since 1980 but not solely restricted to
that period. Meaning, it is important to illuminate the political and econoinic
environment prior to 1980 but our central focus remains 1980—2001. Some of this
history will be presented in the first chapter and other portions will be analyzed in the
literature review. Since this dissertation encompasses case studies, a significant portion
of the research surrounds the collection and analysis of political historiographies of
Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, and Botswana. In addition to the historical analysis a
substantial part of the methodology centers on the collection and analysis of existing
statistics. The IMF, IBRD, and ADB publish annually African development reports.
global trade statistics, and world development reports.
The IMF publishes various working papers and an international financial statistics
yearbook. The World Bank publishes annually a World Development Report, African
Development Indicators, a report on Global Development Finance, and regional and
sectional case studies. Additionally the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) publishes an annual World Investment Report and the ADB
publishes statistics on African development indicators and working papers. These
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economic statistics are at present the best source available for data concerning African
economic development. The amount of capital flows, prices for commodities, Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI), foreign aid, statistics on rural development and gender are all
included in these various sources. Each of these areas will be examined from 1980 —
2001 for the selected case studies. Additionally, while it is important to present the data
from these various sources it is also important to extrapolate their interpretation of these
statistics before I provide my analysis. While there are numerous texts on African
development we are not aware of any study that has a specific focus on this time period
and analyzes the impact of capital on African development. Much of what one finds on
this subj ect concerns Africa’s relationship to the external funding institutions.
The statistics on capital flows will be analyzed for each country in the case study
and compared against the social reality for that period. We will be looking for more or
less equity, any indigenous movements against increased investment, employment
statistics, and any projects that may have resulted from increased IFC. A particularly
important characteristic to examine is the type of government that obtains increased
levels of IFC. This is important because of the rhetoric concerning democratization and
African countries. It is assumed that countries that are less democratic receive small
amounts of IFC relative to their more democratic counterparts. Furthermore,
democratization has been called for in Afiica as the panacea for what ails Afiican
countries.
Examining the historical development from 1980 — 2001 for each country in the
case study is extremely important to our methodology. This will provide the context for
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analyzing an increase or decrease in IFC and other possible reasons for unemployment,
lack of equity, and a lack of technological development. However, historical
developments before 1980 are also an integral component of our approach. What
becomes a key methodological component for this research is some of the assumptions
from development macroeconomics. Agenor and Montiel argue “developing countries
tend to be capital importers; face exogenous terms of trade; and rely heavily on imported
intermediate goods in the production process.”69 Whether African countries are fixed in
this process or are “developing” will be borne out through the methodology.
While this dissertation seeks to explain the increasing significance of IFC on
African development, every country is not surveyed. An analysis of aggregate data will
be performed; however, the case studies should provide specific information, which
allows for generalization. We attempted to pick a country from each region; high-
performing and low performing countries; democratic, non-democratic and countries in
transition; and countries which historically embraced capitalism or socialism.
Botswana provides an example of a high-performing country that is applauded by
Western governments as a model of democratization and free market integration. Since
Botswana is viewed as an African country moving in the right direction, analysis of its
development over the last twenty years should offer constructive information regarding
African development. Kenya is an African country that embraced capitalism early in its
independence and provides a historic contrast to Tanzania, which opted to forgo capitalist
led development and develop a model of “African socialism.” Additionally, the level of
69Agenor and Montiel, 20-3 8. The authors list twelve macroeconomic features which tend to
define development macroeconomics.
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corruption in Kenya, and Tanzania’s tentative embrace of capitalism over the past fifte
en
years offers an opportunity to examine where IFC goes and why. Nigeria was selected
because it has the largest population in Africa and most observers agree that Nigeria has
the best potential to be an economic force internationally. A dynamic that few African
nations can match. Botswana is Africa’s longest lasting multiparty democracy and
Nigeria is often referred to as one of the most corrupt nations in the world. The contrast
between Kenya and Tanzania should provide an excellent regional contrast that
highlights the differences between embracing capitalist led development and embracing
an alternative development model.
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Concepts
African Development Bank— Founded in 1964, the ADB’s primary purpose was to assist
the economic growth of the newly independent African states. In 1982 the members
allowed non — African states to join.70
Balance of Payments — “A tabulation of the credit and debit transactions of a country
with foreign countries and international institutions during a specific period
Transactions are divided into two broad groups: current account and capital account. The
current account is made up of trade in goods (so-called visible trade) and in services and
the profits and interest earned from overseas assets, net of those paid abroad (invisible
trade) ... The capital account is made up of such items as the inward and outward flow
of money for investment and international grants and loans”.7’
Capital — A social process that utilizes money and commodities as a moment in a
continuous process. Capital is a factor of production a good already produced) used to
create wealth.
Capitalism — A social and economic system where the means of production are privately
owned with the objective to maximize profit.
Democracy — A form of government characterized by the existence of free elections on
the basis of universal adult suffrage, free press, free speech, and an equitable distribution
and access to resources. This term is often separated into liberal and social democracy.
The term “liberal democracy” indicates an emphasis on individual liberty while “social
72 Graham Bannock, R.E. Baxter and Evan Davis, The Penguin Dictionary ofEconomics, 6th ed.
(London: Penguin, 1998), 5.
71 Ibid., 16-17.
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democracy” places emphasis on greater equity in the distribution of essential resources
and social benefits (such as old age pensions, health care, and education).
Derivatives — A generic term for futures, options, and swaps (i.e. instruments derived
from conventional direct dealings in securities, currencies and commodities). Trade in
derivatives increased substantially in the 1 990s, given their usefulness to company
treasurers and fund managers as a hedge against security price changes and currency
7
fluctuations. -
Development — A normative concept by increases in rates of economic growth, literacy,
health care, and decreases in ethnic cleavage, environmental degradation and corruption.
For any valuable meaning these concepts must be combined with an equitable
distribution and access to resources by all members of society.7
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) — Direct investment, which occurs across national
boundaries, that is, where a firm from one country buys a controlling investment a firm in
another country or where a firm from one country sets up a branch or subsidiary company
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in another country.
Free-Market Economy — Goods and services are exchanged with little to no regulation on
the basis of relative prices, and private property rights are protected.
72 Bannock eta!., 112.
73 Clearly, this definition means that no society can truly be said to be developed. The term is
more a goal to be reached than an existing state. Countries moving toward this goal and making
substantive policies to achieve it are considered as developing. This definition rejects the notion that
western industrialized countries are developed. We argue instead that they are advanced economically and
have historically “underdeveloped” African and other nations to advance their economic, cultural, political,
and social interests.
74 Peter Dicken, Global Shfl.’ The internationalization of Economic Activity, 2nd ed. (NY:
Guilford Press, 1992), 87.
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Globalization — The intensification of the movement of capital impacting the social,
political, economic, cultural, and religious spheres. This is fundamentally a process that is
primarily an internationalization of western views and values.
Gross Domestic Product — The value of all production within a country excluding only
income remitted by citizens who are living abroad and income from foreign investments.
Gross National Product — The value of all production by citizens and companies
including those located abroad.
Integration in Global Economy — This concept is characterized by membership in
International Funding Institutions, global trade regimes, and level of privatization within
a particular economy.
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) — A part of the World
Bank Group (International Development Association; International Finance Corporation;
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency). The purpose of the Bank is to encourage
capital investment for the reconstruction and development of its member countries, either
by channeling the necessary private funds or by making loans from its own resources.75
International Finance Capital (IFC) — Investments in the form of loans, Foreign Direct
Investment, Derivatives, and Portfolio Investment (stocks and bonds).
International Monetary Fund (IMF) — The Fund was established to encourage
international cooperation in the monetary field and the removal of foreign exchange
restrictions, to stabilize exchange rates and to facilitate a multilateral payments system
75 Bannock et. al., 215.
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between member countries.76
Neoliberalism — A commitment to the private ownership of goods and services, a free—
market economy and international regimes, which stimulate cooperation between nations,
and the free circulation of capital. Neoliberals advocate increased financial transparency,
downsizing of the public sector, the deregulation of private industries, and the lowering
of tariff and non-tariff barriers.
Portfolio Investment — Refers to the situation in which firms purchase stocklshares in
companies purely for financial purposes; that is, like any other investor, they build up
portfolios of company shares. But such investments are not made to gain control.77
Principle of Comparative Advantage — Countries can raise their income by specializing in
producing those goods in which it has a comparative or relative cost advantage. Those
same countries should import goods that they have a relative cost disadvantage. Static
advantage is based on short-run assessment and dynamic advantage seeks to maximize
their advantage over a longer period.
World Trade Organization (WTO) — Established in 1995 during the Uruguay Round of
negotiations. which led to the WTO replacing GATT. This agreement encompasses
GATT and includes trade in services and intellectual property.
76 Ibid., 217.
77 Malcolm Gillis, Dwight Perkins, and Michael Roemer, Economics of Development (NY: W.
W. Norton & Company, 1987), 18.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on finance capitaL international economics, development, capital,
capitalism, and the relationship of each to Africa is extensive to say the least. This
literature review therefore is not an attempt at exhaustiveness, but simply an endeavor to
highlight recent work and seminal critiques. Much of the literature in the various
categories is similar in the sense of utilizing similar concepts and historical references.
There is however, uniqueness amongst the various authors even in the midst of shared
beliefs. I will attempt to tease out the nuances between the different approaches by
organizing the discussion into three separate yet interrelated sections: (1) Capital and
Capitalism; (2) Global Finance; and (3) Africa and Global Issues.
Capital and Capitalism
In Capitalisni and Its Economics. A Critical History, Douglas Dowd argues that
much of what passes for economics is largely ideological. Dowd provides a cursory
analysis of economic thinkers throughout the historicity of capitalist development.
Primarily Dowd’s work is an attempt to move toward an understanding of the
contemporary notion of globalization and the exalted role which economists reserve for
markets. In essence, this represents an endeavor to construct a politico-economic
historiography of capitalism. For Dowd, the eighteenth-century French economist Jean
Baptiste Say was the forerunner of those who advocate free-market supremacy. It was
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Say who believed that “overproduction cannot happen” and “[whose] idea leads easily to
the firm stand that it is never necessary or desirable to interfere with markets, whatever
trouble they may seem to have brought.”l This constitutes the tone of Dowd’s work.
Additionally, and this is specific to the scope of our work, he operationalizes the
period from 1975 — 2000 as being particularly defined by large Transnational
Corporations (TNCs) and dominated by finance. Dowd’s assessment of finance seems to
be an appendage rather than a focus of his discussion. His critique of TNCs resonates
with a recent Monthly Review essay by John Bellamy Foster. Foster examines the notion
of monopoly capital and views this as a primary point of departure for analyzing “the
new globalization.” According to Foster “Radical dissenters frequently single out the
WTO, the IMF, the World Bank. and Multinational Corporations. . . for criticism, while
dc-emphasizing the system, and its seemingly inexorable forces. “2
This approach by Foster echoes the direction of this dissertation. In addition to
the work of Dowd and Foster, István Mészarós attempts a noteworthy reconceptualization
of Marx’s Capital. In Beyond Capital, Mészarós reemphasizes the strength of Marx’s
original while adding more breadth in relation to contemporary historical developments.
A critical component in his analysis concentrates on critiquing the Hegelian dialectic
which, in Mészarós’ understanding. viewed capital as an inescapable relationship guided
by a benevolent spirit which encompassed the best interests of civil society.3 In short,
I Douglas Dowd, Capilalisni and Its Economics: A Critical History (London: Pluto Press, 2000),
34.
2 John Bellamy Foster, “Monopoly Capital and the New Globalization,” Montith’ Review 53
(January 2002). This is an excerpt from Understanding Capitalism: Critical Analysis from Karl Marx to
Amartya Sen by Douglas Dowd.
3 Meszaros, 25.
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the Hegelian framework was limited by not seeking to transform what Mëszarós calls the
“metabolic mode of control” of capital. Capital is a mode of control that can only be seen
as benevolent from the interstices of the ruling class but when viewed from the
perspective of labor, comprises their doom. This point constitutes the germ of Mészarós’
thesis that:
Capital is not a ‘material entity’ — let alone a rationally controllable
‘mechanism’, as the apologists of the allegedly neutral ‘market
mechanism’ . . . tried to make us believe. . . but an ultimately
uncontrollable mode of social metabolic control. The main reason why
this system must escape a meaningful degree of human control is precisely
because it itself emerged in the course of history as a most powerful .
‘totalizing’ framework of control into which everything else, including
human beings, must be fitted, and prove thereby their productive viability,
or perish if they fail to do so.4
What Mészarós is constructing is a framework grounded on the analysis of Karl
Marx but clearly attempting to fashion a holistic understanding of capital and dissuade
counterintuitive claims of economic determinism. Mészarós however seems to engage in
a slight paradox, whereby he claims that capital, as a mode of control, is uncontrollable
but is “controlled by the private capitalists.”5 He tries to correct this by stating that the
private capitalists have misunderstood the true nature of the controlled/controller
relationship. What makes this further confusing is his argument that “capital’s coming to
dominate in the realm of material production and the development of totalizing political





Of primary interest and concern to Mészarós are the inherent contradictions
within the capitalist project. The primary contradiction is the need for expansion while
relying on national states for the command structure of capital. The contradiction is
resolved by essentially exporting exploitation. The “national states” provides a high
standard of living for labor and a liberal democracy for its citizens while supporting
‘authoritarian rule, exercised directly or by proxy, in the ‘underdeveloped periphery”.7
The crux of Mészarós s’ argument is that the system of capital, at all scales, wastes
human and material resources. This is no anomaly but inherent to its mode of social
metabolic control. The only solution for Mészarós is Socialist revolution.
Global Finance
Eric Helleiner produced a seminal work on global finance — States and the
Reemergence ofGlobal Finance. He notes the momentum of global finance since the
1950s, increasing to the point of even outstripping the daily value of international trade.
Helleiner points out that states’ role in this process is nothing less than integral:
States have played a much more central role in the reemergence of global
finance. By easing controls, states have given market operators more
freedom than they otherwise would have had. At critical junctures, states
have also chosen not to use comprehensive controls, the two mechanisms
proposed by Keynes and White in the early Bretton Woods drafts for
overcoming the difficulties of controlling capital rnovements.8
This observation counters the proposition that the nation-state paradigm is
anarchic because of MNC strength. Helleiner’s position elucidates a concert of
movement between states and international capital. Noticeably he does not
7 Ibid., 53.
8 Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence qfGlobal Finance: From Bretton Woods to the
1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 81.
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operationalize this relationship in the control/controller framework of Mészarós but both
works complement each other by stipulating the “still” salient role of the state. Helleiner
in an article “Regulating Capital Flight,” views capital controls as a constituent element
of the international financial order, with historical links to the Bretton Woods conference.
The argument provided is seemingly based on the widely held assumption that capital is
exported expeditiously from peripheral to core nations. A problem that Helleiner seems
to run into, as do other scholars, is that capital flight is limited to “citizens from many
poorer countries.., sending their money in the other direction.” This dangerously limits
the notion of capital to money and provides no presumed analytical value. International
Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods by Harold James examines roughly the same
period as Helleiner but lacks any notable analysis of global finance. In fact, whereas
Helleiner discussed the contemporary transcending of trade by finance, James focuses on
trade as the engine for the world economic system. Paradoxically James is less interested
in a critique of the international system than an explanation, as the title suggests, on
cooperation. Thus, short shrift is given to the dependency school and other critiques of
the international economic system. James does illuminate the views of Singer and
Prebisch, which is a start, but it hardly constitutes a serious effort to come to grips with
the strengths or weaknesses of that particular approach. To be sure James utilizes that
discussion as a bridge to discussing the role of the World Bank. In James’ opinion “The
Bank. . . stepped in where markets were nervous because of inadequate information, and
educated lenders as well as helping its borrowers.”9
9 Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretion Woods (Washington, D.C.:
International Monetary Fund: New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 135.
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The work of James is clearly preoccupied with trade and sustaining an open
global economy for capital. Philip Cemy, editor of Finance and World Politics, takes a
different perspective by asserting that the “most significant common denominator” in the
global economy is finance.lO This is a result of the shift to floating exchange rates which
Cerny argues constitutes a new period of international economic development. It was
following this period that international flows and attempts to regulate international
finance gained momentum. 11 Like Helleiner, who contributes a chapter to this work,
Cerny also places importance upon international financial developments over the last
thirty years as being the primary motive force in the global economy.
Cerny contributes a chapter “The deregulation and re-regulation of financial
markets in a more open world” which analyzes the time period this study is concerned
with. Here Cerny agrees with most scholars that the Thatcher and Reagan duo
represented an ideological counter to previous Keynesian influences. This counterattack
combined with “volatile capital flows” to situate financial regulationlderegulation at the
center of discussion. His analysis is not based on any particular case study; rather, Cerny
constructs an analysis of the financial system proper. His attempt at generalization
ultimately falls short because of a failure to explain specific aspects integral to finance
and world politics.
Where Cerny fails, Robert Solomon seemingly flourishes. Solomon argues that
the transformation the world economy absorbed in the 1 970s was a result of stagflation in
10 Philip Cerny, ed.. Finance and World Politics: Markets, Regimes and States in the Post
Hegemonic Era (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Pub., 1993). 17.
11 Ibid., 13.
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the industrial economies; an inability of centrally-planned economies to provide its
citizens with higher standards of living; and the borrowing by developing countries which
increased their debt burden. Solomon acknowledged the impact of ‘Reaganomics” as
reducing the role of the federal government; cutting non-defense spending and tax rates
and accelerating deregulation. Thatcher, Reagan’s ideological ally. also wanted a smaller
role for government while reducing the power of trade unions and mobilizing a concerted
effort for deregulation and denationalization. 12 Combined they provided a beachhead for
free-markets. Susan George in “A Short History of Neoliberalism” supports this
assertion where she critiqued the effects of Thatcher’s and Reagan’s policy. Essentially
the top twenty percent benefited while the bottom eighty percent stagnated or
regressed.13 The dialogue of George’s article relays a concern about the “losers” in
Global Finance, a stark contrast from the “magical markets” which pervade economic
and political analysis. This work complements another work by Solomon as well —
Money on the Move: The Revolution in International Finance Since 1980.
The neoliberal revolution as characterized by a variety of authors reached its apex
with the culmination of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations. The Uruguay
Round sought to:
Reduce all tariff levels by at least a third, completely eliminate tariffs in
many sectors, bring agriculture fully into GATT, abolish some NTBs,
tighten up on a wide range of rules, restrict government subsidies, lay the
basis for harmonizing technical standards, create an unprecedented new
12 Robert Solomon. The Transformation ofthe World Economy (‘NY: St. Martin’s Press, 199). 6-
7.
13 Susan George. “A Short History ofNeoliberalism” in Walden Bello. Nicola Bullard, and
Kamal Maihotra. Global Finance: New Thinking on Regulating Speculative Capital Markets (NY: Zed
Books. 2000), 33.
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pair of agreements covering services and intellectual property, begin an
assault on investment controls and strengthen the disciplinary processes of
the multinational system. 14
This process. for Dunkley, will result in non-economic factors outweighing
“speculative” dynamic economic gains. While the proponents of free-markets insist on
its merit as something intrinsic to human nature, Dunkley argues the converse that “free
trade is not a natural state of society.”15
Edward LiPuma and Benjamin Lee capture the essence of the problematic of
International Finance Capital in their work Financial Derivatives and the Globalization
ofRisk. LiPurna and Lee argue that financial derivatives are a part of the ‘culture of
financial circulation.” This culture encompasses speculative capital, financial derivative
products, and the “newly minted and determinative conception of risk.” 16 Rather than
view 1980 as a critical historical moment in the ascendance of international finance
capital as I and others have, the authors view 1973 as a critical historical moment. “1973
[is] the period when the fulcrum of power and profit began to shift from the production of
commodities to the circulation of capital.” 17 1973 is the year that the first oil crisis shook
the world and also represents the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. LiPuma and Lee
argue that this historical moment represents such a revolutionary departure, that t cannot
be viewed as simply another form of capitalism. They argue that financial derivatives
have produced new forms of domination that orthodox Marxists and critical theorists
14 Graham Dunkley, The Free Trade Adventure: the WTO, the Uruguay Round and Globalisni — a
Critique (NY: Zed Books, 200). 10-11.
15 Ibid.. 28.
16 Edward LiPuma and Benjamin Lee, Financial Derivatives and the Globalization of Risk




simply cannot explain by resorting to analysis of “class relations, private property,
material production, and also surplus value.” 18 The rise of derivatives produces a new
form of domination that is abstract. LiPuma and Lee discuss the rise of “abstract
symbolic violence” that results from the culture of financial circulation. It is “in everyday
life, [that] people experience the effects of the market...through the products they can no
longer afford, interest rates that make buying a home or improving a business impossible,
the retrenchment of social welfare policies...and a decline in the standard of living.”19
The abstractness of financial capital is very different from earlier stages in that
circulation is now valued over production and risk over labor. In fact, circulation
(primarily speculative) is the primary way of creating profit. The authors view neoliberals
as the main facilitators for creating a receptive environment for financial circulation. The
1973 oil crisis was the impetus to reverse the capital controls that Jolm Maynard Keynes
and Harry Dexter White (architects of Bretton Woods System) believed “were necessary
to allow governments to set interest rates to advance their domestic aims and to prevent
short-term speculative moments and flights of currency.”20 Keynes was clear about the
flaws of the free-market and the potential for revolutionary change as a response to those
flaws.
The significance of manufacturing, agricultural production, mining, et. al. has
now been overtaken by the use of financial derivatives. The above are all long-term







idea is.. .to discover pricing irregularities allowing for the arbitrage opportunities that are
a speculators dream: the realization of riskless or instantaneous profits.”2 I This certainly
benefits investors and those with the resources to exploit arbitrageable opportunities. It
does not benefit countries that seek long-term commitments. Moreover a popular
component to this culture of financial circulation of currency speculation, which can
devalue a currency overnight simply by predicting a downward trajectory of the economy
or concern over the direction of the government. LiPuma and Lee argue that ultimately
“no nation-state, not even the United States, can regulate the exchange value of its
currency, the character of its reserve assets, or the transnational movements of capital.”22
It is in this context that the valuation of derivatives by 2000 was at $100 trillion.
Financial Derivatives and the Globalization ofRisk is a work that compliments
this dissertation. The major difference is that I take 1980 as my point of departure and the
authors see 1973 as a watershed moment. Further, my discussion of International Finance
Capital encompasses what they call the “culture of circulation.” They deftly portray the
abstractness of this new form of domination in a way that does riot reify derivatives or the
culture of speculation. The notion that the culture of circulation is answerable to no state
on its face seems like reification. But what they do and I attempt to do, is delineate the
shift from production-centered capital, heavily influenced by the nation-state, to
circulatory speculative capital, which is external to the nation-state. More to the point,
The main reason why a market this large has been able to avoid detection
and regulation is that derivatives are too complex, too virtual, and





who investigate political economy and culture. In a sense, the derivative is
the perfect capitalist invention, because it seems to have no concrete form
sufficiently legible and visible to allow it to become a sustained subject of
conversation in the public sphere. The derivative surfaces only
episodically as a diffuse threat to the financial system when the public
learns of the failure of a firm or government agenc\...23
Africa and Global Issues
For a brief period the definitive work on Africa and its relationship to the rest of
the world was Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. What made this
work so appealing at the time was that while dependency theory picked up numerous
adherents in the late 1 960s. there was as yet no specific work committed to analyzing
Africas relationship to the international economic system. Walter Rodney filled a
considerable void. The work of Rodney incorporates the Marxist interpretation of history
and thus, examines notions of class struggle, development, imperialism, and the
trajectory of development. Further, African participation in the global economy is a
result of a dialectical relationship. Rodney plainly states “the contention here is that.
Africa helped to develop Western Europe in the same proportion as Western Europe
helped to underdevelop Africa.”24 It is in this vein that Rodney distinguished himself and
his work as providing substantive analyses for other activists. Rodney was clear that this
was a political contribution as much as a historical one:
The main request which you make is that the manuscript should be passed
on to an African historian, because you felt yourself unequal to the task of
judging its worth as ‘serious history’. It is an ideological challenge.
Unfortunately, there is scarcely anyone about, who combines my own
world-view with data about the African past. My procedure has been to try
as hard as possible to let the work be scrutinized by progressive
23 Ibid., 105.
24 WaIter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (D.C.:Howard University Press, 1981)
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individuals. To pass it on to a serious bourgeois historian would be a sheer
waste of time . . . The text aims at a strata of literate Africans in
universities, secondary schools, the bureaucracy and the like. They will
have to judge whether it makes sense in the light of present conditions in
Africa.25
At that moment, Rodney was the major person deconstructing the role of Africa in
the global economy. In an interesting twist, whereas Walter Rodney was writing during
the heyday of Marxism, Samir Amin published Maldevelopment: Anatomy ofa Global
Failure in 1990, which some regard as the beginning of the Marxist funeral. In fact,
Amin labels the “present age one of disillusionment.” Amin however is not analyzing the
“failure” of Marxism but of development. But criticism for Marxist analysis is not found
wanting as Amin chides Marxists for not developing categories for modes of domination
as they have for production.26 The significance of this work rests with Amin’s belief
that Africa’s development (or lack thereof) has continually faltered because African
economies failed to produce an “agricultural revolution.” This is noteworthy since many
authors tend to focus on structural adjustment, democratization, corruption, and debt
relief rather than the failure of agricultural development. The emphasis of Amin on
agriculture stems from his belief that “industrialization and social development are only
possible through an agricultural revolution.”27
As other authors have attempted to change the dialogue concerning African
25 Rupert Lewis, Walter Rodney’s Intellectual and Political Thought (Wayne State University
Press, 1998).
26 Samir Arnin, Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a Global Failure, 2.
27 Ibid., 8. Kinfe Abraham in his work The Missing Millions: Why and How Africa is
Underdeveloped, argues that “Africa[’s] agricultural process largely stems from (1) a dualistic
development policy which is biased against agriculture; (2) high population growth rates; (3) the pace at
which arable land and harvested areas are developed; and (4) technological change, which is leading to a
wide-spread stagnation or even decline in crop yields. (4)
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development, Amin attempts to reconceptualize the crisis ridden 1 970s and 1 980s as
primarily an attack on African peasants. Samir Amin argues that “the system of super-
exploitation of the countryside, established by colonialism, has not been challenged by
the neo-colonial system that faithfully carries on the tradition.”28 By locating the attack
on African peasantry as an extension of colonialism, Amin firmly locates himself in the
historicist tradition, a tradition shared by Rodney, Ake, Wallerstein, and Gunder-Frank.
This clearly does not mean they all share the same argument. There are particular
nuances between them. However, they are linked by an influence of Marxism that views
relationships dialectically. Further evidence of this is Amin’s assertion that the:
World capitalist expansion has always been and continues to be divisive.
From the outset it has caused and perpetuates a center-periphery
dichotomy inherent in currently existing capitalism. In this sense
peripheral development has always been a story of perennial ‘adjustment’
to the demands and constraints of dominant capital.29
The proposed solution by Amin is to delink. As we shall discuss shortly. this
notion is consistent with Fantu Cheru’s analysis and argument of an alternative based on
African solutions. Additionally, Amin does not focus specifically on capital but does
critique the “crisis of the state” as the result of a contradiction with the “increasing
worldwide expansion of capital.”30
In The Silent Revolution in Africa Fantu Cheru criticizes the single-mindedness of
the IMF/World Bank export led strategy. Cheru attempts to provide an alternative and





Cheru’s alternative to such strategies is “strategies that promote democracy, self-reliance,
accountability and sustainability.”3 I While Cheru focuses on the IMF structural
adjustment policies, the Berg Report of 1981 is taken to task for overlooking the need for
African governments to support small-scale industry, using local resources to meet
domestic demand.”32 Cheru clearly attempts to counter the prevailing notions of free-
market led development and democratization. Central to his critique is a
reconceptualization of the democratic idea. Cheru wants to change the dialogue on
African development to meaningful discussions on self-reliance. This ultimately means
rejecting closer integration into the global economy and increasing cooperation within
Africa by regional integration and with other underdeveloped states by South-South
cooperation. The following quote is lengthy but provides a summary of Cheru’s
arguments: The key to African development is the participation of the people in decision
making. In the Lagos Plan of Action and subsequent declarations on development
strategy, African governments have clearly articulated the strongly-held view that
Africans must be responsible for their own development and that outside agencies need
only support African initiatives. . . . If the dignity and vitality of Africa is to be restored,
people at all levels, must have the right to establish and manage their own organizations,
such as co-operatives, and organizations of women, youth, workers and consumers. .
without such changes, national policies will continue to be in the hands of the same
3 1 Fantu Cheru, The Silent Revolution in Africa
32 Ibid., II.
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corrupt local elites that mortgaged their countries.33
Cherus critique of the democratization process or more to the point, the type of
democratization, is shared by the work of Claude Ake. Ake, after such an inauspicious
beginning with his work The Theory ofPolitical Integration, developed a serious critique
of Africa’s relationship to the global economy. Ake founded the Center for Advanced
Social Science (CASS) as the institutional apparatus for his vision. While working at
CASS Ake published several monographs which focused on the prospects of democracy
in Africa. The first monograph published by CASS is Democratization of
Disempowerment in Africa. Ake puts a different twist on the democratization process by
arguing that Africa is democratizing the disempowerment of everyday people. This
process is a result of western financial institutions and governments’ pushing the idea of
liberal democracy, which is reduced to standard operating procedures of multipartyism,
free elections, transparency and free speech.34 The conception of democracy as electoral
competition benefits the elite in Africa who have the resources to exploit electoral
politics to their benefit. African politics is a struggle over state power that is undergirded
by an undemocratic process. This process necessitates a democratic transformation of the
state.35 Ake’s vision of democracy empowers the masses by involving them in the
process at the gateway. Moreover, democratization does nothing for the interests of the
majority Africans who live in rural areas and are subsistence farmers. Ake is concerned
with how:
33 Ibid., 161.
34 Claude Ake, Democratization and Disemnpowerment in Africa CASS Occasional Monograph
NO I (Port Harcourt, Nigeria: Malthouse Press, 1994), 1-3.
35 Ibid., 8.
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The process of democratization in Africa is not only leaving non-elites,
especially rural dwellers, disempowered but democratic participation now
tends to be a ritual affirmation of their disempowerment. . . The African
who is slated for democracy is a rural dweller, who lives in a society
which is still predominantly communal. She is a subsistence farmer toiling
for a precarious existence. She has virtually no access to safe drinking
water, health services and sanitary facilities and she is illiterate or nearly
so. What does democratization mean in this setting and for this person?
There is no chance at all that how she votes or whether she votes at all is
going to make accountable to her. . . She is offered only a spurious choice
which is framed by forces beyond her control, often beyond her
understanding and of little relevance to her needs.36
The democratization that he argues for is not vacuous. Free elections mean very
little if they are dominated by elites. They mean very little if the social relations of
production stay the same. Ultimately for Ake’ s vision of democracy to take hold a
transformation of the state must take place. For Crawford Young this is simply not a
vision of democracy but a “utopian integral-populist version.”37 Larry Diamond shares
Young’s view and others who view democracy in its most basic sense and believe
democracy will flourish in African countries that throw off the fetters of authoritarianism.
This coincides with the western notion of democracy and that supported by IFIs.
Another CASS monograph, The Marginalization ofAfrica: Notes on a Productive
Confusion details a little more how Africa can develop. Ake takes an ingenious look at
marginalization. Ake finds it interesting that for so long we have complained about
Africa’s tortuous integration into the capitalist world economy and then we oddly
complain about its marginalization in the world economy. While Africa is marginalized
in the sense of economic and political factors it achieves a prominence of sorts, albeit in a
36 Ibid., 20
37 Crawford Young. “Africa: An Interim Balance Sheet.” in Democratization in Africa edited by
Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (MD: Johns Hopkins University Pre4ss, 1999): 78.
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negative manner. The production process is what is essentially marginalized in Africa, at
the end of the day decreasing the value of primary products and terms of trade.38 Ake
unambiguously locates the African elite and international financiers as occupying a
duplicitous relationship which results in the underdevelopment of Africa. Central to
Ake’s analysis is the dialectical materialist construction of history. Thus, the
marginalization facing Africa is “what Africa needs” to develop. This forces Africans to
rely on their resources and collective will to develop. As Cheru pointed out, to date the
most progressive plan for African development has been the Lagos Plan ofAction which
offers a distinct contrast to the World Bank’s Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa: An Agenda for Action. Ake argues that:
The Lagos Plan 0/Action takes a holistic approach in several senses. First, in
treating agriculture and industrial development together and being methodically
attentive to the effects of the one on the other. Second, in recognizing the integral
relation of the internal and external causes of the African crisis. Third, in seeing
development as a task which must involve everyone and every sector, private and
public, agriculture and industry, labour, capital and peasantry. In this respect, it
leans towards participative development.39
The program of the World Bank was based on developing more access to the
African market and African countries continually focusing on primary production. As
pointed out by Ake, African leaders viewed this plan as a ruse to deepen Africa’s
exploitation in the global economy.
38 Ake, The Marginalization ofAfrica: iVotes 01? a Productive Confusion CASS Occasional
Monograph NO 6 (Nigeria: Malthouse Press, 1996). 7.
39 Ibid., 25-26.
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The culmination of Ake’ s CASS work is Democracy and Development in Africa.
Ake begins by examining the nature of the independent African state and concluding that
while the managers changed, the nature of the state remained. The African elite
embraced external led development while superficially acknowledging the need for self-
reliance. Again the burden rests with the indigenous elite who exploit a duplicitous
relationship with external interests. Predictably this results in the disempowerment of the
indigenous majority. Ake takes independence leaders to task, most notably Nkrurnah and
Kenyatta, for acquiescence in the development paradigm, which attempted to increase the
wealth of the nation as opposed to the people. The exogenous development strategies are
a result of a lack of vision from African leaders. Ake restates his argument about the
democratization of disempowerment but offers what he considers to be four
characteristics of suitable democracy for Africa:
1) Democracy in which people have some real decision making power
over and above the formal consent of electoral choice.
2) A social democracy that places emphasis on concrete political, social,
and economic rights, as opposed to a liberal democracy that emphasizes
abstract political rights.
3) Places as much emphasis on collective rights as it does on individual
rights.
4) Democracy of incorporation.40
These emphases from Ake and Cheru are characteristic of what can be considered
Marxist-influenced scholarship on African development. While not describing the
challenges Africa faces in Marxist language, the concepts utilized speak to works highly
influenced by the Marxist interpretation of history. The work of Rodney, Amin, Cheru,
and Ake represent the best critiques of Africa’s interaction in the global economy. Each
40 Ake. Democracy and Development in 4frica(DC: Brookings Institution, 1996). 132.
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focus critically on structural challenges posed by integration in the global economy and
views the relationship in strictly historical terms. It is because of this historicist position
that they are essentially dismissed by the work of George Ayittey. Ayittey believes that
Africa’s problems are primarily self-inflicted. In a somewhat crass conceptualization,
Ayittey described the types of African theorists as internalists and externalists. For
Ayittey constructing the schools of thought in this manner conveys a fundamental
understanding as to why Africa is imploding. Ayittey argues that “a mind deeply
obsessed with the past is incapable of cogent analysis of present and future issues.”41
This is particularly problematic since Ayittey emphasizes how the world has changed
over the last fifty to one hundred years. Ostensibly opportunities are available for
African states where they previously did not exist. Ayittey believes that the internalists
are best able to provide sound analysis of contemporary developments since they believe
that colonialism did hinder Africa but internal factors have made Africa’s plight
significantly worse.42
Ayittey’s work does provide some value for locating the various objectionable
practices by porous African leaders. However, we find the same critique in the work of
the so called “externalists” who Ayittey believes to shy away from such criticism. The
fact that Ayittey does not critique Africa’s relationship to the global economy in any
significant detail is shortsighted to say the least. It is because of this limitation that his
work has been applauded. In fact, Andrés Velasco in a recent article in Foreign Policy




While solely focusing on the Latin American theorists and experience, Velasco concludes
that “Liberalization of trade and investment is. . . here to stay by popular demand.”43
The type of work of Ayittey and Velasco offers no structural critique and are essentially
grounded in the behavioral approach. The other authors provide excellent insight into
Africa’s condition and there is much overlapping in their analysis. However, what seems
to also connect their work is a lack of emphasis on capital beyond a critique of the
funding institutions. It seems that Marxist authors focus on capital and negate Africa,
whereas Amin, Cheru. Rodney, and Ake while Marxist influenced, tend not to focus on
capital per Se. Because of the increasing impact of international financial capital on the
global economy in general, this is an aspect we can ill afford to negate or minimize.
In sum, I found the work on Africa and global issues to be illuminating and
helpful yet none have asked the questions that we ask for this specific time period. The
literature primarily is concerned with democratization, structural adjustment, delinking,
dependency, agricultural development, corruption, and to a lesser extent gender issues.
The focus of this study with an eye toward capital as a social process undergirding the
IMF and IBRD, to date has not been focused on in relationship to African development.
The critique of William Tabb is particularly pertinent. Tabb argued that “Labor and the
larger progressive movement need to give far more attention to the emergent international
financial regime now underconstruction.”44
Conclusion
43 Andrés Velasco, “Dependency Theory,” in Foreign Policy (2002) : 44-45.
44 William Tabb. “Labor and the Imperialism of Finance,” in Monthly Review 51, no. .5(1999):
20-34.
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In conclusion, the literature reinforces a few points: (1) global finance has become
the motive force in international economics; (2) the period beginning roughly in 1980
symbolized by the Thatcher and Reagan regimes represents a transition of sorts for the
global economy; (3) the increase globally of trade and investment popularly regarded as
globalization, has produced a rise in living standards for industrialized countries but
fundamentally structural problems remain; (4) African countries have opted en masse for
globalization.
There are only two studies that tangentially focus on the topic of this study and
only one is concerned even remotely with the same time period. Icheduru’s work
examines the period encompassing 1980-1991 but is specifically concerned with
structural adjustment. While his study is informative it does not fully capture the
dynamism of the period or the factors that gave birth to that particular stage of
development. The work of Mészarós and Tabb echoes our focus on examining capital
but clearly does not provide a substantial analysis of its relationship to African countries.
Therefore, after reviewing the literature, we conclude that no study has examined the
impact of international finance capital on African development from 1980-2001.
CHAPTER THREE
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNATIONAL FUNDING
INSTITUTIONS AND NEOLIBERAL PHILOSOPHY SINCE 1980
The crucial factor [of the Uruguay Round Negotiations] would seem to be the
emergence in the postwar period of a transnational market system which benefits
some and imports costs on others. The interests associated with the rise of this
system seek to pry open protected markets and to extend the internationalization
of economic decision making to new sectors of activity, and they have the
political resources to do so.
-Philip Cerny, Finance and World Politics.
Markets, Regimes and Slates in the Post
Hegemonic Era
Introduction
This chapter concerns how the international economic environment has developed
since 1980. The time frame however, is a misnomer of sorts. It is a misnomer because it
is always difficult to point to one historical moment as the critical or defining moment for
any specified phenomena. 1980 was selected in this instance, and widely accepted by
others, because of several factors that helped transform the international economic system
into a distinctly new era. The events of the late I970s and early 1980s are a result of a
dogged determination by the adherents of free market economics to chart a new strategy
for advancing their interests. To be sure there are significant differences and various
nuances to this eclectic group. What they seem to share is a harsh aversion for the
revolutions that shook the twentieth century, from the Bolshevik revolution to the
Vietnam conflict. During that phase tyrannical leadership, embodied best by Stalin and
Hitler, provided plenty of fodder for conservative anti-labor and anti-Marxist theories.
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The result is that an interesting dialectic is played out whereby the masses in the “third
world” were throwing off the fetters of colonialism, during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.
and declaring a self-determined, non-aligned strategy of development, while they were
being countered by adherents of a philosophy, which argued that the very essence of
freedom was the acceptance of the free market. Indeed, Friedrich Hayek equated the
nationalization and import-substitution schemes that would momentarily prevail during
the I 960s and early 1 970s for many newly independent countries with serfdom. Hayek,
and shortly thereafter, Milton Friedman, would both equate the essence of capitalism (the
unhindered search for profit), with liberty. I The exponential growth of the United States
economy following the Great Depression, mainly the post-WWII period, coupled with
the tyrannical regimes of Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini in the minds of many to validate
capitalism and the free market over alternative strategies for development. Although
Mussolini and Hitler represented right-wing states that shunned socialism and progressive
movements, this fact has not stopped people(mainly economic conservatives) from
placing them in the same category as Stalin. To be fair, this type of grouping is usually
reserved for the popular imagination and by pundits - not by scholars. The end result was
that a resurgent right-wing would slowly but surely ingratiate itself with the mainstream.
This turn of events was lucidly captured by David Ricci:
In the 1950s and 1960s. right-wing sentiments inspired what later
conservatives called the Old Right. This ideological conglomeration, a
I Naomi Klein provides a detailed examination of Milton Friedman in The Shock Doctrine: The
Rise of Disaster Capitalism (NY: Picador, 2007). Friedman is largely recognized as the leader of the
neoliberal/neoconservative movement. A movement as much against Keynesianism as it was/is for
unfettered free i-narkets. According to Klein, Friedman’s philosophy needed catastrophe’s in order to be put
in practice. A scorched earth policy of sorts, whereby, all government intervention is dissolved, labor
unions broken, wages cut, and the door flung open to private investors (i.e. the market).
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verbal catchall really, included such thinkers as Russell Kirk, Friedrich
von Hayek, James Burnham and Frank Meyer, such organizations as the
John Birch Society and the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, and such
journals as Human Events and William Buckley’s National Review. All
the elements that later became familiar as parts of the “New Right”
woridview were present in the Old Right, including a commitment to
Western tradition rather than moral diversity, a preference for individual
freedom and private property, and a generic American fear of communism
as the common enemy. Buckley summed up this outlook when he
defined American conservatism, in both its earlier and later incarnations,
as “a spirit of resistance to the twentieth century.”2
This conservative formation was not relegated to only a domestic point of view.
Rather, we see a similar defense and inflexible assertion of the Western tradition in
arguments developed by advocates of modernization theory. Modernization theory was a
clear attempt to shape the world according to western standards. A not so thinly veiled
effort was made to persuade the newly independent countries to open their markets to
International Finance Capital and embrace western notions of democracy. At times this
effort was advanced by the CIA in its attempts to advance strategic national interests,
which ultimately meant embracing dictators that opposed populist leaders — even if
democratically elected. While modernization theory was significantly challenged in the
1 960s and 1 970s its impact on development theory and the push for interdependence in
the 1 970s should not be underestimated.
The term “globalization” has been in use since the early 1990s to describe a
process that is as old as capitalism itself Expanding to new markets -cheap markets- is a
requirement built-into the system. The infinite search for profit, unhindered by
government interference is a feature of the system that binds all capitalists together.
2 David Ricci. The TransJrination ofAmerican Politics: The New Washington and the Rise of
Think Tanks (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 155.
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Since expansion is part and parcel of the capitalist process rather than simply an
aberration, globalization is viewed here as an integral component of capitalism. Even
with this caveat in mind however, the role that International Finance Capital plays or the
influence it has, expanded significantly since 1980. Tn fact, trade in financial derivatives
barely registered a blip on the international economy during the I 970s. Now it outstrips
all other forms of trade — even if it has been overvalued.
Keynesianism
While it stands to reason that in a world dominated by capital, picking a particular
period as more important than another or representing a fundamental change from
another period, may be disingenuous; a movement away from the welfare state and desire
to open the markets further to International Finance Capital marks a significant moment
in contemporary international politics. In this vein. 1980 marks the rise of Thatcher
(1979) and Reagan (elected 1980), a decade long culmination of neoliberals and
neoconservatives asserting their ideology, and the second significant oil shock. More
importantly, by 1980 Keynesian economics, which had dominated economics for much
of the twentieth century, had lost much of its vitality as it was increasingly under attack
by conservatives and neo-conservatives. Keynesian policy had a profound impact on
economic theory and fiscal policy before and after his publication of The General Theoiy
ofEmployment, Interest, and Money. his magnum opus.3 Although it should be pointed
out that before publishing The General Theory Keynes wrote ‘The Economic
3 Keynes was not the first to argue for a reform of classical liberalism. In fact, nations began to
move to some type of reform before his 1936 publication. Eric Hobsbawm provides a useful survey of this
period in The Age ofExtremes: A Histori’ ofthe World, 1914-1991. Chapter 3, “Into the Economic Abyss.”
covers with the Keynesian influence.
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Consequences of the Peace” which critiqued the Treaty of Versailles and anticipated his
post-1929 focus. Keynes influence stems from that period and peaked during the Great
Depression. While every schoolchild knows laissez-faire. many do not know the type of
reform Keynes helped to shape. His basic proposition that aggregate demand can and
should be influenced by fiscal policy and not simply market forces reformed classical
liberalism and capitalism. It may not be a stretch to argue that it prevented either a
revolution or a counter-revolution in America and other parts of the world during the
1930s. Before 1929, American businessmen were in large part admired but the unbridled
speculation, which was a significant factor leading to depression, left very few Americans
with a warm heart for seekers of unfettered profit. Largely as a result of John Maynard
Keynes, the government would take a more activist role in the economy and international
funding institutions (GATT, IMF, World Bank) were organized following WWII to
provide oversight for the international economy. Oddly enough. the two principal
international funding institutions that Keynes helped create now spend an inordinate
amount of time disabusing sovereign countries of the notion of an activist government in
the economy.
Keynesian economics was dominant in the United States and Western Europe
from approximately 1930 to 1980. Unmistakably. this period spans revolutionary
movements and struggle in Africa, African independence and post-independence history,
the Civil Rights, Black Power, global student protest and anti-war movements. Many
underdeveloped nations, while not utilizing Keynesian economics in the strict sense
(many were Marxist inspired) incorporated the notion that sound fiscal policy positively
influenced aggregate demand. Import substitution policies became the latest rage as
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former colonies devised schemes to empower themselves and not be beholden to external
interests. The result was an abundance of parastatals that often failed to deliver the type
of development promised by leadership. This prospect coupled with the rise of
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in the late 1960s and early 1970s, created a
significant challenge to state “hegemony” in the economy or so was argued at the time.
In fact, numerous studies were published at the time regarding the supposed challenge
posed to the Westphalian system by MNCs and increased interdependence: l3arnet and
Muller published Global Reach: The Prni’er ofi’Iultinational Cotporations, Richard
Rosecrane Rise ofthe Trading State and Harry Magdoffs The Age ofImperialism: the
Economics of US. Foreign Policy. There were stirrings from all ideological persuasions
about the “rise” of MNCs, which led one author to predict that “when the history of the
late twentieth century is written, it will surely be said that it was the operations of
industry that did more than anything else to undermine the overwhelming dominance of
the nation state over the condition of man for the last three centuries.”4 Much of the
debate centered on the MNCs ability to transcend state relations or dictate policy because
of their enormous potential. While Rosecrane did not specifically focus on MNCs, he
was still prescient in stating that “international openness, low tariffs, efficient means of
transport. and abundant markets offer incentives to many nations’ that have only to find a
niche in the structure of world commerce to win new rewards.”5 Rosecrane captures the
very elements of an order dominated by International Finance Capital. IFC requires
4 Hugh Stephenson. The Coming Clash: The Impact ofMNCs on National States (NY: Saturday
Review Press, 1972).
5 Richard Rosecrane, The Rise of/he Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern
World (Perseus Books Group, 1986). ix.
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openness. the abolition of tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). and the privatization of
the economy whereby MNCs are able to flourish. The change to this type of international
regime in large part results from the events of the early 1970s. Although there has been a
recent backlash, particularly in Latin America, against the hegemony of IFC, it remains
the dominant force in international political and economic relations.
Keynesian dominance of domestic and international economics was severely set
back when the United States, whose currency was the underpimiing for the Bretton
Woods System, began to suspend gold payments in 1971. The suspension of gold was
historic and effectively ended the regime of “fixed” or “pegged” exchange rates.
Countries were now allowed to “float” by adopting flexible exchange rates. Between
1946 and 1971, gold was backed by the dollar at $35 per ounce. To further complicate
matters, the United States proceeded to levy a 10% tax surcharge on all imported goods.
The result was a system (Bretton Woods) thrown into crisis because the dominant
economic power was incapable or unwilling to keep the system afloat. But in one of
history’s ironic moments, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
which to a large extent was an outgrowth of Arab nationalism and to a lesser extent
underdeveloped nation’s attempt to create leverage for themselves in the international
trading environment, set the wheels in motion for the transformation of the world
economy that would soon come to be dominated by finance and investment capital.
Oil Shocks and Collapse of Bretton Woods
The two oil shocks of 1973-74 and 1979-80 damaged underdeveloped nations (in
this case African nations) more than any other group. The tripling of the price of a barrel
of oil created significant challenges to oil importing nations, especially those following
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Keynesianism or Marxism. This is the case because of these regimes’ propensity, for
very different reasons, to spend on social programs. The need to allocate more financial
resources for the consumption of oil lessened government’s ability to meet the health and
educational needs of its citizenry, particularly when there already was a struggle to meet
those needs before the price rise. Further, African nations ability to pay back their debts
was put at severe risk. Now the irony I alluded to earlier was a result of OPEC’s
willingness to stockpile their profits in western banks. The banks in turn lent vast
amounts to underdeveloped countries. Robert Solomon at the time argued that. “The
developing countries incurred very large deficits as a result of the recession, and their
financing needs exceeded by far what would have been required to meet the higher costs
of oil imports. This is a major problem for 1976 and beyond.”6 The problem for
underdeveloped nations was so dire that in retrospect the 1950s and 1960s surge of
independence that brought so much promise would seem like a distant dream by the end
of the 1970s. To further complicate matters, the collapse of the Bretton Woods System
led to increased protectionism amongst the leading industrialized nations. While they
turned inward in the 1 970s the international environment would view that as anathema in
the next decade for underdeveloped nations.
African nations had experienced a modicum of economic growth to varying
degrees during the I 960s and countries such as Tanzania spread African activists
throughout the diaspora. We are on safe ground assuming that many African countries
were on a high from independence, even in light of the Biafran War, and revolutionary
6 Robert Solomon. The International tWonetarv System, 1945-1976: An Insider’s View (NY:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1977), 300.
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struggle in Guinea-Bissau, South Africa, Rhodesia, and places for African liberation. But
if we examine the impact of African independence movements and other “third world”
nations asserting themselves, and oppressed people globally, a decisive counterattack was
waged, which ostensibly shaped the international system in IFCs best interests.
Conservative Backlash
The success of independence movements, often accompanied by charismatic
leadership with populist undertones, coupled with the social movements in the United
States to create a conservative backlash against the left. In the United States the backlash
took the form of a conservative movement that was determined to stem the tide of the
Civil Rights Movement, Black Power Movement, and Anti-war movement. Additionally,
and more pertinent to our focus, the conservative movement attempted to wrestle
economics away from the grip of Keynesians. The key to conservative success was
largely a byproduct of “first, rates of inflation began to rise more rapidly in the
industrialized world from the end of the 1 960s. Second, unemployment began to increase
along with inflation during the 1 970s.”7 Richard Nixon seized upon the economic impact
of Vietnam to begin the process of dismantling Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society. The
political and economic realities that led to resurgent conservatism ushered in a movement
to reestablish capital as a ‘social metabolic mode of control.” Peter Hall provides a brief
overview of this conservative link:
Monetarist doctrines also had a special appeal for conservative politicians
because they provided a new rationale for policies that conservatives had
long espoused, including reducing public spending and taxation, limiting
7 Peter Hall, “Monetarism” in The Oxford Companion to Politics ofthe World, edited by Joel
Krieger (Oxford University Press, 2001).
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state intervention and the power of trade unions in order to reinforce the
role of market mechanisms in the allocation of resources, and renouncing
the responsibility of governments for unemployment. Thus, monetarist
arguments began to figure prominently in the market oriented programs
that conservative politicians promulgated during the 1970s and 1980s.8
The point that must be reiterated here is that the regime of IFC was not and is not
solely relegated to responding to market forces and economic debates. After Vietnam,
because of the negative critiques of war influenced of course by body bags returning and
not soldiers, proxy wars became the number one alternative to advance U.S. political and
economic interests. At the time, U.S. foreign policy decisions were very much concerned
with strategic economic interests and not humanitarian. Therefore, the installation of
tyrannical leaders’ vis-à-vis U.S. military intervention was less about democracy and
more about making the world safe for capital.9 While the administrations of Nixon, Ford,
and Carter generally supported financial liberalization; it was not until Reagan that a
religious like zeal for financial liberalization took hold. More precisely, no two political
figures did more for the regime of IFC than Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher:
In foreign policy, Reagan breathed new life into the rhetorical division of
the world into a free west and slave east that made the United States and
its allies, by definition, part of a “crusade for freedom”.. .Reagan
expanded the category [of freedom fighters] to include armed groups
struggling to overthrow mostly established Third World governments
friendly to the Soviet Union.. .In his 1964 nominating speech for
Goldwater, Reagan had declared freedom the central value of American
life and identified two threats to its survival: communism abroad and big
government at home.. .the “free market” took its place alongside the free
world as the essence of freedom.. .economic freedom for Reagan meant
dismantling economic regulations and reducing the power of unions. 10
8 Peter Hall. 556.
9 Christopher Hitchens, “The Case Against Henry Kissinger,” in Haipers Magazine (March,
2001). Hitchens provides a detailed analysis of the influence Kissinger had on U.S. foreign policy and how
this policy was crafted on the basis of strategic U.S. interests — be they economic or political.
10 Eric Foner. The Story ofAmerican Freedom (NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), 321.
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The first policy implemented by the Thatcher regime was to end Britain’s
arrangement of exchange controls. I I This was in line with the conservative backlash
against Keynesian economics, which dominated Britain since the 1930s. Neoliberalism
took root in Britain with Thatcher and in 1981 in the United States when Reagan assumed
office. Both regimes had a profound influence on the major international funding
institutions and were able to direct their course, in terms of neoliberal policies since 1980.
Because the two oil shocks had particularly deleterious effects for the underdeveloped
economies, causing widespread debt, the major Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and
World Bank, exploited the [situation] to dictate neoliberal prescriptions. The first shoe to
drop was in Mexico 1982 when the government “[suspended payment] to its foreign bank
creditors.” 12 The possibility of Mexico defaulting on its loans would have compounded
to include other Latin American countries at minimum, thereby jeopardizing the
neoliberal renaissance. The United States moved quickly to stave off the crisis by bailing
Mexico out of its crisis but “The United States made it clear to the Mexican government
that no rescheduling agreement could be reached with the banks unless it first accepted a
tough austerity and restructuring program designed to restore the confidence of foreign
creditors.”13 This was a foreshadowing of what would be a common practice for
underdeveloped countries. The IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs
required borrowers to accept certain conditions, most notably reduction in state
Ii Eric Helleiner. States and the Reemergence qfGlobal Finance. From Bretton Woods to the
1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). 150.
12 Pierre-Richard Agenor and Peter J. Montiel, Development Macroeconomics, 2d ed. (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1999), 547.
13 Helleiner, 176.
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involvement and a devaluation of the state currency. The Bank’s position was driven
home in a controversial report, The Berg Report, in 1981. This report was in stark
contrast to the Lagos Plan of Action (1979) which sought to transform African economies
from an export orientation that was not diversified, to a self-reliant orientation with
forward and backward linkages. Fantu Cheru offers a stinging and concise critique of the
Berg Report:
Throughout the Berg Report suggests a period of austerity associated with
increased dependency of the continent on the countries of the North. The
Bank’s vigorous campaign to force African countries into accepting free
market and export-led strategies condemns the continent to its traditional
colonial role as a supplier of cheap raw materials and as an importer of
expensive manufactured goods from the West. The more pressing need for
a fundamental domestic restructuring that would involve input by the
population for building an equitable and self-sufficient economy is not
seriously considered in the bank’s agendai4
The impact of the leading industrialized countries and leading financial
institutions collaborating in pushing a neoliberal agenda, had a ripple effect throughout
the global economy. It became clear that in order to gain any concessions for debt
rescheduling, the neoliberal program had to be adopted. In turn, more opportunities were
created for International Finance Capital. The international financial market has
experienced exponential growth since 1980. Derivatives have taken center stage as an
increasingly common transaction. In fact “today, most major institutional borrowers and
investors use derivatives.” 15 The transition however to a regime dominated by
International Finance Capital stunted any notions of self-reliant growth, making the
14 Fantu Cheru, The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development and Democracy (London:
Zed Books, 1989), 9-14.
15 Robert Solomon, Money on the Move: The Revolution in International Finance since 1980
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1999), 110.
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Lagos Plan of Action sheer folly in a decidedly neoliberal environment. The dominance
of IFC coupled with the retreat of the radical left (i.e. Marxists) led the vast majority of
African countries to tread the path laid by the major industrialized countries and
International Funding Institutions. The end result following a slow growth period from
1989-1993 was an increase in deregulation and “the removal of restrictions on foreign
ownership which had impeded inflows of foreign direct investment.” 16 Deregulation and
increased integration of course were only enhanced by the Uruguay round of
negotiations, which included the transition from the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT) to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO agreement has a
particular emphasis on financial services. These events and agreements since 1980 has
made it easier for international investors to gain entry and make profits, however, for
African countries, which continue to be hindered by their lack of diversification, they
continue to struggle to protect commodity arrangements. Furthermore, the WTO has
failed to curb agricultural subsidies by the West, most notably by the United States,
which places African farmers at a decided disadvantage. The absolution of the subsidies
would benefit African farmers and others because of their low production costs.
Conclusion
This chapter reviews some of the major changes that has taken place throughout
the world since 1980. As dynamic a century as the twentieth century was, prior to 1945
there were no international economic institutions to guide or oversee the international
economy. Earlier efforts to produce an International Trade Organization (ITO) were
I6Agenor and Motiel. 577.
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stillborn. The sociopolitical and socioeconomic context created by World Wars I and II
influenced the desire to create a more interdependent world and a world that rejected
classical liberalism.
The first half of the twentieth century led to the dominance of Keynesian policies
at a moment when manufacturing and industrial interests held sway over the international
landscape. Underdeveloped nations sought to develop these industries through a series of
failed policies, while simultaneously attempting to provide the infrastructure necessary
for development. Although the late 1950s and 1960s were decades of hope for formerly
colonized countries, they were soon mired in debt and forced to adjust to a changing
international environment that rejected Keynesian policies. In fact, the transition after
1980 to an international economy dominated by finance capital constitutes a
revolutionary moment when we consider how the world was organized for much of the
20th century. It represents a seismic shift that African countries still have not adjusted.
Many African economies are still trying to develop and need to develop their land, labor,
and capital (i.e. production). However, the international economy is dominated by banks,
portfolio investment, derivatives, and foreign direct investment (i.e. finance capital).
CHAPTER FOUR
BOTSWANA
The most significant goal of Botswana was to reduce its vulnerability to its
powerful neighbors.
- Richard Dale, Botswana ‘s Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa
Introduction
Globalization has been discussed ad nauseam since the early 1990s. Discussions
concerning the benefits or drawbacks of globalization are sure to stimulate energetic
debate among policy makers, academics, and activists. The context in which
globalization is usually discussed centers around the influence of specific countries, the
usual suspects being the United States, Western Europe and Japan. However, as a
strategy for “proving” the inefficiency of alternatives to free-market development,
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brazil, and to a lesser extent India have all
been put forward as examples of how globalization can transform previously
“undeveloped” societies. When the discussion turns to Africa and critics are likely to
lament the “basket case” syndrome, we can be quite sure to hear the utterance that Africa
should “look at what the Asian Tigers have done over the past 30 years.” However,
during that same period, there is a well-known suggestion that Africa does indeed have a
homegrown example to support the belief that the free-market lifts all boats. This chapter
is an attempt to come to grips with the veracity of that proposition.
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The history of Botswana provides an interesting corridor into the understanding of
African development. Botswana, like most African countries, has struggled to throw off
the fetters of its colonial past. This historical challenge of Botswana’s past provides a
microcosm of Africa’s exploited past. Botswana’s history is very much a history of
external dependence resulting from European colonialism; dependence on a larger
neighbor (South Africa); indigenous resistance and cooptation of indigenous leaders; and
a nominal independence where Botswana has struggled to diversify its economy.
Botswana presents an interesting case study because of the prevalent view among
advocates of liberal democratic capitalism that Botswana is “the” success story in Sub
Saharan Africa. The perception that Botswana is a success — relative of course to the rest
of Africa — is based on apparent low levels of corruption; an openness to foreign
investment; consistent GDP growth; a tradition of liberal democracy; a willingness to
reform or restructure their economy; and abundant diamond mines to exploit and
providing Botswana with a comparative advantage. This chapter will critically examine
the character of Botswana’s development historically while emphasizing post-colonial
strategies for development.
Historical Context
The history of the people of Botswana although extending back to the fifth
century A.D., was deeply altered by contact with Europeans in the 19111 century. Before
the interlopers arrived, the Tswana. the dominant ethnic group in Botswana, primarily
lived in a subsistence economy that heavily relied on cattle production and hunting. In
fact, cattle production is an instance where the colonial economy did not alter a
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traditional practice and continues to play a major role in Botswana’s economy. Not
unlike other African societies, following contact with the colonizers, the Tswana soon
were engaged in an internal and external struggle, which would overdetermine their
future path of development. Externally they had to ward off the ever-present threat of the
London Missionary Society, German missionaries and the Boer Republic. 1 European
settlers long had their eyes set on Southern Africa not only as a source for resources but
as a strategic location to the Far East and as a corridor to North and East Africa. The
Southern Africa region represented a virtual European paradise, which could serve as a
retreat for the wealthy and ostensibly as a location to “civilize” backward Africans.
Despite the fact that the scramble for Africa proper begins in 1884, military struggle
between the colonizers and indigenous people of Southern Africa was marked throughout
the 1 9th century. Although the most cited resistance is the Zulu revolution, the Tswana
waged a protracted physical resistance as well. Ultimately having to contend with raids
from the neighboring Ndebele and the Boers proved too great an impediment in the
Tswana’s attempt to defeat the colonizers. Perhaps as a precursor for things to come
following colonization, indigenous Tswana King Kgama, along with other kings in the
region, who although they “may have abhorred the principles of westernization and
colonialism, they none the less were in desperate need of foreign support to assure their
survival ... they ultimately adopted missionary alliance and British ... protection as
essential instruments of policy.”2 A well-known dilemma indicative of the impossible
1 Louis A. Picard, The Politics ofDevelopment in Botswana: A Mode/for Success? (Boulder: L.
Rienner Publishers, 1987), 26-27.
2 Ibid.
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choices African countries were faced with under colonialism.
Once the Batswana began to acquiesce to colonial interests, the door was open to
establish Botswana as a base for migrant labor for the principal jewel in the British crown
South Africa. During the Berlin Conference, the Batswana, as a result of Kgarna’ s
relationship with the missionaries, were able to become a part of the British protectorate
in 1885, henceforth known as the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Botswana, as other
Southern African nations, would be underdeveloped vis-à-vis their connection with South
Africa. South Africa’s prime coastal location and plethora of resources was an excellent
opportunity for the British to establish a port off the coast of Africa. What one quickly
notices upon researching the history of Botswana is that “the indigenous Bechuanaland
society was transformed into a dependent society which supplied cheap unskilled labor.”3
It is within this context that Botswana’ s history is representative of Afiican History as it
regards the continent’s colonial past. The Batswana were quickly viewed as a resource
for the Kimberley mines, which would come to serve as the cornerstone of the Debeers
diamond monopoly, which until recently, dominated the international diamond industry.
Since Botswana’s status as a protectorate until the present, the mining and cattle industry
have served as Botswana’s economic lifeline. Louis Picard reveals that:
Britain’s priorities in Bechuanaland were to stimulate the cattle industry
and encourage labor migration at the expense of an expanded role for
Botswana in the trading sector or in agriculture. Britain’s interest in
Bechuanaland’s agricultural production was limited to the small European
community resident in the eastern part of the territory. The colonial
administration’s limited interests in African agriculture was linked to the
vested interests in the preservation of the European trader’s role as agent’s
3 Jack Parsons, “The ‘Labor Reserve’ in Historical Perspective: Toward a Political Economy of
the Bechuanaland Protectorate” in The Evolution ofModern Botswana; Politics and Rural Development in
Southern Africa by Louis Picard (university of Nebraska Press, 1985), 53.
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for food imports, part of their larger monopoly of the entire import trade.4
Picard’s observation is timely because it contextualizes the nature of Botswana’s
development. In like manner, Samir Amin emphasizes as much as anyone the lack of
prominence given to agriculture when considering African development writ large.
Botswana’s economy was manipulated during the colonial era to be extraverted and meet
Britain’s needs, or rather, to satisfy England’s strategic economic interests. More to the
point, the Botswana economy was constructed to further South African and British
aspirations as global political and economic hegemons. Consequently, there was a
concerted attempt on behalf of the colonizers to make South Africa the imperialists most
favored nation in Southern Africa. Our concern here is how this relationship was or was
not transformed following “independence.”
Colonialism
It stands to reason that a central query proffered when examining African
countries should be “did the social relations of production change during the transition
from colonialism to independence?” In analyzing Botswana and any other African
country, the answer to this question will provide a critical answer for where Africa is
going and needs to go in the 21st century. Certainly our answer must be empirical but
also normative in our attempts to understand African development. One can readily
understand that British and South African duplicity resulted in Botswana not being
industrialized after gaining independence and that “Botswana had no manufacturing
industry worthy of the name. Besides the [Botswana Meat Commission], there were only
4 Picard, (1987), 113.
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six firms employing more than 50 people.”5 Although Botswana was extremely
underdeveloped by 1966, from that time to 1995 they were able to average a 6% annual
increase in GDP.6 An annual increase of this type is excellent for a highly developed
economy let alone a newly independent county. Whereas some African countries aligned
themselves with anti-capitalist regimes, Botswana was able to cultivate significant
resources in the educational and scientific fields by utilizing the expertise of numerous
countries, the most prominent being the United States and Soviet Union. That they were
able to manage this during the Cold War speaks volumes about their function as a
moderate country.7 A conscious effort was made to not engage in the ideological and
revolutionary — counterrevolutionary struggle during the Cold War. Botswana’s function
as a moderate country has been a constant since 1966 through the regimes of Sir Seretse
Kharna, J. Quett K. Masire, and Festus Mogae. In fact, Batswana now often refer to their
country as “the Switzerland of Africa.” The reference is of course to the Swiss’ well-
known neutrality, which the Botswanan government firmly believes will enhance
Botswana’s attractiveness to international investors. To be sure, the evidence tends to
support this assertion.
Independence
In the late 1960s throughout the developing world there was a pervasive optimism
about the future of Africa and its relationship to the rest of the world. This optimism was
5 Balefi Tsie, The Political Economy ofBotswana in SADCC (Harare: Sapes Books, 1996), 108.
6 Presidential Task Group for a long term vision for Botswana, A Frameworkfor a Long Term
Vision for Botswana (1996), 10. Robert Curry posits that the percentage is 7.3%. Curry, “The Legacy of
Sir Seretse Khama: Botswana’s ‘Real’ Diamond Mine.” Paper Presented at Association of Third World
StLldies Conference, November 2003, Shreveport, Louisiana.
7 Dale, 69.
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a result of the flood of independence movements in Latin America and Africa. Many
African people were captivated by their leaders that led the independence struggle who
were often charismatic and battle tested from the great effort against colonialism. These
leaders symbolized the century’s long struggle against colonialism and the hopes for an
egalitarian society that only independence could bring. In this regard Botswana was no
different than other African countries and the leadership of its first president, Sir Seretse
Khama, did nothing to dim this optimism. Robert Curry points to the Leadership of
Khama as an integral component of Botswana’s exceptional economic growth.8 Khama
did create an environment where corruption would not be tolerated during his tenure,
however, Botswana’s economic growth was due in large part at the time of
independence, “[To] DeBeers announce [ment] of its rich diamond discovery at Orapa
Bamangwato Concessions had (an Anglo-American and AMAX subsidiary) decided to
develop the Selebi and Phikwe copper-nickel deposits.”9 Since then the government has
purchased ownership shares, thus the name Debswana (Debeers + Botswana). In fact, the
Orapa Expansion Project II (The Orapa Complex) “is considered to be the world’s largest
diamond mine.”lO Botswana’s production of gem diamonds accounts for roughly 40 per
cent of the gem diamond output globally and the thriving mining sector now accounts for
35 per cent of the Botswana GDP.
The expansion of mining operations has increased the urban labor force but
politics in Botswana continues to be dominated by the cattle industry and some rural
8 Curry, passim.
9 Hans-Erik DahI, “Economic and Social Development in Botswana 1966-1978,” in Papers on the
Econoniv ofBotswana, edited by Charles Harvey (London: Heinemann, 1981), 6-7.
10 OECD, African Economic Outlook 2001/2002 (OECD. 2002)i0.
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farmers. The influence that the cattle industry had over Botswana before colonization did
not change after independence. Ronald Libby argues that the “Tribal Grazing Land
Policy (TGLP).. . had the effect of exaggerating the already skewed distribution of wealth
and income in the rural area.”l 1 This reflects the notion advanced by Mészarós most
recently that antagonistic relations are created by the structuring of hierarchical social
relationships, based solely on a particular group’s proximity to capital. 12 In short, the
historic importance of the cattle industry privileges those that control the cattle industry
over the rest of the community. Forty per cent of the national population is in the
livestock sector, which accounts for the continued political influence from this sector.
Although the economic impact of this industry does not coincide with its economic
production.
Although many view Botswana as a success they continue to be dominated by
external interests in the form of International Finance Capital. Those who support the
underdevelopment thesis have always argued that raw materials and cheap labor are
prerequisites for investments. The evidence from Botswana seems to support this notion.
We have to consider that the mining and quarrying industry “account[s] for over half of
GDP, and diamond exports for over two-thirds of total exports” from which only a small
minority has benefited. 13 Since Botswana diamond mining specializes in gems (as
opposed to industrial diamonds), the export receipts are significant. By 2001 over 85%
11 Ronald T. Libby, The Politics ofEconomic Power in Southern Africa (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1987), 114.
12 Istvan Meszaros, Beyond Capitol (London: Merlin Press, 1995), 43.
13 Paul Collier, Jan Willem Gunning & Associates, eds. Trade Shocks in Developing Countries:
Volume 1: Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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of Botswana’ s exports were from the diamond industry. That remains significant for a
minority considering that the mining industry employed a high of 9% of the labor force in
the early 1980s and only a small percentage of this 9% flourished.14 To take the point
further, IFC in Botswana dictates the wages of workers based on market fluctuations. An
example of this phenomenon is shown during the diamond recession of 1981-1983.
Wages were frozen, ostensibly in a move to offset the recession. Certainly recessions are
a part of the business cycle, however, the freezing of wages and the dependence on the
diamond industry illustrate the tenuous nature of Botswana’ s development.
In turn the Botswana government, while clearly acquiescing to market
fundamentalism, has done a commendable job in increasing its foreign exchange reserves
during boom cycles to offset episodes of recession. To their credit, the government
recognized that Botswana is open to the vagaries of the market but their stockpiling of
reserves is interesting given Botswana’s growing divide in wealth and poor
unemployment rates.
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The above table highlights that Botswana has had consistent economic growth,
which is why their economic policy has been applauded for so long. Table 4.1 also
14 Moortaza Jiwanji and Maria Sarraf “Beating the Resource Curse,” World Bank,
Environmental Economics Series (October 2001).
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reveals that Botswana’s income is exceptional for an African country.
Table 4.2 Wages (monthly earnings U.S. dollars) In Agriculture, Mining, Construction
Manufacturing, and Transport
1980 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
Agriculture ---- 54 71 80 97 97 90 90 90 80
80
Ivlining ---- 287 319 450 424 436 496 430 428 372
Construction ---- 148 159 182 196 211 220 214 228 197
218
Maiuifacturing---- 181 171 206 199 242 250 200 210 186
Transport ---- 239 296 346 417 457 434 468 435 376
Source: Data from African Development Indicators 2003 (World Bank. 2003),
Excepting transport and communications, by far the mining industry provides the
highest wages; nevertheless, the influence of the cattle industry remains extremely
important. The cattle farmers have an abundance of influence in politics and “the
proceeds from livestock sales go directly to the farmers, and these incomes, with their
attendant multiplier effects, help to increase rural purchasing power and stimulate rural
development and employment opportunities. Livestock represents a major national
resource and remains the cornerstone of the agricultural sector.”15 It does not seem to be
the case however, that the multiplier effect referred to has had the tertiary impact
generally associated with this phenomenon. Balefi Tsie makes an even stronger analysis
concerning the influence of the cattle class:
Botswana’s cattle-based bourgeoisie is predominant at both levels of the
15 Owodunni Teriba, “Country Case Studies,” in The Challenge ofAfrican Economic Recovery
and Development, edited by Adebayo Adedeji, Patrick Bugembe, and Owodunni Teriba (Great Britain:
Frank Cass & CO. LTD, 1991), 70-71.
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state and civil society. It constitutes what Poulantzas [In State, Power &
Socialism] has called a “power bloc” in the sense that it is its interests that
are advanced by the state more than those of other fractions of the
dominant class.16
This is particularly risky considering the droughts that periodically strike the
region. Before the Uruguay Round of negotiations, Botswana enjoyed preferential
trading arrangements with the European Union for their livestock exports. However, the
Uruguay round of negotiations led to the creation of the World Trade Organization and
the dismantling of preferential trade arrangements. Even in light of the Uruguay round
and the droughts, the “small but influential socio-economic elite, who have gained and
anticipate continuing doing so, from the cattle sectors’ integration into the world trade
systern.”17 The government’s strategy for best dealing with persistent drought and
dismantling of preferential trade arrangements is to diversify
the economy. The government seeks “to establish Botswana as a center for financial
services within the region or further afield.”18
To encourage increased investment, the government has gone out of its way to
attract foreign investment. Botswana is regarded as one of the most open countries to
foreign direct investment. 19 Botswana’ s textile industry is almost wholly foreign owned.
To be fair, the government of Botswana has made a point in characterizing the
disproportionate foreign ownership as a problem. The problem is in continuing to attract
l6Tsie, 183.
17 Kutlwano Mulale, “The challenges to sustainable beef production in Botswana: Implications on
rangeland management,”
18 Ibid.
19 African Economic Outlook 2003/2004 (OECD, 2004), 55.
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investment while decreasing the percentage of foreign ownership.20 Botswana already
allows for profits and direct investment to be repatriated without any restrictions.
Exchange controls of any magnitude have been successfully eliminated.
The ability of Botswana to sustain economic growth since independence clearly is
a result of the thriving mining sector, not simply diamonds, but the copper-nickel finds as
well. However, a more significant factor in Botswana’s development is that while
Botswana’s history reflects the common challenges that most African countries have
faced, Botswana developed differently during what Cohn Legum penned “the period of
disillusionment 1970-1985.” Legurn describes this period as being rife with military
coups, increased debt burden, vulnerability to the vagaries of the market, and high rates
of population increases.2 1 Botswana has not experienced one military coup in its history
since independence. This may be attributed to the fact that Botswana, more than most
African countries, is ethnically homogenous. Whereas Nigeria has over 250 ethnic
groups, 95 per cent of the population in Botswana is from one group — the Batswana.
This degree of ethnic homogeneity creates an atmosphere conducive to cooperation rather
than conflict. The debt burden of Botswana did not increase during the 1980s. Because
of the strength of their mining sector and ability to consistently attract IFC, Botswana did
not resort to implementing an IMF/World Bank structural adjustment program.
Conclusion
Recent evidence suggests a growing economic divide in Botswana. Clearly
Botswana is a success story when accounting for liberal democracy. By all accounts
20 A Frameworkfor a Long Terni Vision for Botswana (1996), 8.
21 Cohn Legurn, Africa Since Independence (Indiana University Press, 1999).
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Botswana has had regular free and fair elections and Africa’s longest running stable
democracy. Botswana is consistently regarded as one of the least corrupt African
governments and continues to attractive to foreign investors. The annual economic
growth rate of 13% during the period 1966-1991 has slumped to 5% since 1992, which
coupled with the debilitating effects of the HIV/AIDS crisis has stunted Botswana’s
development. This intractable crisis has certainly impacted life expectancy and the labor
reserve. Botswana has had consistent economic growth since independence, however,
nearly half of Botswana’ s population lives below the national poverty line. The people
that have benefited from the years of growth have been those who run the cattle industry
and the diamond industry.
While Botswana has had a long period of peace, in contradistinction to the
development of other African nations this has not translated to more equitable
development and raises significant concerns about the ability of a society, open to the
free-market, equitably distributing its wealth. This promises to become more challenging
as Botswana’s foray into the stock exchange becomes more pronounced. The Botswana
stock exchange accounted for 6.62% of the GDP in 1991 and this figure increased to
21 .03 % by 2001. Not surprisingly, with the sole exception of the construction industry,
wages decreased during the same period of the stock exchange increase. This implies a
negative correlation between increased securitization and wages. All the more
disconcerting is the fact that:
The international foreign exchange market is decentralized and does not
have a systematic, comprehensive system for recording individual trades.
Instead, to regulate private banks and financial institutions and measure
capital flows, central banks and supervisory bodies require them to
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register overnight balance sheet positions. In today’s 24-hour global
marketplace, however, foreign exchange traders can hide positions by
shifting them between branches in different time zones and so always
remain within working hours, or they can use derivative financial
instruments that do not show on balance sheets. Finally, traders can avoid
the foreign exchange market altogether by buying and exchanging
securities, such as bonds, or treasury bills, denominated in different
currencies.22
22 Rodney Schmidt, “A Feasible foreign Exchange Transactions Tax,” in Global Finance: New
Thinking on Regulating Speculative Capital Markets
CHAPTER FIVE
TANZANIA
Tanzania is seen as a failed experiment and no longer elicits the kind of
enthusiasm or sympathy it did in the 1 960s and 1 970s when Tanzania’s brand of
socialism attracted the attention of states, donors, international organizations,
movements and individuals.
-Marja Liisa Swantz & Aili Man Tripp, What Went Right in Tanzania.’
People ‘s Response to Directed Development
Introduction
Tanzania, in a backhanded compliment way, is an interesting country. We can
attempt to find a sexier adjective than “interesting”, but after reading about Tanzania’s
history, a simple, plain, quizzical reaction is in order. Tanzania is a country that at
independence was concerned with eradicating poverty, disease, and illiteracy, which were
“the three enemies of the people.” Oddly enough, even though they were operating in an
international system that their own leaders, and others, called neo-colonialist and
imperialist, Tanzania was applauded by both supporters and detractors for its alternative
path of development. This praise continued after the Arusha Declaration in 1967 into the
early 1 970s. Clearly there were not many countries in the world, which declared
socialism and continued to receive support —rhetorically at least- from the international
community. The “support” they received however was short-lived and Tanzania since
the mid-1980s has been described by many as an economic basket case. The country has
a reputation, economically at least, that is the polar opposite of Botswana. This
reputation, primarily because of the leadership of Tanzania under the stewardship of
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Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and his attempt at socialism, led to the country being
marginalized from the international economy. Nyerere stepped down from office in 1985
after refusing to accept the International Monetary Fund’s conditions. Joseph Stiglitz
even points out his own confusion at the IMF in its handling of Tanzania. Since 1986
Tanzania has attempted to develop by accepting the conditions and creating an
environment that welcomes International Finance Capital. Yet Tanzania remains one of
the Highly Indebted Countries even in light of its decision twenty years ago to forgo
Ujamaa and seek market prescriptions. An analysis of Tanzania should provide useful
information to understand why some underdeveloped countries have been unable to
prosper in this democratic liberal capitalist environment. Further, it should provide an
enlightening contrast to Botswana. As the case with Botswana, Tanzania is best
understood by understanding its role in the region. Whereas Botswana was neglected in
large part because of South Africa, Tanzania was disregarded from any serious notions of
development because of more significant economic interests in Kenya.
Historical Context
Tanzania is an East African country bordered by the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, Mozambique and the Indian
Ocean. Originally named Tanganyika, the country merged with its island neighbor
Zanzibar in 1964 to form Tanzania. Tanzania has over thirty-seven million residents, 68
per cent of whom live in rural areas. The overwhelming majority (99 per cent) of the
residents is black African and primarily speaks Kiswahili, Chagga, and English. The
staple of Tanzania’s economy is the export of sisal, cotton, coffee, and minerals,
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particularly gold and diamonds.
Energized by the first “Scramble for Africa” in 1884-1885, Germany gained
colonial control over Tanganyika. Over the course of the following thirty-three years, a
turbulent thirty-three years, this area would be knovvn as German East Africa and
Tanganyika. From the outset indigenous Africans resisted the colonizers, fiercely
culminating in large-scale uprisings in 1905- 1907, with the most notable being the Maji
Maji revolt. These uprising forced Germany to tacitly agree to introduce reform
measures; however, the settlers (mainly from South Africa) “resisted reform and
continued to exploit the territories human and material resources.” Since the country was
rich in natural resources, Africans were conscripted to work settler plantations that
produced coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco, and sisal. Additionally, ivory became a major
export for the colonialists during this period.1 The net effect of this means of
production entrenched Africans role in the increasingly international division of labor as
“hewers of wood and drawers of water.” This period was unmistakably one of expansion
for the world economy, ultimately dominated by European and United States’ imperial
ambitions. While Europe expanded into Africa after the Berlin Conference of 1884-
1885, the United States had already made it clear, via the Monroe Doctrine, that the
Ai-nericas were their business and their business alone. The “white man’s burden” to
civilize so-called backward African people was complete. Further, there were shortages
in the supply of raw materials, thus making expansion in Africa extremely profitable.
The significant charge for Tanganyika, as well as Kenya and Uganda, was to produce a
1 Joseph Harris, Africans and Their History (New York: Penguin Books, 1972), 200.
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significant amount of cash crops for the United Kingdom and strengthen its waning
empire.2
As in all cases the historical record may be viewed from many ideological lenses.
In this particular context, although many view colonialism as a fetter to African
development, there is a significant, more conservative view on colonialism in Africa.
Montague Yudelman, writing for the Hoover Institute, views the role, and creation of the
role of Africans in the world economy as a positive force for development. In
“Imperialism and The Transfer of Agricultural Techniques” Yudelman posits that before
the colonial period Africans existed “outside of the money economy.” Yudelrnan
continues to present the “benefits” of colonialism:
By the end of the colonial era, however, the colonial impact had created
conditions that had a substantial bearing on raising agricultural output and
trade. The establishment of ‘law and order’ and the advent of the
administrator, teacher, missionary, tax collector and trader all contributed
to the need to produce a surplus to meet money obligations.. .The surplus
was large enough to meet the demands of the expanding urban centers in
Africa, as well as to provide the major exports to earn foreign exchange
with which to finance imports needed to foster economic development.3
Interestingly, Yudelman, who at the time was the director of the agriculture
department for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank), placed no importance on who benefited from the economic development. His
analysis is couched in the ideology of classical liberalism, which primarily is concerned
about protecting the free market and the notion of comparative advantage that stipulate
2 Peter Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds., “The Three Stages of African Involvement in
the World-Economy,” in Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (London: Sage Publications, 1985),
45-50.
3 Montague Yudelrnan, “Imperialism and the Transfer of Agricultural Techniques,” in Peter
Duignan & L.H. Gann, eds., Colonialism in Africa: 1870-1960 (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution
Press, 1975), 329.
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that every state has a particular role or function in the world economy. In this way,
Tanganyika became associated with exporting agricultural resources with no thought
given to the deleterious effects colonialism had in Tanganyika and East Africa. Also, no
analysis is made to the mention of “money obligations.” In A Political Economy of
Africa, Claude Ake gives further details about on the destructive monetization process:
The real task of Monetisation began, and this mainly the task of making
the new medium of exchange thoroughly pervasive in the economy. First
they encouraged wage labor often by force.. .by appropriating land from
Africans and thus reducing them first to squatters and eventually to wage
laborers on their land.. .African economies were monetised by imposing
taxes and insisting on payments of taxes with the European currency.4
Ake illuminates the cultural impact as well as the economic. Monetisation
devastated Africans’ standard of living, notably in Tanganyika. After being subject to
German rule, Tanganyika was allotted to Britain after World War I. The League of
Nations issued a mandate that granted Britain another east African territory to administer
in addition to Kenya and Uganda.5 During the British colonization of East Africa they
envisioned solidifying the Suez route to India as a means of controlling and expanding
their trade routes. It is along those lines that Kenya retained strategic importance for
British policy. Railway construction was quickly in progress to further advance the
British into Kenya’s inland. This railway linked the Uganda and Kenyan interior with the
coast and reached the Lake Victoria basin, which borders Tanzania, by 1901. The
purpose of this advance was to transform East Africa into a source and exporter of raw
4 Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa, 34.
5 William Tordoff, Government and politics in Africa (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,




The British transformed Kenya into the center of East African development while
relegating Uganda and Tanganyika to the margins. Tanganyika’s economic role was one
of exporting “a small number of agricultural commodities” and supplying migrant labor
to Kenya. Tanganyika exported cotton, coffee, and sisal7 and in so doing, maintained the
role created for them under the German East Africa Protectorate. No attempt was made
to “develop” Tanganyika technologically or diversify their economy.8 Even though cash
crop farming became a significant venture in Tanganyika, which ultimately because of
the coercion and exploitation of the peasants, created clear contradictions that led to a
nationalist movement.9 It was during this period that Tanganyika’s economy became
linked with Britain’s East African colonies and protectorates. It should be pointed out
though, that Tanzania after the First World War and up to the end of the Second World
War became one of the leading producers of sisal in the world. In large part this was a
result of British finance capital seeking high returns from the agricultural sector and a
dispossessed rural African class.10
6 A. Adu Boahen, General History of Africa: VII Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880-1935
(California: Unesco, 1990), 73.
7 Encyclopedia Britannica online. “The plant is native to Central America, where its fibre has
been used since pre—Columbian times. Commercial interest in sisal was stimulated by the development of
the machine grain binder in the 1 880s, which brought a demand for low-cost twine, and plantings were
soon established in the Bahamas and Tanganyika (now Tanzania).” http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-
9067998/sisal accessed 11/12/07.
8 Joel D. Barkan, “Comparing Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania” in Joel D.
Barkan with John J. Okumu, eds.; Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania (New York: Praeger
Press, 1979), 13; also see Claude Ake, “Ideology and Objective Conditions,” Ibid., 123.
9 William Tordoff, Government and Politics ofAfrica 3 ed. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana
University Press, 1997), 49-50.
10 Werner Biermann, The Tanzanian Economy 1920-1985: Colonial Valorisation,
Reconstruction, and Crisis (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Oar es Salaam University Press, 1998), 44-48.
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Because of Tanzania’s geographic location one would think that crop production
would flourish. Although Tanganyika is bordered by three lakes: Nyanza (Victoria),
Tanganyika, Nyasa, and the Indian Ocean, other geographical characteristics have
hindered its agricultural production. Gilbert L. Rutman points out that the combination
of rocky terrain, low rainfall, and the tsetse fly has historically impeded Tanganyika crop
production. This effectively limited production to four small areas: a small coastal area,
the lake shore, Southern Highlands, and areas along the western border. ii During the
colonial period Tanganyika produced two major minerals for export: diamonds and gold.
Tanganyika did not have the technological capability to exploit other natural resources
(i.e. coal, copper, iron ore, nickel, graphite, tungsten). Britain and other European
powers viewed Tanganyika, as was the case for most other African countries, as little
more than a supplier of commodities. During the colonial period the Tanganyikan
economy experienced little diversification and industrialization. The combination of the
fact that upwards to 90 percent of the population were farmers and by 1950 only 5 to 10
percent of the adult population was literate, led to Tanganyika being deeply
underdeveloped. 12 Much like other African countries, Tanganyikans placed a heavy
emphasis on education and good health care. The peasants and the urban work force,
were united in their insistence on improved health care, education, and higher wages.
Independence
The combination of peasants and workers organizing and consistently pressing for
change, coupled with Britain’s inability to maintain its colonies, led to the independence
11 Gilbert L. Rutman, The Economy of Tanganyika (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), 11.
12 Ibid., 13-25.
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of Tanganyika in 1961. Unlike many African countries (i.e. Morocco, Angola,
Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, et. al.), the transfer of power was made peacefully.
Tanganyika, however, entered the independence era with a population that was not
sufficiently prepared to run a country successfully. There was minimal technological
development, low literacy rates among the adult population, and widespread poverty.
However, the first strategy for independent Tanganyika was one of liberal development.
Thus, the economy was open to international investors and geared toward export
production. Tanganyika like many African countries experienced GDP growth in the
early 1960s. Table 2.1 shows the growth Tanganyika experienced in the early period.
Rapid economic growth was a goal of the first five-year plan from 1964-1969.
Table 5.1 GDP and Population Growth, 1960-1998 (percent)
CATEGORY 1962- 1962- 1978- 1984- 1992- 1995-
1968 1977 1983 1991 1994 1998
Real GDP 3.8 5.4 0.5 3.8 1.6 3.8
Population 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.8
Per Capita 0.7 2.2 -2.6 0.6 -1.5 0.9
GDP
Source: Data from Arne Bigsten and Anders Danielson, Tanzania: Is the Ugly Duckling
Finally Growing Up? : A Report for the OECD Project “Emerging Africa” (Uppsala,
2001).
However, in 1963, opposition to the British-installed Arab leadership in
neighboring Zanzibar led to a coup. The leader of Tanganyika (Nyerere), and the leader
of Zanzibar (Abeid Karume), agreed to unite Tanganyika and Zanzibar into one state —
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Tanzania. Shortly thereafter, the growth that Tanzania had first experienced was
threatened by declining prices for sisal, which was the staple of Tanzania’s exportsl3. In
addition, the first few years of independence had not led to a more equitable society and
no little had happened to reduce illiteracy in Tanzania. These realities led Julius K.
Nyerere to promote African socialism, which he operationalized as Ujarnaa:
By the use of the word ‘Ujamaa’...we state that for us socialism involves
building on the foundation of our past, and building also to our own
design. We are not importing a foreign ideology into Tanzania and trying
to smother our distinct social patterns with it. We have deliberately
decided to grow as a society, out of our own roots, but in a particular
direction and towards a particular kind of objective. We are doing this by
emphasizing certain characteristics of our traditional organization, and
extending them so that they can embrace the possibilities of modern
technology and enable us to meet the challenge of life in the twentieth
century world. 14
From the instant Julius Nyerere returned to Tanganyika in 1954 from school in
England he led the struggle against colonial domination. Nyerere organized the
Tanganyika African Association (TAA), which became the Tanganyika African National
Union (TANU) in 1954. TANU sought majority rule for the indigenous Africans. Led
by Nyerere, TANU won the elections in 1961, which were part of the process that was to
lead to independence in 1961. Shortly thereafter in 1964, TANU joined with the Afro
Shirazi party of Zanzibar to form Tanzania. In May of that year, Nyerere announced the
nation’s objective(s), which he wanted to reach by 1980. The first objective was to raise
per capita income. Secondly, Nyerere sought to increase the trained manpower of
Tanzania with the hope of making it self-sufficient. Finally, he wanted the average life
13 Joel Krieger, ed., The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the Wor1d2’ ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 826-827.
14 Julius K. Nyerere, Uhuru NA Ujarnaa: Freedom and Socialism (Dar es Salaarn: Oxford
University Press, 1968), 2.
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expectancy raised from 35 years to 40-50 years. The plan was to be implemented over
three five-year plans.15 The first five-year plan, as stated earlier, was geared towards a
liberal economic model. The failure of the first five-year plan to address Tanzania’s
most pressing needs adequately led to more radical measures, most notably, the
nationalization of foreign businesses. Nyerere rapidly developed a more critical stance
towards capitalism and sought to turn inward to African traditions and practices for
solutions. He attempted to craft an agenda that applied socialism to Tanzania. based on
Tanzania’s historical and cultural background. This led to the Arusha Declaration of
1967. The Arusha Declaration shaped Tanzanian social and economic policy for 18
years:
Tanzania embarked on a bold experiment to break with the colonial
legacy. In 1967, following the adoption of the Arusha declaration as its
blueprint for development, Tanzania turned sharply left by embracing a
policy of socialism and self-reliance. This conception of development
stressed a more equitable distribution of the country’s wealth at the
explicit expense of high rates of economic growth; state ownership of the
“commanding heights” of the Tanzanian economy; the diminution and
regulation of the private sector; de-emphasis of Tanzania’s principal
agricultural exports-coffee, cotton, and sisal- in favor of the creation of
rriore than 300 import substitution industries owned by the state.16
Rather than looking solely to the West, Tanzania turned east for assistance to the
Soviet Union and China while becoming active in the non-aligned movement and the
struggle for the liberation of South Africa from apartheid. Nyerere shunned economic
growth for its own sake, in pursuit of an equitable and just society. 17 But Tanzania
15 Rutman, 15-30.
16 Barkan, 5.
1 7Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development Ulneumi Na Maendeleo : A selection of writings
and speeches 1968-1973 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973). 262-336.
128
remained at first on good terms with international funding institutions and western
nations. Andrew Kiondo explains this particular phenomenon:
Tanzania’s policy of socialism and self-reliance as briefly explained above
could not change the country’s financial dependence on the Western
world. In fact, the economic history of Tanzania, which had been one of
heavy financial dependency on the Western world, continued unaffected.
At independence, Tanzania was mainly dependent on Great Britain, West
Germany, and the United States. But after the Arusha Declaration,
Tanzania diversified its sources of financial assistance by mainly
concentrating on international financial institutions such as the IMF and
the World Bank. By the late 1970s, the Nordic countries of Sweden,
Norway, and Denmark had also joined the list of Tanzania’s important
donor countries. Substantial aid was also received from other Third World
and socialist countries.18
Tanzania would heavily rely on foreign aid from the promulgation of the Arusha
Declaration in 1967 until 2001. In fact, during the period of 1975-1984 only Egypt and
the Sudan received more Official Development Assistance (ODA) and since 1990, only
Egypt and Mozambique have received more ODA. 19 Tanzania’s attempt to move away
from dependency to self-reliance resulted in attempting Import Substitution
Industrialization. Many underdeveloped nations, primarily in Latin America, during the
1 950s and 1 960s implemented Import Substitution Industrialization programs. Import
Substitution is the effort to replace imports with locally-produced goods. The process
entails a large commitment by the government to local industries, by subsidizing the
industries and erecting tariff barriers to protect them against competitors. Adopting such
a policy is anathema to a liberal international free trade order and raised flags for
18 Andrew Kiondo, “The Nature of Economic Reforms in Tanzania,” in Tanzania and the IMF:
The Dynamics ofLiberalization (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 23.
19 The World Bank, African Development Indicators, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank,
2003), 285.
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previous Nyerere supporters. Although the strategy of Import Substitution (1ST) looks
attractive to nations that seek to control their own destiny, there is a considerable
challenge in progressing through the different stages of 1ST. P. Anyang Nyong’o presents
the three stages of 1ST:
(1) Local production of mass consumption goods.
(2) Producing intermediate goods locally (i.e. steel, paper,
chemicals, fertilizers, petroleum refining, glass, etc.)
(3) Developing a capital goods sector.20
Tanzania failed, as did most of the countries that took this path, to develop
beyond the first stage. The path of development that Tanzania adopted cut to the core of
the challenges that African nations faced following independence. Ostensibly, the
fundamental nature of independence means to transcend dependent relations. It stands to
reason that the requirement to rely on others’ programs of “development” no longer
exists. Further, it would seem that essential to achieving functional independence is the
ability to produce some goods internally and not depend on imports from abroad. In
order to achieve 1ST the state has to play a central role in facilitating this process. As
stated above, the state must subsidize this process as well as allocate social surpluses to
help ISI industries maintain their existence. However, this increased state interaction
conflicts with the fundamental objectives of the international economic order.
International Funding Institutions seek to limit, indeed eradicate, state intervention in the
economy. The result of Tanzania’s policy since Arusha was increased marginalization in
their region.
20 P. Anyang Nyong’o, “The Possibilities and Historical Limitations of Import-Substitution
Industrialization in Kenya,” 15-16.
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As a member of the East African Community (EAC), a regional organization
composed of Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda, Tanzania was the lone member to attempt to
develop outside the capitalist orbit. Kenya was unabashedly pro-capitalist, while
Uganda, led by Idi Amin from 1971 to 1979, was no ally of the Tanzanian government.
In the face of marginalization from the international economy and the East African
Community, Tanzania’s path was strewn with insurmountable hurdles. Moreover with
the petroleum crises in 1973 and 1979, the collapse of the EAC in 1977, war with Uganda
in 1979, and a decline in the terms of trade for sisal and coffee during the 1 970s, disaster
was imminent for the Tanzanian economy. The two oil shocks are critical since the
majority of African nations rely on petroleum products heavily, ranging from 60 to 90
percent “of the energy required to power their factories.” While African countries
enjoyed low prices for oil in the 1960s (roughly $2 a barrel), the decision of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 to cut production and
the resulting oil crisis increased the price of oil to $12 a barrel. By 1981 following the
second oil shock, prices for a barrel shot up to $34. The result for Tanzania was that
higher percentages of their export earnings were used to purchase oil. By 1980, 60
percent of Tanzania’s export earnings were used to purchase oil. For a nation that is
committed to public owned industries and land, as well as a strong commitment to
education and health care, Tanzania could ill afford to pay more for oil and strengthen its
social infrastructure.
During the early 1980s, following the second oil shock and the end of a boom in
coffee prices, economic growth in Tanzania could not keep pace with the rate of
1•)
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population growth. This resulted in a decline of per capita income to a level from which
Tanzania has yet to recover. According to Nyerere, “In 1988 Tanzania’s per-capita
income was $280. Now, in 1998, it is $140.”21 Cereal production and agricultural
exports fell, while lack of foreign exchange created a balance of payments deficit. Social
programs, already constituting a significant part of their GNP, combined with the balance
of payment deficit, and subsequently Tanzanian foreign earnings were diminished. Thus,
Tanzania (along with many African nations) sought assistance from the International
monetary fund.22 International Funding Institutions required Tanzania to devalue its
currency, deregulate the marketing of agricultural products “by eventually
privatizing.. .money-losing state-owned corporations.” A lack of foreign exchange
created a balance of payments deficit and from 1979-1985 the economy was near
collapse. Nyerere was unwilling to accept the conditions of the IMF and World Bank. It
was during this period that Tanzania embarked on a self-imposed Structural Adjustment
Program (SAP) rather than accept what they considered faulty IMF and World Bank
policy. Implementation of the Tanzanian SAP was stillborn after sharp debate within the
government. Nyerere was steadfastly committed to the principles enunciated by the
Arusha Declaration, while others sought to adopt a more liberal economic agenda. The
debates over whether to accept the terms of the International Funding Institutions
ultimately led to the resignation of Nyerere as Tanzania’s president. Ali Hassan Mwinyi,
who was more inclined to accept the conditionalities as the new president of Tanzania,
2llkaweba Bunting, “The Heart of Africa. Interview with Julius Nyerere on Anti-Colonialism,” in
Nei’ Internationalist Magazine issue 309 (January-February 1999).
22 J. D. Fage, A Histo,’y ofAfrica (London: Routledge, 1995), 505-506.
implemented an Economic Recovery program, requiring the eventual devaluation of the
Tanzanian shilling. Since the acceptance of liberalization, Tanzania has increased its
share of FDI. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate the increase in FDT.
Table 5.2 FDI inflows, 1989-2000 (millions of dollars) annual averages
1989-1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
15 150 172 183 193
149 158
1980 1985 1990 1995 1999
Inward 0.9 1.3 2.2 7.0 11.2
Outward --- ---
Source: Data from United Nations Conference on Traae and Development, World
Investment Report 2001. Promoting Linkages (New York: United Nations, 2001).
As tables 5.2 and 5.3 indicate, Tanzania gained a significant increase in FDI
inflows since the 1 980s. This change began after the resignation of Nyerere in 1985 and
the implementation of IMF structural Adjustment programs. However, the trade-off was
that while Tanzania has experienced growth in investment, primarily FDI, there was a
sharp drop-off in public expenditure for education and health care.24 This is significant
considering the number of educated Tanzanian’s at independence. By any standard, the
level was at crisis proportions. But with the adoption of the IMF Economic Recovery
463.
23 The African Development Indicators 2003 shows FDI inflows for 1999 as 517 and for 2000 as
24 Mahmood Messkoub, “The Social Impact ofAdjustrnent in Tanzania in the 1980s: Economic
Crisis and Household Survival Strategies,” in Internet Journal ofAfrican Studies No. 1 (April 1996).
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followed Nyerere. It was not long after the election of Mwinyi (1986) that Tanzania
Source: Data from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World
Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linkages (New York: United Nations, 200 1).23
Table 5.3 Inward and outward FDI stocks
1980, 1990, 1995 and 1999 (percentage)
as a percentage of gross domestic product,
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Program (ERP) in 1986, Tanzania’s currency, the shilling, was devalued from 17
shillings to the U.S. dollar in 1986 to 193 by 1990. Coupled with an exorbitant rise in
inflation, the average Tanzanian suffered a decline in their quality of life (i.e. access to
health care and education). This has not deterred the government, however, in attempting
to increase Tanzania’s integration in the world economy. The government has:
Since 1990. . . made determined efforts to attract substantial inflows of
private investment into the country. Key measures taken have included the
promulgation of the Investment Promotion Act and the creation of the
Investment Promotion Centre. A greater role for the private sector is
envisaged in the medium-term as the direct involvement of the public
sector in productive and communal activities is progressively reduced. In
1993’94 work continued on amendments to the Companies Ordinance and
to the Investment Act. These amendments are intended to remove
remaining obstacles to private sector participation in the economy and, at
the same time, enable the country to benefit more adequately from such
participation.25
Consequently, Tanzania now has few restrictions on the movement of IFC. The
increased movement of International Finance Capital in Tanzania has been directed
towards the mining industry. Mining production, particularly gold, has become the
leading sector in Tanzania (Table 5.4). The former dominance of the agricultural sector,
coffee, cotton, and sisal (during the 1960s and 1970s), has waned slightly.
Table 5.4. Tanzania: Composition of Exports, 1991-2001 (In percent of total exports, fob.)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
2001
Traditional exports 51.6 59.9 59.6 65.6 57.1 58.3 58.4 60.5 55.5 44.1
29.8
25 The Rolling Plan and Forward Budgetfor Tanzania for the Period 1994/1995 — 1996/1997 vol.
1 (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Government Printer, 1994), 5.
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Coffee 21.8 15.4 22.3 22.5 21.2 18.2 16.0 18.5 14.1 12.6
7.4
Cotton 19.1 25.3 18.2 20.5 17.9 16.8 17.5 8.1 5.2 5.7
4.3
Sisal 1.0 0.3 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.3 0.8
0.9
Tea 5.5 5.8 8.8 7.7 3.5 3.0 4.3 5.2 4.5 4.9
3.7
Tobacco 2.7 7.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 6.6 7.2 9.4 8.0 5.8
4.6
Cashew nuts 1.4 6.1 5.4 10.0 9.5 13.1 12.2 18.2 18.6 12.7
7.3
Cloves 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 1.5
1.6
Nontraditional exports 48.4 40.1 40.4 34.4 42.9 41.7 41.6 39.5 44.5 55.9
70.2
Minerals 5.8 10.6 16.0 5.8 6.7 7.5 6.9 4.5 13.5 26.9
38.9
Ofivhich: gold 0.2 0.5 6.4 17.0
32.2
Manufactured products 24.9 16.6 12.1 15.0 16.3 16.4 14.9 6.1 5.5 6.5
7.2
Fish products 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.6 12.6 10.5 11.5
12.5
Horticulture 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.5 1.6 1.5
1.4
Other nontrad. exports 17.7 12.9 12.3 13.6 20.0 17.8 11.6 14.8 13.4 9.5
10.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
100.0 100.0
Source: Data from International Monetary Fund, Tanzania: Selected Issues and Statistical




The resulting effects are that Tanzania remains dependent on the agricultural sector.
Agriculture accounts for 46 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while
providing 85 percent of the exports.26 Foodstuffs, manufactured goods, machinery, and
transportation all are imported. No significant attempt is made to eradicate this 100-year
dependency. By and large the Tanzanian economy relies on the export of the same
agricultural crops it did in 1890 as a protectorate under Germany, and after World War I
as a British Mandate. The corruption that Nyerere so deftly avoided by prohibiting
investment from elected officials has now reared its ugly head again. Corruption is
becoming an everyday experience. By 1981, Nyerere had increased enrollment in
primary schools sevenfold and threefold in secondary schools over what it was in 1964.
The literacy rate improved dramatically during his regime. Since the imposition of the
World Bank and IMF, literacy rates have steadily decreased. Tanzania at present is
relegated to adhering to the program of the IMF and the World Bank’s Heavily Indebted
Poor Core Countries Initiative. The result is the “four times as much is spent on debt
repayment as on primary education, and nine times as much on basic health.” To qualify
for debt relief from the HIPC initiative, Tanzania has to go through a six-year waiting
period and accept complete liberalization of their economy. Tanzania has accepted
rapid integration into the international economy. Increased privatization, combined with
enhanced structural adjustment has fixed Tanzania’s place in the international economy.
26 African Economic Outlook, 283.
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It seems inconceivable that Tanzania’s fate in this world capitalist system could
have been otherwise. Without the cooperation of other African nations, combined by the
fact that Tanzania is not endowed with an abundance of natural resources, the chance for
being independent and socialist was less than zero. André Gunder-Frank offered a
sobering summation of this state of affairs:
The Third World has long been, and for the foreseeable future will remain,
an important part of the world capitalist system. Indeed...the Third World
is destined to play a major role in the attempt of capital in the world
capitalist economy.27
Tanzania remains one of the poorest nations in the world. The solutions imposed
by the World Bank and IMF are grounded in an anachronistic 1 8th-i 9th century notion of
comparative advantage. Tanzania provides an excellent example of a former non-
capitalist economy making a transition to a free-market economy. To date the results
have been uneven and that is being kind. While there has been an increase in IFC and
Tanzania is more open to private companies, consequently placing them in good standing
with international lenders, Tanzania remains mired in poverty. By 2001 the Tanzanian
stock exchange accounted for 4.22% of the Gross Domestic Product continuing the path
of financial liberalization. This path has yet to provide substantive benefits for those
mired in poverty and from all appearances benefits only the elite — Tanzanian and
foreign. In fact, it is a bit surprising that of the 1 8 African countries with stock
exchanges, Tanzania accounts for one of them — in light of the wretched nature of
27 Andre Gunder Frank, “Crisis of Ideology and Ideology of Crisis,” in Dynamics of a Global







If one wants to analyze the impact of colonialism and the attendant transition to
neo-colonialisrn, Kenya provides one of the more interesting examples. Kenya perhaps
more than any other African country, contains in its history colonialism, neo-colonialism,
indigenous resistance to those concrete realities, Pan-Africanism, and a progressive role
of women in the struggle against European hegemony. This chapter will analyze the
continuing dialectic in Kenya between indigenous struggle for self-determination and the
corresponding arbiter of capital.
Historical Context
The history of Kenya is similar to that of many African countries. Their pre-colonial
history is to a great extent determined by Kenyans’ relationship to the land. It was during
the nineteenth century that the average Kenyan’s life was influenced by the spread of
agricultural settlements throughout the Kenyan Highlands. The increase in migrant
pastoralists was pervasive and by the late 19th century farmers occupied most of central
Kenya and the highlands. Consequently, this led to the rise of the closely related cultural
and linguistic traditions of the Kamba, Gikuyu, and Meru at The majority of Kenyans
moved and settled into autonomous ethnic farming communities. The importance




placed on farming engendered notions of self-reliance and self-sufficiency.
Unfortunately, it also fostered conflicts between the various ethnic groups. As is so often
the case, the schisms that were created would later prove to facilitate European advance
into the interior by sharpening and exploiting the conflict between the indigenous ethnic
groups.2 These conflicts were often over land, which was cherished by the indigenous
groups. Jorno Kenyatta points to this fact in Facing Mount Kenya:
In studying the Gikuyu societal organization it is necessary to take into
consideration land tenure as the most important factor in the social,
political, religious, and economic life of the society. As agriculturalists,
the Gikuyu people depend entirely on the land. It supplies them with the
material needs of life, through which spiritual and mental contentment is
achieved. 3
As a consequence, land tenure is an essential concept for understanding the
politics of Kenya. Controlling the land became a necessity for the pastoralists but the
geopolitical interests of European capital would undermine the relative serenity —when
compared to colonialism- enjoyed by the indigenous Kenyan people. As was the case in
most African countries, Kenya became a victim of European colonial expansion. To be
more specific, Kenya became a satellite in the grand scheme of European imperialism,
which spanned the globe accelerating Western industrialization and accumulating wealth.
Although European colonizers had occupied South Africa since the 17t1 century, the
Berlin Conference precipitated their advance to Kenya. At the outset the partition of East
Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) was designed by the British to solidify the Suez
Late Nineteenth Century (Yale University Press, 1988), 9-14.
2 Ibid., 31.
3 Jorno Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Lfe of the Gikuvu (Ney York: Vintage Books.
1965), 22.
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Route to India. Kenya’s location made it an integral part, indeed the primary target, of
Britain’s strategic interests.4 Apparently it did not take long for the British to recognize
that in addition to Kenya’s strategic location on the route to India, the potential also
existed for agricultural production in the highlands of Kenya and the tropical climate in
other areas was suitable for the cultivation of crops such as cotton, rubber, cocoa, coffee,
and sugar.5 As a result, what began as a strategic venture almost immediately
transformed into an economic one. The colonizers not only solidified their route but also
obtained a new locale for supplying goods and resources to their mother country. It was
in this context that British colonization of Kenya came to fruition:
In 1895 the British declared the protectorate (the East African
Protectorate; later Kenya), the imposition of western laws, collection of
taxes, recruitment of labor, and many other necessary components of the
colonial administration required the formation of a central
bureaucracy. . . .The key to the successful extension of British rule over
Kenya was the policy toward the Masai, whose power in the interior could
have seriously obstructed British penetration toward Uganda. But the
Masai were preoccupied with raids, epidemics, and famine, the latter two
providing an opportunity for British assistance which impressed the
Masai. . . .The highlands of Kenya, like those in Central and Southern
Africa, led to deliberate colonization schemes in which the British
supported the apportionment of land to white settlers, the recruitment of
cheap African labor, and blatant racial discrimination.6
As mentioned earlier, the British were able to exploit already existing rifts
between ethnic groups. A prime example of their success is the British co-option of the
Masai to ward off resistance from other ethnic groups. This was a key factor in securing
4 M. P. K. Sorrenson, Origins ofEuropean Settlement in Kenya (Nairobi: Oxford University
Press, 1968), 9.
5 Ibid., 4.
6Joseph Harris, Africans and Their History revised edition (New York: New American Library,
1987), 193.
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the British position in addition to the dynamic of building a railway, the transfer of
Uganda to the East African protectorate, and the arrival en masse of European settlers.
Railway construction was facilitated to further advance the British into Kenya’s interior
and link it and Uganda with the coast, with the objective of reaching the Lake Victoria
basin by 1901 .7 We should emphasize that the sole purpose was to transform East Africa
into a source and exporter of raw materials for Europe.8 In due course, Kenya was
involved in a dependent relationship and at the behest of the interests of European capital.
Europeans, mainly from Britain and South Africa, were encouraged to immigrate
to Kenya and help facilitate this noxious form of “development.” The colonizers were
expected to “develop a viable agricultural economy” that would provide the needed
capital for the construction of the railway, which would transport goods and resources to
the coast for export.9 By 1902 the white settlers formed an association of planters and
farmers that demanded the highlands of Kenya be reserved only for their use. Predictably
the result was that indigenous Africans were prohibited from owning the most fertile
land. If that was not enough, they were not allowed to grow coffee (which was the most
lucrative crop), more land was seized from them, taxes were imposed, and stipulations
were made that Africans must provide labor for public works and settled
farms/plantations.1o Consequently, Africans who had been self-sufficient pastoralists
before the arrival of Europeans were now wage earners working for the Europeans.
7 Unesco, General History ofAfrica p. 73
8 Exactly how this relationship has developed throughout Kenya’s history, particularly during the
period under review, is critical for understanding the success or failure of independent Kenya.
9 D. Pal Ahluwalia, Post-colonialism and the Politics ofKenya (New York: Nova Science
Publishers, 1996), 29.
10 Unesco, General history, 178.
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Africans were systematically deprived and stripped of direct access to the economic
production, all the while being the engine for British colonial development. By the time
of WWI, Kenya was being advertised in England as a “winter home for aristocrats” and
settlers were granted by the Crown Lands Ordinance an extended lease from 99 years to
999 years. 11 Colonialism was now firmly entrenched in Kenya and East Africa, but this
did not happen without resistance.
Indigenous Resistance to Colonial Occupation
While it is true that Kenya has a significant diversity in ethnic groups, the
Gikuyul2 are the largest group accounting for 20% of the population. The Gikuyu were
also affected the most by the British appropriation of the Kenyan highlands since the
highlands had been solely populated by the Gikuyu for years. Other groups in Kenya had
a sufficient amount of surplus land to mitigate the impact from the arrival of the British;
however, the Gikuyu had no such luxury. 13 It was the Gikuyu who bore the brunt of land
alienation, low wages, and racial discrimination. The combination of these factors led to
the protracted resistance of the Gikuyu to colonialism.
The Gikuyu first attempted to address the land issue by forming the Gikuyu
Association in 1920. However, it was not long after the formation of the Gikuyu
Association that a more militant group, the East African Association (EAA) was formed,
which included the Buganda and other Africans throughout Nairobi. The EAA led by
11 Angelique Haugerud, The Culture ofpolitics in modern Kenya (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995). 7; Unesco, General 1-listoiy, 174.
12 Gikuyu is also spelled Kikuyu.
13 Carl Rosberg Jr. and John Nottingham, The Myth of Mao Mao “; Nationalism in Kenya (NY:
Praeger, 1966), 18.
1
Jesse Kariuki and Harry Thuku not only protested land alienation but tax and labor laws
and the law stipulating that Africans must carry identification cards. 14 This “pass” law,
as were many of the modes of domination in Kenya, was fashioned after the South
African pass laws. Moreover, many of the early settlers in Kenya migrated from the
South Afiican Cape colony. 15 The radical activity of the EAA resulted in the arrest of
Harry Thuku in 1922. Thuku is still honored by Kenyans as a founding father in the
struggle against colonialism. 16 Although the detention of Thuku represented a setback for
indigenous activists, the formation of activist organizations would actually rise after
Thuku’s arrest. In 1924 the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) was formed and by 1928
the future president of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, became KCAs Secretary-General and
editor of their journal. It was soon thereafter that Kenyatta traveled to London to present
the grievances of the KCA to the British government. This effectively placed Kenyatta
and the KCA firmly in the Britsh government’s consciousness. The colonial regime
recognized the impact the movement potentially wielded and declared the KCA illegal in
1940.17 However, it should be pointed out that even though resistance at its most nascent
stages was largely a Gikuyu endeavor, the struggle quickly transcended Gikuyu borders
and spread throughout Kenya. The expansion of resistance beyond the Gikuyu
undermined colonial practice that
Confined African political organizations to single districts, which state
officials usually envisioned “a constellation of ethnically exclusive
14 Harris, 227.
15 Ibid., 227-228.




districts that incorporated deeply rooted, isolated, and mutually
antagonistic tribes.” This grid of districts overlay formerly autonomous
pre-colonial communities that did not fall under the authority of any
indigenous state. 18
Although the colonial government outlawed the Gikuyu Central Association in
1940, the post-1940 period represents the high tide of indigenous resistance in Kenya. In
1944 a small cadre of Africans, which included ex-slaves, organized the Kenya African
Union (KAU). In 1947 Kenyatta became the president of KAU and thereafter an icon of
Kenyan resistance to colonialism. According to Harris, the KAU provided the impetus
for more militant political action in the late 1 940s. The KAU excoriated the colonial
regime for “rising prices-low wages, increased unemployment, unused land in the ‘white
highlands’ while Africans were being evicted and sent to overcrowded reserves and
[generally insulted]” and intensified the masses dissatisfaction with colonial policies.19
The result of the increased protest and mobilization was the formation of the Kenya Land
and Freedom Army (the Mau Mau) and a fierce conflict in which 95 Europeans were
killed and over 13,000 Africans died. The colonial regime responded by intensifying its
suppression of the indigenous population, arresting Jorno Kenyatta, and instituting a
national emergency that lasted from 1952 to 1960.20 The timing of the increased violent
clashes is significant since Kenya would soon become an independent nation.
A very important variable that few political scientists account for is the role of
18 Haugerud, 40.
19 Harris, 228.
20 Jorno Kenyatta is commonly referred to as the leader of the “Mau Mau” however, Dedan
Kimathi was from all accounts the true leader of the Kenya Land and Freedom Army. In fact, the British
made Kirnathi’s capture a priority and eventually hung him. Ostensibly, the capture and murder of Kirnathi
ended the “Mau Mau” rebellion.
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women in Africa’s struggle against European hegemony. Cora Ann Presley provides
some insight into women’s contribution to Kenyan struggle:
First, the British colonial government was quite aware of the potential
power of women. District commissioners in their annual reports frequently
chronicled individual female activity. . . second, through the collection of
oral data, it has become evident that there was a nucleus of women who
took as their task the organization of rural resistance to colonialism in the
central province of Kenya.2 1
Between 1912 and 1930 Kenyan women protested the labor laws of the
government that stipulated African women and children must work in coffee estates and
government road projects. Women protested by supporting a petition of the East African
Association in 1919 and by utilizing protest songs. Protest songs combined with plays
and poetry, successfully limited colonial policies and helped lead to the success of
Kenyan activism. The arts were and to a large extent still are important components to
building political awareness in Kenya. Women would sing debasing songs about chiefs
who complied with the colonial regimes policies. The songs ranged from praising Harry
Thuku to assailing the policies of missionaries, who sought the prohibition of female
genital mutilation. Many Gikuyu women placed a great deal of significance on female
genital mutilation because it symbolized a transition to womanhood. Thus, in the minds
of many Kenyans, an attack on the practice equated to an attack on Gikuyu culture.
Resistance by Gikuyu women empowered other African women in Kenya and the
collective Kenyan African community. The central role played by Gikuyu women was
manifested in the “Mau Mau” rebellion. Gikuyu women led the oath taking ceremonies,
21 Gary Okihiro, ed., In Resistance: Studies in African, Caribbean and Afro-A merican History
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1986), 53.
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where initiates pledged never to sell Gikuyu soil, nor report Africans to Europeans, and to
give their lifelong allegiance to the “Mau Mau.” The story of activist Kenyan women in
many ways is a departure from standard descriptions of African resistance to colonialism.
More importantly, it underscores how indigenous Africans viewed their relationship to
the land and its significance to their cultural practices. Consequently, in our examination
of the power of IFC on African development, the ability of the indigenous Kenyans to
reclaim their land and cultural practices registers as a significant means of describing this
relationship.
Independence
Immanuel Wallerstein argues that “In any changing society it is always those who
rule that hang onto the best of what is left of the old order, and at the same time take the
best of what is offered by the new, [leading in time to] a considerable diversification.”22
The constant push for independence by the Gikuyu, particularly the Mau Mau,
created an interesting dialectic whereby the colonial regime was forced to respond in
ways other than sheer violence. Kenya, as many African countries, was increasingly
becoming ungovernable. The result was that the colonial government in the 1 950s
introduced limited land reform, educational opportunities to create an African intellectual
elite (i.e. a buffer class), and granted indigenous Africans the franchise in 1956. The
significant point is that the British had to create a governing class that would provide an
open environment for capital. This was exceedingly necessary since the struggle for
independence in Kenya had produced dynamic. charismatic leadership. In this vein,
22 Owen Lattimore, ed., Inner Asian Frontiers ofChina (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962).
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indigenous leadership in Kenya reflected the type of leaders that came to the fore
throughout Africa and the “Third World.” Ainilcar Cabral, Kwarne Nkrumah, Julius
Nyerere, Fidel Castro, Ché Guevara and others are some of the more prominent names
from this international progressive leadership. Aside from the oft-mentioned Kenyatta.
the struggle in Kenya produced Tom Mboya, Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, Oginga Odinga, and
many others. Mboya was a dynamic young leader of the Kenya Federation of Labor. He
worked on several fronts challenging white supremacy at every step. His leadership
tactics included leading protests for human labor laws, petitioning for the redistribution
of indigenous land, and serving as a strong advocate of Pan-Africanism. It was during
Kenyatta’s incarceration that Mboya, along with Odinga, formed the Kenya African
National Union. KANU was comprised of the larger ethnic groups in Kenya — the
Gikuyu, Luo, and Kamba. The power created by this alliance carried KANU to victory in
the election of 1961 and consequently led to KANU demanding the release of Jomo
Kenyatta. These developments led to Kenya’s declaration of independence in December
1963.23 However, it immediately became clear that “independence” would have to
respond to the interests of capital:
In order to avoid labour rebellions in the colonies, Lord Hailey argued, it
was necessary to organize appropriate industrial relations between
employers and workers. Such relations could not be developed unless
trade unionism — guided unionism — was allowed. The same argument was
advanced with regard to the demands of the African nationalists; if they
could be brought in to share power an be responsible, their political
enthusiasm could be converted from rebellion.., to political responsibility
within the empire’s global economic goals... colonial progress, hand in
hand with the formation of a “responsible middle class” which could
guarantee capital investment in and profit repatriation from the colonies
23 Harris, 228-230.
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afler independence. . . was the essence of neo-colonialism.24
The strong point of colonial activity in Kenya was a result of their clearing the
way for international finance capital. In order for the colonizers to augment their iron
grip on Kenya, duplicity had to be maintained between the white settlers and the British
government. The nature of this duplicitous arrangement was that subsidies were granted
to the settlers, while oppressive laws generated a market of cheap labor. In fact, the
African peasant producers contributed more to the economy than the settlers. However,
settler needs remained the only priority of the colonial regime. It was as early as 1905
that ilTiport-export houses were established to suit the settler consumers’ needs and for
Kenya to supply Consumer goods throughout the East African region.25 Before long, in
response to the period of increased rebellion, the colonial government created “The
Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940” to co-opt colonial nationalists by
consolidating colonial interests with a new “petty bourgeoisie” class. Therefore, the
granting of independence in no way signified the end of Western dominance.
Unfortunately, Kenyatta assured the “former” colonial regime that unlike Cuba,
nationalization would not take place in Kenya. This move by Kenyatta certainly resulted
from a recognition not only of the global context of which Kenya operated but the
trajectory along which the international economy was going. This assurance went beyond
rhetoric as a Foreign Investment Protection Act (1964) was implemented one year into
independence. This act granted foreign investors a “certificate of approved enterprise,”




which ostensibly would further the development of Kenya. The act provided companies
with the right to “repatriate profits, loans, interest on their loans and the approved
proportion of the net proceeds of sale of all or any part of the approved enterprise.”26
The colonial government had succeeded in creating a buffer class that was closely linked
to the objectives of international finance capital. This new class overwhelmingly held
positions within the new independent government. The problem was exacerbated by
Kenya being a one-party state.
Kenya remained a one-party state until 1966, when Odinga resigned from the
vice-presidency and formed the Kenya People’s Union (KPU). During this turbulent
period, Kenya experienced marked growth to their economy, which led western observers
and investors to applaud their “transition.” The two-party Kenyan state was short-lived
as Odinga was arrested in 1 69 and trade union leader and government minister, Ton
Mboya, was assassinated. During this period political power coalesced around Jomo
Kenyatta and the Kenya African National Union. Kenyatta effectively led Kenya as a
one-party state until his death in 1978.
The transition from Kenyatta to Daniel Arap Moi hastened the decline of good
governance or what was left of good governance. Although Kenya became increasingly
corrupt, this did not initially hinder Nairobi from becoming the leading industrial and
commercial center in East Africa. In theory the standard of living is changed when the
pattern of production shifts front the agricultural sector to the industrial sector and when
there is a shift front labor-intensive labor to capital-intensive labor. Yet this did not
26 Ibid., 21.
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increase the standard of living for most Kenyans. Table 6.1 illustrates the decrease in
private capital flows and foreign direct investment:
Table 6.1 Kenya Aid and Financial Flows (millions of dollars) Net private capital flows,
foreign direct investment, and external debt (present value % of GDP)
1990 1997 1990 1997 1990 1997 1997
124 -87 57 20 7,056 6,486 49
Source: Data from The World Batik, Entering the 2]’ Centwy World Development Report
1999/2000
(Oxford: Oxford University Press/The World Bank, 2000), 270.
Table 6.1 clearly shows a decrease in capital flows, although it must be pointed out that
donors did not withdraw en masse until 1997. The hesitancy for donors to leave Kenya
probably resulted from Kenya’s attempt at a liberal trading regime. The government
made a conscious effort to create an open if not always transparent trading regime. In
order to attract investment:
Kenya has a relatively long history of structural reforms to liberalise its
economy. Earlier reforms included the removal of quantitative import and
price controls, the abolition of foreign exchange controls and the revision
of labour laws to make them more flexible and in line with private sector
requirements.27
Kenyan leadership gained a reputation for institutionalizing corruption. During
the period of enhanced liberal reform, Daniel Arap Moi was the president. Moi’s regime,
without exaggeration, was corrupt to its core. Although Kenya did not become officially
become a one-party state until 1982, it had operated as a one-party state during the
leadership of Kenyatta. Kenyans were not only damaged by corruption, but by investors




Table 6.2 GNI Per Capita-
Kenya
1980 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000
01
440 330 250 250 260 320 350 360 360 250 350
Source: Data from African Development Indicators 2003 (World Bank, 2003).
By 2001 the total debt per capita was $190.00, which means that the average
Kenyan was barely out of debt. However, that is misleading when we take into account
the average monthly earning in the various industries:
Table 6.3. Wages in Kenya 1980— 1997
Occupation 1980 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
97
Agriculture 59 53 48 47 45 --- --- ---
39
Manufacturing 169 139 136 134 121 --- --- ---
94
Mining 157 104 106 101 93 --- --- ---
96
Construction 133 98 96 99 95 --- --- ---
80
Source: Data from African Development Indicators 2003 (World Bank, 2003).
The above is a stark contrast to the GNI for Kenya. One can see that the average
Kenyan income was well below the GNI. In fact, 52 per cent of Kenyans “live below the
poverty line of one U.S dollar a day.” As in most cases, poverty is experienced more in
rural areas where little development has taken hold. Much of the Kenyan poverty can be
attributed to corruption. Following the leadership’s protracted acknowledgement of the
need for reform and went to multiparty (1991) elections, Kenya still received $6 billion
FDI in 1992 and $2 billion in 1993.
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Conclusion
Kenya was situated during the colonial era as a benefactor of colonial interests.
Kenya, as did many African countries, developed in the context of colonial oppression.
This factor led to two developments: (1) the creation of an indigenous elite allied to
neocolonial interests and (2) the indigenous struggle for the right to self-determination.
These two realities came to a head during the Kenyatta era and resulted in the neocolonial
indigenous elite routing any hopes of uncompromi sed indigenous development.
Rather than “set forth a new man and woman” as Fanon offered, Kenyan society
gradually transformed into one with large gaps between the haves and have-nots. That
development was in concurrence with Kenya creating Free Trade Zones (EPZ’s),
protecting foreign businesses with the foreign Investment Protection Act, and broadly
embracing the neoliberal agenda of clearing the path for IFC. The desire to attract IFC
resulted in an unwillingness to work through the process of diversifying their economy.
Thus, as any textbook on international economics explains, reliance on agriculture as a
primary means of developing results in opening the economy to the vagaries of the
market. These come in many forms such as, bad weather, poor international prices of
agricultural commodities, poor infrastructure, drought, poor crop husbandry, and high
cost of farm inputs all wrecked havoc on the Kenyan economy and particularly those who
could ill-afford it the most.
In the final analysis, Kenya “developed” into a country where the richest 1 0% had
a 36.1% share of the income and the richest 20% had a 5 1.2% share. By 1999 27% of
1 —
1)3
Kenya’s population lived under one U.S. dollar a day. By 2001, 50% of Kenya’s
population lived under the poverty line ($2 a day). By any standard, Kenya’s integration
in the international economy has been an abysmal failure. While corruption certainly is
responsible, it could not have taken place without a duplicitous arrangement between
Kenya’s leaders and the international financial community.
CHAPTER SEVEN
NIGERIA
When the colonial state was terminated in October 1960, most Nigerians
associated the transition with progress and thought that the end of
underdevelopment was in sight.. . Most of the economic and social indicators were
interpreted as positive; Nigeria was Africa’s largest country, with a population of
55.6 million; it was Africa’s largest single market, with a strategic location and an
endowment of rich mineral and agricultural resources on which many industries
could be built; it had a rapidly expanding population with an increasing standard
of living and a definite demand for “sophisticated product of science and
industrialization”; the people were innovative, enterprising, and ready for
change... .and all sectors of the economy were capable of expansion.
-Toyin Falola, A History ofNigeria
Introduction
Discussion regarding Africa’s potential as a global political, economic, and
cultural force has persisted for decades. People from various settings, particularly
African people, are quick to point to the continent’s vast resources - many of which are
untapped — as a way of countering the pessimistic attitude toward the present. Further,
many look backward to the Garvey movement and Black power movement in the United
States as well as the Black consciousness movement spearheaded by Steve Biko to
promote the view that Africa had and has vast potential. In that vein, attempts to grapple
with the continenf s present status are often accompanied by an inveterate focus on
Africa’s past glories. To be sure this research seeks to illuminate future possibilities after
critically examining pre-colonial developments. With the above in mind, it is no
exaggeration to say that Nigeria provides the best example of a country with a glorious
past and promising future. Contextually, Nigeria serves as a microcosm of Africa.
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Nigeria presents us with the opportunity to observe a country with a far-reaching and
notable pre-colonial past; an example of indigenous resistance to imperialism; a tragic
victim of European colonialism and the arbitrariness of boundaries that accompanied that
venture; and finally, a disjointed effort to assert itself as a political, economic, and
cultural power.
Historical Context
Nigeria has an extremely rich history that dates far back into the pre-Christian era.
Nok civilization noted for its agricultural development and tool-making industries existed
around 900 B.C. Nok culture was the source of much of the trading and communication
between an assortment of West African communities in the forest and savannah regions.
The cultural vibrancy that flourished in that region gave birth to numerous groups that
cultivated their own particular identity. Oddly enough, the combination of a rich cultural
tradition and the development of many independent groups have created significant
problems in creating a Nigerian identity that supercedes any other identity. More than
250 ethnic groups live in Nigeria today and are all victims of British imperialism in one
way or another.
The British first established a protectorate on the coast in 185 1, setting in motion
Nigeria’s introduction to colonialism, although Nigeria proper was not created until 1914.
To be sure, 1851 does not represent the first contact between Nigerians and Europeans.
Nigerians were regularly enslaved and exported to the Americas from the 1601 to the 19th
centuries. I The modification of Nigeria’s role in the world system was a reaction to
I L. I. Izuakor, “Patterns of Pre-Colonial Exploitation” in Britain and Nigeria: Exploitation or
Development? Edited by Toyin Falola
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British policy towards slavery in the 19 century. While slavery became morally
repugnant to Westerners, other modes of domination, became more feasible and were
seen as morally justifiable:
It is possible to discern two distinct changes in the British pattern of
exploitation of Nigeria during the period 1830-1900. The first was the
shift from the slave — to ‘legitimate’ trade. This was facilitated greatly by
the suppression of the slave trade and slavery throughout the British
Empire. The second change concerned the gradual shift of the ‘frontier of
opportunity from the coast to the hinterland. The successful penetration
of the hinterland by the British was facilitated by the invention of the
steamship and by the use of quinine as an antidote to malaria fever.2
Nigeria, along with the Gold Coast, Niger, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia (West
Africa) became a central location for British imperialism in Africa. The strategic shift
from exporting slave labor transformed into exporting palm oil so quickly that the Niger
delta region became known as the Oil Rivers.3 That name would take on an entirely new
meaning in post-colonial Nigeria. In addition to the transition to palm oil as the new
major product, the economic transformation included the export of native cloths, cotton.
and ivory.4 As important to British imperial strategy during the time was the installation
of what Ake called the “monetisation process.” The process began with the importation
of silver coins from England, which gradually created dependence on British currency,
culminating in the introduction of paper currency in 1916.5 As the case with other
African countries, indigenous currency or forms of barter were outlawed and British
currency was the only accepted means of carrying out financial transactions. The
2 Ibid., 41.




successful transition from slave and barter trade to wage labor was now complete. The
British were able to assuage the moral sensibilities of their public while continuing to
exploit African labor and resources to their benefit. But the transition was not
simply a matter of legislating particular practices. British multinational firms would play
a central role in transforming the Nigerian economy.
British multinational firms that were consolidated in 1879 into the United African
Company by Sir George Taubman Goldie carried out the colonization of Nigeria. Goldie
structured a duplicitous relationship between the company and indigenous African chiefs.
Goldie was able to carry out his plans because of the wars occurring in the region. The
more prominent conflicts were the Fulani versus Hausa and wars in Yorubaland. These
wars reflected a strong commitment to ethnic identity and allowed for the relatively
seamless cooptation of local leaders. The cooptation was so thorough that Julius
Ihonvbere and Toyin Falola state “By 1900. the subjugation of the pre-colonial power
elites, and the incorporation of the Nigerian formation into the world capitalist system
was cornplete.”6
The cooptation of Nigeria into the larger world system was aided by the
proletarianization of the peasants. Following the introduction of British currency,
Nigerian peasants were relegated to becoming cheap wage laborers for British colonists.
Additionally, as was the case with all the colonizer— colonized relationships, taxes had to
be paid in the new currency as a way of compelling the colonized to use the new
currency. Later during the period of colonization, marketing boards were introduced to
6FaIola and Ihonvbere. 205.
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further entrench Nigerians within this particular mode of domination. Marketing boards
set prices and created a monopoly over production. The lack of any viable alternative for
Nigerian farmers left them super-exploited. In fact, “The British colonial state in Nigeria
made a 733 percent profit on peanuts and a 559 percent profit on palm oil, of which little
or none was passed along to the African producers.”7 Thus, it may be incorrect to even
characterize the colonial process as the illusion of economic development. Very little
pretense was made that indigenous Africans were benefiting from this process. The
formation of marketing boards set in motion a process of underdeveloping the Nigerian
agriculture industry, which has yet to recover, particularly once the variable of mining
was added to the equation. Chima J. Korieh provides an excellent summary of the impact
of marketing boards in Nigeria:
The repressive actions of the marketing boards exacerbated the agricultural crisis
because farmers were unwilling to re-invest in agriculture. The dilemma faced by
the peasant producers led to the dramatic decline in the officially marketed output
of crops for export in Nigeria. while the world market price for these products
was rising. Low producer prices and the instability in the markets created
conditions that led many farmers to abandon extensive commercial agriculture.
As a result of the contradiction inherent in the activities of the marketing boards,
they were abolished in June 1986 in Nigeria.8
Independence
The agricultural industry has deteriorated from its once dominant role in the
economy to playing second fiddle to the mining industry. The government made a
strategic decision to focus on encouraging foreign direct investment in the mining
industry by creating an open climate for private investors. The added focus on mining
7 Schraeder, 110.
8 Chima J. Korieh, “Agriculture,” in Africa: Volume 5 Continental Africa (North Carolina:




was coupled with a waning interest in developing the agricultural sector and decreased
prices for agricultural resources to underdevelop the agricultural industry. Consequently,
the agricultural percentage of GDP was in steady decline by 1980.
Table 7.1 Major Components of the GDP of Nigeria (In percentages 1960— 1980)
1960 1964 1968 1972 1976
Agr. Forestry 63.4 57.6 55.0 32.0 27.3
& Fishing
Mining/Quarryingo.9 2.0 2.7 39.3 27.3 21.1
Manufacturing
& Crafts 3.6 5.6 7.6 4.1 5.6 5.9
Electricity
& Water Supply 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3
Building &
Construction 3.0 4.4 4.9 4.1 10.9 15.9
Distribution 9.1 13.6 13.7 8.1 20.9 20.0
Transport &
Communication 4.4 5.0 3.9 3.9 3.5 3.2
General Govt. 4.1 3.6 3.3 5.5 ----
Education 2.6 2.6 3.2 2.6 5.9 5.4
Table 7.1 Continued
Health 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6
Other Services 1.9 2.0 3.2 1.4 2.7 3.1
Source: Data from I. N. Obasi, “The Domestic Dimensions of the Nigerian Economy 1960-
1985,” in U. J. Ugwu and R. Omotayo Olaniyan, eds., Nigeria’s International Economic
Relations: Dimensions of Dependence and Change (Lagos, Nigeria: Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs, 1989), 4.
The development of the oil industry presented a windfall to the petit bourgeoisie
and foreign investors. Soon after the discovery of oil an arrangement was concocted
between some of the Nigerian elite and oil companies, which granted concessions above
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and beyond anything the oil companies generally received from other countries.9 Their
ability to profit was in great part due to an oil boom from 1959 to 1981. Table 7.1 above
illustrates how much weight oil came to have in the economy and the corresponding
undevelopment of the agricultural sector. While it may be easy to criticize the corrupt
regimes, a more likely explanation is proffered by development macroeconomics by a
phenomenon labeled “Dutch Disease.” Simply put, the sector in the economy that
experiences a boom “raises expenditures on both internationally tradeable and
nontradeable goods but enhances oniy the supply of tradeables (through imports).” The
price in the nontradeable oil sector, in this case export crop agriculture, is raised and
creates new problems since “in the 1 960s crops such as cocoa, oil, palm, and rubber were
the principal source of export revenue.” 10 The following provides an example of the
“Dutch Disease”:
As Moisés Nairn, a former Venezuelan trade minister, explains in the
current issue of the magazine Foreign Policy. “An economy that relies
mostly on oil exports inevitably ends up with an exchange rate that makes
imported goods lcss expensive and exports more costly.” Agriculture,
mining and tourism, he says, become less internationally
competitive.”.. .Only when a country has a strong democracy, a large
economy and an effective public sector. as in Norway and the United
States, has oil not been a seriously distorting factor. The developing
countries that have really made it, notably those in Southeast Asia, have
lacked oil — and. often. other natural resources. I
As the case with many African countries, the profits from the oil boom were not
9 Segun 0. Osaba, “The Economic Background of Balewa’s Foreign Policy, 1960-1965” in
Nigeria and the International Capitalist Si’stem (Boulder, Cob.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988). 19.
10 David L. Bevan, Paul Collier, and Jan Willem Gunning, The Political Economy ofPoverty,
Equity, and Growth: Nigeria and Indonesia (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999), 50.
II Jonathan Power. The gift that corrupts: Nigeria’s struggles against the curse of oil,” in the
International Herald Tribune (Opinion, January 8, 2004).
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redistributed in an effort toward a more equitable society. Only the elite, primarily the
military elite, benefited economically from the oil boom. Urban workers received a
slight improvement in their pay and more money was earmarked for education and
healthcare. Unfortunately, during the period of the oil glut in the late 1970s (1978),
expenditures on education were not adjusted to be commensurate with the economic
reality. Rather, support of education was used as a political maneuver to retain the
tenuous support of the masses. However, the decision to maintain the spending levels for
education and healthcare were not carried out in a vacuum.
The context within which Nigeria had to develop dramatically changed during the
Second Republic, which was a civilian government led by Shehu Shagari (1979-1983). It
was during this period that the Nigerian economy would deteriorate to a point that
facilitated the interposition of external development plans into Nigerian development
schemes. The neglect of agriculture and an inability to diversify their economy since the
oil discoveries came to a head with the end of the oil boom in 1981. From 1978 to 1982
Nigeria’s foreign debt increased from 3.3 billion naira to 14.7 billion naira. Strangely
enough. government spending increased over the same period. 12 Increased spending as
the debt increases would not be strange for a society with high-growth. However, an
underdeveloped society, such as Nigeria, should not increase spending as its debts rise.
The larger context that Nigeria was trying to develop is best understood as a struggle
between development ideologies. African countries had adopted the Lagos Plan of
Action in 1980, which “was a decision for restructuring African economies on two
l2Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Nigeria: A Countiy Study (Federal Research Division, Library of
Congress, I 992), passirn.
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principles: self-reliance (national and collective) and self-sustaining development.”13
The Lagos Plan of Action was an effort by African countries, under the auspices of the
OAU, to have a meaningful sovereignty and was clearly a part of the objective of the
Non-aligned Movement to secure greater independence for its members. African
countries, like other underdeveloped nations, attempted to diversify their economies,
develop their human resources by increasing their social service expenditures, and
demand a more congenial international trading environment. The Lagos Plan of Action,
which was highly critical of the western highly industrial countries, was in direct conflict
with the Berg Report by the World Bank, which placed a significantly larger share of the
burden on underdeveloped countries. The Berg Report focused on more openness, less
corruption, and a greater focus on exploiting their comparative advantage in natural
resources. Privatization was demanded, whereas greater expenditures on education and
healthcare were frowned upon. Regardless of the contours of the debate, Nigeria faced a
serious problem with institutionalized corruption.
It would be incorrect to define one period following independence as more
corrupt than another period. An examination of Nigeria’s history reveals a
preponderance of corrupt regimes both civilian and military. This becomes even more
noteworthy ‘hen we consider Nigeria’s plight during the 1980s. The equity gap
worsened during this period, social services were stretched, and the access for IFC was
open. By 1980 per capita income in Nigeria was $1,500.00, which for Africa was
excellent. But the collapse of oil prices led to the dramatic decline of Nigeria’s GDP.
13 Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa, 23.
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The GDP had grown in 1980 2.9%. However, from 1981 — 1984 there was a decline,
which hit its highest point at -4.9 in 1983 and -4.8 in 1984.14 The inflow of International
Finance Capital for 1980 is mixed. There was a significant decline in FDI (Table 7.2) but
the net flows of long and short term loans (Table 7.3) were significant. The decline in
FDI however, is consistent with the experience of developing countries in general.
Agenor and Montiel operationalize this period in three stages:
(1) 1978-198 1 —Represents a surge in capital inflows
(2) 1982-1989 — Represents the period of the debt crisis
(3) 1990-1994--Represents a new resurgence in capital inflows.15
Agenor’s and Montiel’s format is consistent with Nigeria’s experience in
attracting FDJ, which had resurgence in the 1990s (Table 7.2).
Table 7.2 Net Foreign Direct Investment (millions of US_dollars)
1980 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01
-739 714 581 588 677 760 1,539 1,220 1,472 1,374 1,800
Source: Data from African Development Indicators 2003 (World Bank. 2003).
Table 7.3 Net Flows: Long and Short-term loans, including_IMF
1980 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01
2,780 -708 -472 -660 -559 -1,334 -663 -279 -385 -696 -1,417
Source: Data from African Development Indicators 2003(World Bank, 2003).
The increase of FDI in the 1990s was offset by the decrease in Net Flows. Thus,
there is no corresponding rise in the income or percentage of people advancing out of
poverty. Table 7.4 reveals a miniscule change in income per capita during the 1 990s and
a glaring inability to return to 1980 levels.
14 Gary Moser, Scott Rogers, and Reinold van Til, Nigeria: Experience with Structural
A djustment (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1997), 9.
15 Agenor and Montiel. 576-578.
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Table 7.4 Gross National Income Per Capita
1980 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01
780 290 240 220 210 250 270 260 250 260 290
Source: Data from African Development Indicators 2003 (World Bank, 2003).
The stagnation in the GNI per capita is particularly problematic since Nigeria has
experienced severe inflation since 1985. In not so ironic fashion, the leading
international funding institutions were able to implement SAPs beginning in 1986 under
the Babaginda regime. To stretch the irony further, whereas the IFIs call for democratic
regimes, they were content to negotiate with the second consecutive regime installed by
way of coup. This appears to be a trend in Africa. International Finance Capital on the
face of it benefited from military coups. As documented earlier, African nations in
general and Nigeria in particular, attempted to focus on a progressive development
strategy in the late 1970s and viewed social services as an important conduit for
development. However, movements that were at minimum progressive rhetorically
produced counterrevolutionary acts. Thus, progressive forces. minute as they may be.
were eliminated and internal divisions debilitated the ability of African states to develop.
The collapse of civilian govermrient coupled with the debt crisis to provide entrée to the
neoliberal agenda to thwart any vestiges of Keynesianism, Marxism, or any variant of
Third World self-reliance. In Nigeria, the civilian government of Shagari (1979-1983),
rife with corruption, was overthrown by Major General Muhammadu Buhari in 1983.
After only being willing to denounce corruption rhetorically, Buhari in turn was
overthrown by Major General Ibrahirn Babaginda in 1985. The IMF was in discussions
with Buhari about an SAP but the masses were against the conditions required by the
IMF. Two major mass-based organizations, the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria
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(MAN) and the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) led the protests against the Structural
Adjustment Programs.
The government responded with wage freezes and bans on further strikes.
In an unusually bellicose move on May Day 1987, the NLC demonstrated
vigorously against Structural Adjustment Program policies during a
celebration at the national stadium in Lagos. Shortly thereafter the
government rescinded its decision to abolish the minimum wage in firms
employing fewer than 500 workers... Still, the economic downturn in the
1 980s caused the NLC to lose influence, given the large number of layoffs
and sharp decline in real wages.16
The Babaginda regime represented one of the worst periods of corruption in
Nigerian post-colonial history. Billions of dollars were unaccounted for and the best
example of the duplicitous relationship between IFC and African governments played
itself out during the Babaginda administration. The partnership between the Nigerian
government and Royal! Dutch Shell Oil resulted in the judicial murder of Ken Saro
Wiwa. It was “the Ogonis [that] constituted a threat to those who ran Nigeria. By
targeting the oil industry, the fountain of more than 90 percent of Nigeria’s export
earnings, they had tweaked the vital artery that kept the heart of military rule beating.” 17
To be fair, it was the Abacha regime that carried out the hanging of Saro-Wiwa. But
even in this context, one in which the military continually dominated political life and
where the killing of Saro-Wiwa led to an international chorus denouncing the Abacha
regime, IFC continued to find a place in Nigeria. Table 7.5 illustrates that the inflow of
FDT continued to increase through the Babaginda and Abacha regimes.
Table 7.5 Major FDT indicators (Millions of Dollars)
1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2001
Inflows 205 -739 588 L079 930 1,104
l6Aborisade and Mundt. 143-144.
l7Maier, 76.
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Inward Stock 0 2,405 8.072 14,065 20,184 21,289
Source: Data from African Development Indicators 2003 (World Bank, 2003).
The increase in 2000 and 2001 is a reflection of the “pressure to deliver a
‘democracy dividend’,” as the newly elected Obasanjo regime increased government
spending as a result of an oil windfall in late 1999 and early 2001. Prices for a barrel of
oil increased from $18 per barrel to $28 a barrel in 2001. Again the sharp rise in the oil
sector led to a corresponding decrease in the agricultural sector. In fact, agriculture was
not the only sector to experience a drop-off. The service sector, which accounted for 30.1
percent of GDP in 1999 declined to 27.1 percent in 2000. The manufacturing sector,
which accounted for 3.5 percent in 1999 decreased to “less than 1 percent in 2000.”18
The decline in these sectors however was not associated with a decline in private
investment. In 2000 FDI increased to 12 percent of the GDP after “fall[ing] to a low of
3.7 percent of GDP in 1998.”19
The increase in private investment reflects two political and economic realities
enveloping Nigeria and Africa at the time: privatization and democratization. Because of
Nigeria’s notorious history of military dictatorships, corruption, and civil unrest, the
Obasanjo regime came into power on an overtly democratic agenda. Obasanjo forced
several military officials into retirement, attempted to seize funds stolen during the
Abacha regime, and re-established good relations with the IMF.20 This last characteristic
is particularly important since a good relationship with the IMF/World Bank helped to
reschedule Nigeria’s debt. “Nigeria has been carrying out a three-phase privatization
1 8 African Economic Outlook, 244.
19 Ibid., 244.
20 Aborisade and Mundt. 2 14-215.
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program since July 1999” and a significant sector for Nigeria that will provide a
competitive advantage over other African countries, is the strength of its financial
sector.2 I Liberalizing this sector is critical, particularly in light of the Uruguay Round of
trade negotiations which focused on opening up and expanding trade in financial
services. This is of particular salience since the trade in derivatives has increased at a
remarkable pace in the 1 990s and most highly developed nations are now preoccupied
with portfolio investment. The East Asian countries and some Latin American countries
have been able to stake their claim to portfolio investment but it remains scarce in Africa.
Nigeria’s willingness and ability to exploit its advantage of being one of the few African
nations with “an active stock exchange”22 may result in their ability to attract portfolio
investment. Challenges abound in this arena as well. As with much of the process of
attracting international finance capital, it is often uneven in its purported benefits. As
Joseph Stiglitz points out “financial service liberalization was arguably even harmful to
some developing countries: as large international banks squelched local competitors, the
funds they garnered would be channeled to the international firms with which they felt
comfortable, not the small and medium-sized local firms.”23
Nigeria under the stewardship of Olusegun Obasanjo has clearly distanced itself
from the Abacha era. Its openness to international investment has without a doubt
impressed foreign investors and the major international funding institutions. But a blight
remains even in these more optimistic times for Nigeria. Although the economy has
2 lAfrican Economic Outlook, 250.
22 Ibid.. 250.
23 Joseph Stiglitz. The Roaring Nineties: A New Histoy on the World’s Most Prosperous Decade
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 2003), 206.
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benefited from a surge in oil prices and increased government spending, by 2000 70
percent of the population was living under usSl a day. The majority of those in poverty,
as with most African countries, were in the rural areas.24 The continued advancement of
trade liberalization may further agitate this problem since few Nigerian’s are able to
benefit from the sectors being liberalized. Table 7.7 demonstrates the extreme inequality
that characterizes Nigerian socio-economic life.Table 7.7 Share of Income held by
population groups
Richest 10% (1986-1999) Richest 20% Poorest 10% Poorest 20%
40.8 55.7 1.6 4.4
Source: Data from African Development Indicators 2003 (World Bank, 2003).
The persistence of intractable poverty disproportionately impacts women and children in
Nigeria. In 2001 36.6 percent of the labor force was female and 23.5 percent of the labor
force consisted of children under the age of 14.
None of this has stopped Shell, Chevron, or Exxon-Mobil from investing in
Nigeria. The record of these companies, most notably Royal Dutch Shell, is well-known.
These foreign companies have continued their operations even in light of negative
publicity for quite some time:
The first discovery of commercial quantities of oil in Nigeria was in 1956;
today, the country produces approximately two million barrels per day
(bpd) of crude oil. Estimates of Nigeria’s oil reserves vary from sixteen to
twenty-two billion barrels, mostly found in small fields in the coastal areas
of the Niger Delta. According to the Nigerian constitution, all minerals,
oil, and gas belong to the Nigerian federal government, which negotiates
the terms of oil production with international oil companies. Most
exploration and production activities in Nigeria are carried out by
European and U.S. oil companies operating joint ventures in which the
241n fact, according to the African Economic Oullook “Almost 90 per cent of Nigeria’s core poor
were engaged in agriculture.. while 58 per cent of the urban population were living in poverty.”
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Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). the state oil company,
owns 55 or 60 percent; more recent contracts relating to offshore fields
have been structured rather as “production sharing contracts” in which the
government is not a formal partner. Shell operates a joint venture that
produces close to one half of Nigeria’s crude production; Mobil, Chevron,
Elf, Agip, and Texaco operate other joint ventures, and a range of
international and national oil companies operate smaller concessions.25
Furthermore:
Nevertheless, oil production itself and oil-based industrial expansion have
transformed the local economy, and some in the oil producing
communities have benefited greatly from oil production. Those with full
time employment in the oil industry are paid high wages for skilled work,
but they are a well-paid minority surrounded by a mass of un- or
underemployed; most do not come from the oil producing communities in
any event. Contractors to the oil industry, often traditional leaders or those
with close links to the military administrations of the oil producing states,
also potentially make large amounts of money, often increased by the
widescale corruption surrounding the award of contracts for construction
and other oil industry projects—from which those in the oil companies in
charge of the choice of contractor also benefit. Development spending by
the oil companies has also brought schools, clinics, and other
infrastructure to remote parts of the country that might otherwise be far
more marginalized by the Nigerian government; but many of these
projects are inappropriate for the needs of the communities where they are
sited, and others are incomplete or shoddily carried out. Although a
minority of politicians, traditional leaders and contractors have become
rich on the spoils of oil, and hence support the oil industry’s activities, the
great majority of people from the minority ethnic groups of the oil
producing areas have remained impoverished; at the same time, the
potential benefits of links to the oil industry have exacerbated conflicts
within and among the oil producing communities.26
In Nigeria’s case, there seems to be no effort toward creating linkages and
meeting the local needs of the community. When creating linkages states seek to promote
policies that provide innovative technology to their countries, promote industrial and
25 Human Rights Watch. The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights
J”iolations in
Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities. http://hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/Nigew99 1-01 .htm#P 1908265
26 Ibid.
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educational policies, increases rather than decreases competition, and provides an
impetus for people to work. These factors have been notoriously missing from the
dynamic between the Nigerian government and the foreign oil companies. There is no
significant discussion concerning the protection of infant industries or requirements for
the transfer of technology. Further, local content requirements, which has been used by
many underdeveloped nations in the past, “they... are now being phased out as a result of
changes in host countries’ economic strategies (from protectionist to open strategies) and
of international commitments, in particular the 1995 WTO TRIMs Agreement.”27
Finally. Nigeria’s stock exchange increasingly accounts for larger percentages of
the nation’s Gross Domestic Product. In 1991 the stock exchange accounted for 6.88% of
the GDP and by 2001 it accounted for 11.26% of the GDP. The impacts are numerous: it
increases the attractiveness of Nigeria to investors, increases savings and investment (in
theory), but also increases deregulation and opens the economy up to speculators. Table
7.1 illustrated how traditional industries, specifically the agricultural industry began to
decrease in its portion of the economy. This fact, coupled with the growing importance of
the stock exchange, indicates an economy being driven by external factors. Substantially
the result will be increased unemployment, rise in black market activity, more organized
activity against the state (i.e. guerilla warfare), and coercive state responses.
Conclusion
Nigeria represents an example of an African country embracing International
Finance Capital and rejecting people centered development. It is very likely that as the
27 UNClAD, World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linkages (Switzerland: United Nations,
2001), 167.
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economy increasingly becomes driven by speculative capital that the society may devolve
into civil war. Because of the importance of Nigeria to the region and the continent, this
is a scenario that Africans can ill-afford. The opening-up of Nigeria’s financial sector to
international investor’s, coupled with an already volatile climate, particularly in the oil-
rich delta region, presents a very bleak outlook for change. Moreover, Nigeria’s problems
are generally couched in terms of governance, all the while underestimating the countries
relationship to international finance capital. The following is an extract from a february
2007 National Geographic expose on Nigerian oil. It is lengthy but captures the rerality
on the ground that is neglected, ignored, or the result of duplicity:
Oil fouls everything in southern Nigeria. It spills from the pipelines,
poisoning soil and water. It stains the hands of politicians and generals,
who siphon off its profits. It taints the ambitions of the young. who will try
anything to scoop up a share of the liquid riches—fire a gun. sabotage a
pipeline, kidnap a foreigner...J” igeria had all the makings of an uplifting
tale: poor African nation blessed with enormous sLidden wealth. Visions of
prosperity rose with the same force as the oil that first gushed from the
Niger Delt&s marshy ground in 1956. The world market craved delta
crude, a “sweet,” low—sulfur liquid called Bonny Light, easily refined into
gasoline and diesel. By the mid-1970s, Nigeria had joined OPEC’
(Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), and the governments
budget bulged with petrodollars Everything looked possible—but
everything went wrong.. ..Dense. garbage-heaped slums stretch for miles.
Choking black smoke from an open-air slaughterhouse rolls over
housetops. Streets are cratered with potholes and ruts. Vicious gangs roam
school grounds. Peddlers and beggars rush up to vehicles stalled in gas
lines. This is Port Harcourt, Nigeria’s oil hub, capital of Rivers state,
smack-dab in the middle of oil reserves bigger than the United States’ and
Mexico’s combined. Port Harcourt should gleam: instead, it rots... .Beyond
the city. within the labyrinth of creeks, rivers, and pipeline channels that
vein the delta—one of the world’s largest wetlands—exists a netherworld.
Villages and towns cling to the banks. little more than heaps of mud
walled huts and rusty shacks. Groups of hungry. half-naked children and
sullen, idle adults wander dirt paths. There is no electricity, no clean
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water, no medicine, no schools. Fishing nets hang dry; dugout canoes sit
unused on muddy banks. Decades of oil spills, acid rain from gas flares.
and the stripping away of mangroves for pipelines have killed off fish.28




But being paid,-what will compare with it? The urbane activity with which a man
receives money is really marvelous, considering that we so earnestly believe
money to be the root of all earthly ills, and that on no account can a monied man
enter heaven. Ah! How cheerfully we consign ourselves to perdition!
-Herman Melville, Moby Dick
In everyday life, people experience the effects of the market only through the
products they can no longer afford, interest rates that make buying a home or
improving a business impossible, the retrenchment of social welfare policies
(such as electrification for rural settlements), and a decline in the standard of
living.
-LiPuma and Lee, Financial Derivatives and the Globalization ofRisk
Introduction
Susan George, in reflecting on the radical shift from Keynesian and state-led
development to market-driven development, remarked that those living during the
Bretton Woods era would think the current Gods insane. During the Keynesian period it
was common practice to set limits on capital in order to protect citizens from the vagaries
of the market. Even in the midst of the Cold War, the United States, self-appointed savior
of all things free, saw fit to have a somewhat activist government — one that today’s
conservatives consider socialistic. Although that perspective is an exaggeration and
reflects a zealot-like commitment to laissez-faire, the international political and economic
environment has turned 180 degrees. As George points out, this turn was the result of a




there is such as a thing as T.LN.A and arguments about the end of ideology speaks to their
success. Furthermore, African countries rushing pell-mell to privatize, democratize, and
implement all things neoliberal, crystallizes the sterile nature of alternatives to financial
liberalization.
Interestingly enough, for some the current economic crisis may seem like groundhog day.
The U.S. government has been forced to once again become more interventionist. At the time of
this writing the second stimulus package passed congress where the Federal Reserve injects close
to a trillion dollars in to the economy. This follows the first bailout which effectively gave the
U.S. government a stake in some of the biggest private financial institutions (i.e. Bear Stearns
and AIG).
One must keep in mind that the ascendancy of international finance capital extends
beyond theoretical debates about the incorporation of neoliberal regimes. LiPuma and Lee argue
that the residual impact of speculative capital is an increase in abstract violence — violence often
not attributed to finance capital. While the physical violence of the state and against the state still
exists, more abstract forms of violence become sharper and more destructive as financial capital
gains in importance. This becomes particularly problematic since there is no material villain to
protest but an ethereal antagonist that disrupts access to healthcare, education, and shelter.
We are presently witnessing yet another financial crisis that has resulted from
unregulated markets. Financial derivates. in this case, credit default swaps are at the center of
this most recent financial nightmare. This nightmare is one that is hitting the United States and
European countries, hence the concern. In the United States, states are saddled with billions of
dollars in budget shortfalls. What is striking is the abstract violence that is hurting these countries
have plagued African countries for years. LiPuma and Lee presciently argued that “though it is
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the regional crises and spectacular corporate failures that periodically put derivatives on the front
page and internet banners, their social and economic effects are more pervasive and difficult to
determine.”
The information provided supports the two main hypotheses. The first argued that
between 1980 and 2001 IFC actually increased in African and we expected to find a decrease in
the ability of African countries to deliver health care, education, infrastructural development, and
equity. The second hypothesis argued that during this same period more African nations would
have embraced democracy, in its liberal variation, as opposed to social democracy.
All the case studies indicate the existence of domestic elites within African countries that
benefit from IFC while the masses continue to suffer and have little access to the relative benefits
of increased IFC. Botswana provides the best example of this because it has been applauded so
much for its tradition of democracy and peaceful transitions from one administration to the next.
The case study of Botswana highlights the government’s willingness to yield to the demands of
trans-national enterprises in order to attract investment. The GDP of Botswana has consistently
shown growth since independence. The government of Botswana has been able to leverage
Botswana’s plethora of resources, namely diamonds, to attract investors. However, the purported
benefits have not trickled down to the masses. The question then becomes — who is to blame? Do
we blame the elite or hold the arbiters of IFC accountable. Our argument here is that both should
be held accountable but increasing inequity will continue the more one opens the door to
International Finance Capital.
Much of the discussion surrounding strategies for development remain grounded in
previous notions of how countries develop, the stages of development, and generally how to
LiPuma and Lee, 4.
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build their infrastructure. While all of these have salience, it does not quite capture the essence of
how the world has been transformed. It is no longer possible or sensible to discuss African
development without understanding the role of IFC. Development cannot simply be understood
by bargaining with foreign companies and attracting FDJ. To be sure, that is not the only aspect
of development but one that was heavily emphasized just fifteen to twenty years ago. Now we
must understand derivatives and how this financial tool became so dominant in the international
market economy.
This study was an attempt to understand African development through the lens of the
phenomena of International Finance Capital. It is particularly significant since the period under
review, 1980 — 2001, represents a dynamic shift in capitalist production. However, even in this
context, the fundamental Marxian notion of capital remains not only relevant, but indispensable
for analyzing African development.
The thrust of this study develops from the hypothesis that the 1980-2001 period, over
determined as it was by neoliberal conceptions of development, has contributed to the further
underdevelopment of African countries. At root this study is concerned with how Africa enters
into the relationship with IFC- As a commodity, money, capital, investment, or profit (i.e.
surplus value)? We exposed the complexity of African engagement in the global economy and
the nuance required to understand its variations. The habit of procuring a simple and easy
analysis, whether from supporters of IFC or dyed-in-the-wool Marxists are insufficient. While
some are comfortable believing that corruption is keeping Africa from developing, the facts fail
to uphold that notion. Others are certainly convinced that increased IFC deepens African
oppression. The case studies provide examples that show there is truth to both sides.
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Nigeria and Kenya have both been ravaged by corruption and it is not a stretch to call
either a kieptocracy. In the case of Kenya investors jumped ship after years of legalized
corruption. In fact, much of the private investment that remained in the 1 990s was from local
private investors. Nigeria offers a different view of corruption simply because of Nigeria’s
abundance of oil, which is a much needed strategic resource.
African countries have adopted the There Is No Alternative (T.I.N.A) clarion call. While
many on the left, are more than willing to assess T.I.N.A. as mere ideological propaganda, the
fact is that African countries have roundly rejected socialism or other progressive ideologies. The
countries examined in this study all are opening up their economies to varying extents. Whereas
during the period of the Lagos Plan of Action some resistance was being marshaled against
unchecked free-market forces, today there is no substantive resistance from the leading policy
makers.
The language of resistance has moved from anti-colonialism to anti-imperialism to anti-
capitalism to anti-corruption. African leaders are viewed, by their own citizens and outsiders, as
the main obstacle for African development. No longer are external forces seen as the primary
fetter on African development.
In a sense Africa has devolved to a period when modernization theory was prevalent. Rather than
challenge the theory of modernization as in the past, it seems that most have bought into the idea
that alleviating corruption is the panacea for what ails African countries. Consequently. Rostow’s
stages of development, have now been accepted, even if only unconsciously. African countries
are no closer to “solving’ the riddle of development. In fact, there has been increased discourse
concerning “basic needs” rather than development.
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Other writers have called for an African solution to African problems but the government
officials are hell-bent on following the dictates of the neoliberal agenda. They have failed to
view T.I.N.A. as a narrative supporting western hegemony. Realistically a radical response
should not be expected. At minimum African countries, in concert with other underdeveloped
countries, should seek to implement capital controls and mandate a time frame for investors to
export capital. Some Asian nations have already implemented controls of this sort to varying
degrees of success.
Recommendations
Any meaningful long-term solutions must account for the following:
1- Institute a tax on foreign exchange transactions (whether it is the Tobin Tax or
something else).
a. Doing this will help but it may scare off some investors. However, it is a
trade-off that must be made. Too many African countries open their
economies to the point of incredulity and that simply cannot continue.
The Tobin Tax was proposed as a way to tax on trade of currency across
borders. It was viewed as a way to alleviate speculation in the
international currency markets. A particularly useful idea in the age of
deregulation.
2- Build-up domestic savings and investment
a. Too much income is used to service debt. Consequently, when crises arise
more debt is incurred and investment in the infrastructure is sorely
deficient.
3- Strengthen regional organizations in the areas of finance and trade
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a. A proposition that most leaders in Africa would agree with. Regional
organizations can attract more investment.
4- Develop local infrastructure and industries
a. Another protracted challenge. Import-substitution at one point was
viewed as a means of meeting this challenge. This has been the major
impediment of increased integration into the global economy. African
countries have not developed their local industries and infrastructure and
those that do invest in Africa, do very little by way of infrastructural
development. Requiring a percentage of profits to go to development of
the infrastructure is a start but one cannot get around the fact that local
industries must be protected in some shape, form, or fashion. It is a hard
sell in the present climate. vet the current international economic
meltdown may provide leverage for the protection for nascent industries
argument.
5- Strengthen legal systems to root out colTuption at the highest levels
a. Although there have been many platitudes about good governance, poor
leadership, corrupt leadership, remains a challenge. To be sure this
challenge is everywhere but most African economies are not large enough
to withstand corruption on a large scale. Here is where international
partners are guilty of duplicity. Cooperation through regimes such as
AGOA should have clauses in place that technology is transferred and a
ceiling is placed on how much profit is accrued by the leadership.
Tangible goals should have to be reached in terms of infrastructure
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development and programs to alleviate those most impoverished.
6- Create strategies to develop rural areas, agricultural industry, and employment
opportunities for women
7- Begin work on regional. continental, and international alternatives to current
system. Any alternative must be focused on sustainable development and the
equitable distribution of wealth.
a. This idea is not as far-fetched as it may seem. Anti-globalization scholars
and activists have grown more vocal and active over the past 10-15 years.
However, more scholars should incorporate this into their research
agenda. Rather than accept the existing paradigm, scholars should
challenge it at the gateway. It is only in this context that creativity and
new ideas about development will flourish. In short, KuIm’s normal
scientist should be thrown to the dustbins of history.
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